1980-2

To: Member Company Chief Executive Officers
From: Blake T. Newton, Jr., President, American Council of Life Insurance - Date: April 22, 1980

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss concerns about the liquidity conditions and the possibilities of future adverse developments.

  • The company people wanted to be sure that Mr. Volcker  <Chairman of the Federal Reserve> was fully aware of the potentials of the situation and to arrange a liaison between his staff and the staff of the Council. and this aim was accomplished.
  • In the meantime, we have begun to explore the means by which the resources of the business might be applied to alleviate any temporary extreme liquidity problems that might arise for a particular member company.  (p83-84)

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

<Paul Volcker: 1979–1987, Chairman of the Federal Reserve>

To: Commissioner William H.L. Woodyard, Arkansas
From: Commissioner Ed Birrane, Maryland
Date; June 15, 1980
Re: Federal Intervention in Insurance Regulation

  • A 'motion to reconsider later failed by about ten votes. It seems to me sad that we were unable to swing one vote or that the NAIC was not aware (evidently) of the activity here. This is precisely the situation which would be avoided with a Washington presence.
  • This amendment failed, however, due to poor draftsmanship, I am told by certain staff people in Washington. ·As it turned out, the House rejected the motion because they felt it would give State banking regulaton too much authority and the insurance regulators got lost in the shuffle. ·
    • Here again it would appear that an appropriate presence would have recognized the desire of the Congressmen to help us and we could have provided appropriate draft language in advance.  (p174-175)

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

  • Transparency is a concept imported by Spencer Kimball. Hart Hearings, supra 28, at 1086·1237, 1087·1088 - (testimony of Spencer Kimball);

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

  • REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE NAIC TASK FORCE ON LIFE INSURANCE PROFITABILITY
  • Summary of Record Hearing Before the NAIC Task Force to Evaluate the Life Insurance Solicitation Regulation - Detroit, Michigan - November 19 and 20, 1979
  • Proposal by Fireman's Fund to display savings and protection elements separately - ATTACHMENT B

To: Jon S. Hanson
From: Carolyn Cobb

  • Attached Issues and Options Paper: Prepared for the (C3) Task Force to Reevaluate the NAIC Model Life Insurance Solicitation Regulation.
  • You asked that I prepare a background document discussing the issues and options facing this Task Force.
  • This memorandum is my response to your request.
  • It will briefly describe the current· model cost disclosure regulation, summarize the issues, and finally address each issue in detail.

(p736-780 - More pages..attachments) 

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

  • Whether we are talking about an open competition rating law state or a prior approval state, a pre-condition of viable competitive markets is a reasonably informed buying public.
  • As a consequence a major regulatory tool is adequate consumer information.

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

  • ....would also like to suggest that this report deals effectively with each of the types of "malignant manipulation" suggested in Mr. Reiskytl's letter of March 26, 1979, to the Advisory Committee on Manipulation.
  • If you follow a path as we just followed in these two previous examples, you will see how each of Mr. Reiskytl's problems can be dealt with in Exhibit A, B and C.

MODEL REGULATION ON PARTIAL-ENDOWMENT-TYPE ("DEPOSIT-TERM-TYPE") INSURANCE, (Exposure draft)

The nature, cause, and resolution of complaints most frequently received by insurance companies and state insurance departments

Multi-Track Policies

  • Policies such as Adjustable Life or Deposit Term give the owner the option to increase or decrease the amount of insurance -- or to change or convert the plan from term to permanent or vice versa.
  • We recommend that disclosure of cost indexes be required on the assumption that the option to change is not exercised, but also permit a display of indexes based on stated assumptions as to the exercise of the options.

Term Plus Annuity Combinations

  • In these cases, the two coverages may be provided by separate contract -- or by a base policy and a rider.
  • Dropping or changing one coverage may or may not affect the other.
  • Here, as far as cost disclosure is concerned, we recommend that the Life Insurance Solicitation Regulation be applied to the term part of the package and the Annuity and Deposit Fund Disclosure Regulation to the other part.

Other Areas for Study

Policies With Adjustable Cash Value

  • Several companies have introduced policies with cash values which are increased by interest at a guaranteed rate, plus excess interest at a rate which is determined by the company each year.
  • For these policies, our tentative recommendation would be to require companies to disclose cost indexes based on the current cash values together with the NGE.

History and Background of the Manipulation Problem

  • Differences between the merits of a life insurance policy that (1) are genuine, and that (2) are attributed to it by the company that sells it, have always been a source of difficulty.
  • When life insurance was in its infancy, there was the celebrated case of a 12-month term policy in England which the buyer's beneficiary believed to have granted protection for 12 calendar months, but which the company explained (unsuccessfully) was intended by them to expire after 12 lunar months.

At least as long ago as 1932, the word "manipulated" was publicly applied to policy structures that a critic judged to be contrary to the best interests of policyholders. That comment is to be found in Vol. XXXIII of the Transactions of the Actuarial Society of America, p. 445.

  • In the heyday of the so-called traditional method of policy cost comparison, policy designers knew that the attractiveness of their product would be measured by treating dollars as of equal value regardless of when those dollars were received and paid.
  • There were evident competitive advantages in policies with high premiums, high cash values and terminal dividends at the twentieth policy year customarily used for comparison, and steeply pitched annual dividend patterns.

 

  • The awesome power of disclosure is frequently underestimated.
    • Not only would regulators and individual buyers see the prescribed data, agents also would see it.
    • Agents' vital role in the sales process means that their influence in discouraging manipulation should not be underestimated.
    • Competitors would see it, and also could be a powerful factor in discouraging manipulation. So would other observers of the life insurance business see it, and add their voices
    • .In short, the very act of disclosure might cause companies to refrain from manipulation.

The committee is agreed that a current buyer of life insurance is entitled, on reasonable request, to receive a quotation of premiums, cash values, illustrated dividends and death benefits for each of the first thirty years of the policy. 

  • The policy duration at which an interest rate change occurs is frequently the 20th year, which also is the second of the two policy durations at which cost indexes are required to be quoted under the NAIC Model Solicitation Regulation.
  • The committee is not of one mind on whether it constitutes manipulation to introduce suddenly slower cash value growth on non-participating policies by changing the interest rate ...

Concept of A Life Insurance Policy Data Bank

A national data bank, organized and operated through the auspices of the NAIC, would serve as a depository for raw data on new as well as existing policies for cooperating insurers.

It is anticipated that the national data bank would:

  • The data bank would receive information directly from insurers in coded or machine-readable form.
  • The format for the data would be standardized and subject to infrequent changes.
  • Many companies would wish to be data contributors.

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

(p542) - GOVERNMENT REGULATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN OVERVIEW

  • Prepared for the Advisory Committee on Competitive Rating to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
  • HAMILTON RABINOVITZ & SZANTON Inc.
  • November, 1979 

These twelve objectives include such things as the thought that:

  • (1) a disclosure regulation should allow for comparison of dissimilar policies (the present regulation only allows comparison of similar policies),
  • (2) to the extent that they can be developed, measuring device(s) to aid in comparison,
  • (3) the consideration of various kinds of disclosure approaches not provided in the current model,
  • (4) certain changes in the Buyers' Guide to simplify the descriptive material,
  • ( 5) more timely disclosure than the present model requires, and
  • (6) consideration as to how best to enforce the model regulation.

1980-2, NAIC Proceedings

EXECUTIVE (EX) COMMITTEE; National Meetings (EX1) Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 102

EXECUTIVE (EX) COMMITTEE; Regulatory Information (EX2) Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 105

EXECUTIVE (EX) COMMITTEE; Consumer Participation (EX4) Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 166

EXECUTIVE (EX) COMMITTEE; Governmental Liaison (EX5) Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 173

FINANCIAL CONDITION EXAMINATION AND REPORTING (A) COMMITTEE, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 182

FINANCIAL CONDITION EXAMINATION AND REPORTING (A) COMMITTEE; Accounting Principles,

Procedures and Blanks (A1) Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 192

MARKET CONDUCT, EXAMINATION AND REPORTING (B) COMMITTEE, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 298

MARKET CONDUCT , EXAMINATION AND REPORTING (B) COMMITTEE; Market Conduct and Trade Practices (B1) Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 339

LIFE ACCIDENT AND HEALTH (C) COMMITTEE; Life Insurance (C3) Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc.663

LIFE ACCIDENT AND HEALTH (C) COMMITTEE; Life, Accident and Health Insurance (C4) Technical

Subcommittee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 882

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RESUMED; Report of the Executive Secretary , June 20, 1980, 1980-2 NAIC Proc.1027

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RESUMED; Statement on Behalf of the National Association of Insurance

Commissioners, Before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban, Affairs Committee on, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 1110

PLENARY I RESUMES; Resolutions Committee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 1123

Client/Matter:

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RESUMED; NAIC Position Paper on the Baucus Amendment, January 11, 1980, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 1071

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RESUMED; Statement on Behalf of the National Association of Insurance

Commissioners, Before the Subcommittee on Insurance of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs

Committee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 1077

Task Force to Evaluate the NAIC Model Life Insurance Regulation.
Solicitation
NAIC staff report on evaluation of NAIC Model Life Insurance
Solicitation Regulation
Hearing transcript summary and record of November 19 and 20,
1979 
NAIC issues and options paper
List of Attachments 
Life Insurance Cost Disclosure Task Force.
SOA status report on dividend philosophy.
American Academy of Actuaries' report.
Advisory committee on policy lapsation
Wisconsin Special Task Force report
Advisory Committee on Annuity Cost Disclosure.
NAIC Partial Endowment Type Insurance Model Regulation exposure draft 
ACLl's Ad Hoc Subcommittee report ·
Joseph Belth statement re advisory committee report on manipulation
Advisory committee response to Belth statement
Statement of Brenda P. Roberts
(C4) Technical Subcommittee June 1980 exposure drafts re revisions to Standard Valuation Law and Standard Nonforfeiture Law
Standard Valuation Law - Dynamic Interest 
Standard Valuation Law - Static Interest 
Standard Nonforfeiture Law - Dynamic Interest
Standard Nonforfeiture Law - Static Interest