Gary Gorton

  • FCIC Hearing
  • 2009 - AP - Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, Gary Gorton - 65p
  • 2015 - Book Review - Stress for Success: A Review of Timothy Geithner's Financial Crisis Memoir Gary Gorton, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, VOL. 53, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2015, (pp. 975-95) -
  • AP - The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort
    • https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/jep.27.4.45
  • The Panic of 2007, Gary Gorton -132p
  • 2018 0511 - WSJ - Yale Professor Who Had Controversial Role in the Crisis Now Teaches About It After his work on AIG’s risk models came to light, Gary Gorton received death threats - [link]

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC)

  • 2011 0104 - D Heyl Letter re Use of Gorton Quotes - 2p
  • 2010 0511- FCIC- Gary Gorton Interview - 173p
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 1)_1.wma
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 2)_1.wma
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 3)_1.wma
  • 2010-05-11 FCIC staff audiotape of interview with Gary Gorton, Yale University (Part 4)_1.wma
  • 2010 0227 - FCIC - Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis, American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC
  • Session 9: Shadow Banking - Gary Gorton, Professor of Finance, School of Management, Yale University
  • MR. GORTON: No. I mean, I basically, you know, from roughly 2002 or 2003 to the end, I didn’t really work on this anymore.  (p33)
  • MR. GORTON:  And there –- there are descriptions of, you know, what the model does, basically. And I didn’t write all of them. Sometimes there was somebody I was working with who wrote part of  it.
    MS. HEYL: So as far the CDO modeling, when would you have written a memo about that?
    MR. GORTON: I don’t think -- I’m not sure I ever wrote a memo about CDO modeling.  (p53)
  • MS. NOONAN: So, let’s step back a little bit. If you  developed the model for CDOs around 2002, 2003, ....What was your involvement after building the model when the deals came in?
    MR. GORTON: I typically wasn’t really involved. (p58-59)

    • And there would be all this discussion about it, and there’d be this intense focus  on transactions that looked like there’d been a little deterioration, and, so I would go to that. But, you know, by this time, you know, Adam Frost -- Al Frost and Adam Budnick -- Adam Budnick had been hired at some point -- and they worked on this.  They -- you know, I didn’t really -- they didn’t need me. So I didn’t have any input on it.  (p59)
  • Mr. Gorton: I mean, the company had a loss in Maiden Lane III, I’m told, because of the way the accounting worked, how they priced it or something. I don’t really know the details. But a few months ago is the last time I asked.
    And I said, “Do any of our positions have any realized losses?” And the answer was no. So, you know, and I was curious about that, because, you know, the model had been predicated upon: Could you survive exactly what’s happened? And at least so far, the answer appears to be yes. I mean, there’s no -- no dollar has been paid out to a counterparty under one of these swaps.
    MS. NOONAN: Not under the actual terms of the
    swap as opposed to the collateral --
    MR. GORTON: Yes, the collateral was something --
    MS. NOONAN: -- provisions.
    MR. GORTON: -- completely separate (p6263)

2010 0511- FCIC- Gary Gorton Interview - 173p