Donald Kohn

  • FRB-NY - Federal Reserve Bank of New York - General Counsel and Executive Vice President of the Legal Group 
  • update: brief conversation with Jacob.
    • Told him we were "very reluctant" to open up another 13-3 facility for an entity not even an investment bank.
    • And that the market thought it was not only a liquidity problem but also a capital problem. He gave me the bridge to asset sales speech and then said he would get willumsted and call me back. I'm waiting.
  • [Bonk: Jacob =  Jacob Frenkel, AIG Vice Chairman]
  • [Bonk: willumsted = Bob Willumstad, AIG CEO]

2008 0913 - email - Donald Kohn (FRB-NY) to Scott Alvarez (FRB) - JX-046 - 1p

⇒ Case 1:11-cv-00779 - V2 - 2014 0930 - Trial Volume 2 - Alvarez - 231p

  • 2009 0305 - GOV (Senate) - American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, And Implications for Future Regulation, Government Intervention and Regulation of AIG (CSPAN)
    • [PDF-72p,  VIDEO-CSPAN]
    • [Senate-page] - <mp3, mp4> - R 
    • Testimony
      • Eric Dinallo (NAIC / NYSID) - 8p
    • 14:40 - Senator Shelby -
      • Significant losses in AIG’s State-regulated life insurance companies also contributed to the company’s collapse.  (p4)
      • More than $17 billion in Federal assistance has been used to recapitalize the State-regulated insurance companies to ensure that they are able to pay their policy holders' claims.  (p5)
    • 33:00 - Eric Dinallo (NY / NAIC) - Securities Lending didn't have anything/much to do with AIG Collapse, run on aig life, <Reputational Risk>, 
    • Securities Lending, RMBS, Liquidity, <C-3, 1980 SOA Paper>, Run on AIG, 
    • Scott Polakoff - OTC
    • (p25) - Donald KOHN (Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System):  Our authority under the Federal Reserve Act is to make loans.
      • We thought it was a short-term liquidity situation— in mid-September, this is what we thought—and that if we could bridge this situation with liquidity, then the company could make the adjustments to keep itself a going concern.
      • It turned out that the problems were deeper...
  • 2021 06 - Brookings - Task Force on Financial Stability, by Glenn Hubbard, Donald Kohn, Ralph Koijen, Blythe Masters - 135p
    • (p53) - The life insurance sector, while safe and quite boring in the past, has changed meaningfully during the past two decades from a financial stability perspective.
      • The Global Financial Crisis showed that the life insurance industry has  become fragile.
        • This fragility was not limited to AIG. Some other companies received Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) support (for example, Hartford Financial Services Group received $3.4 billion in TARP equity).
    • (p53) - Although the industry and its regulators responded to some extent to the problems that became evident in 2008, the fragility of the life insurance sector appears to persist.
      • The first important factor is...
    • Captive reinsurance, or “shadow insurance,” has also increased the opacity of the industry.
    • Shadow insurance developed in response to regulatory changes in 2000 and 2003 for term and universal life insurance, known as “Regulations XXX and AXXX.”**
    • These regulations tightened the regulatory capital requirements for these traditional products—for operating companies, which sell directly to consumers, but not for reinsurance companies.
  • (p3) - Co-chair: Donald Kohn
    •  Robert V. Roosa Chair in International Economics and a senior fellow in the Brookings Hutchins Center.
    • Kohn was at the Federal Reserve Board from 1975 to 2010, the last several years as vice chair.
    • He is a member of the FDIC’s Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee and a former member of the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England.