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4	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6	SOUTHERN DIVISION
7	THE HONORABLE JAMES V. SELNA, JUDGE PRESIDING
8	CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
9	JOYCE WALKER, et al., } TRIAL DAY 11 Plaintiffs, }
10	vs. } SACV-10-09198-JVS
11	LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF) SOUTHWEST, et al.,)
12	Defendants. }
13	
14	
15	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
16	Santa Ana, California
17	April 24, 2014
18	
19	SHARON A. SEFFENS, RPR United States Courthouse
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5	PLAINTIFFS'				
6	WITNESSES:	DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS
7	(None)				
8	PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS:			MARKED	RECEIVED
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11	WITNESSES:	DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS
12	JEFFREY STEMLER CRAIG SMITH	15 135	86 164	203	215
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SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 2014; 8:04 A.M. 1 07:44:26 2 (Jury not present) 08:04:07 3 THE COURT: Good morning. Given that one of our 08:04:10 4 jurors is delayed, there are a couple of things I think we 08:04:14 5 can take up. 08:04:15 6 First of all, would you state your appearances, 08:04:17 7 please. 08:04:18 8 MR. BROSNAHAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Brian 08:04:18 9 Brosnahan for the plaintiffs. 08:04:2010 THE COURT: Good morning. 08:04:2111 MR. FOSTER: Good morning, Your Honor. Jacob 08:04:2112 Foster for the plaintiffs. 08:04:2213 THE COURT: Good morning. MR. MARTENS: Good morning, Your Honor. Matthew 08:04:2214 08:04:2415 Martens for the defendant Life Insurance Company of the 08:04:2416 Southwest. 08:04:2417 THE COURT: Good morning. 08:04:2518 MR. SHAPIRO: Good morning, Your Honor. Jonathan 08:04:2819 Shapiro also for defendant LSW. And to my left at counsel 08:04:3120 table is Elizabeth MacGowan, our representative. 08:04:3521 THE COURT: Good morning. 08:04:3622 Please be seated. 08:04:4323 I received a marked-up copy of Exhibit 673, and I 08:04:5024 guess I'm just a little slow today. I'm not sure who wants

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what in or out. Some material is highlighted; some material

08:04:5425

08:04:57 1 is circled in red. 08:04:57 2 So could you --08:04:58 3 MR. SHAPIRO: If I may attempt to decipher, Your 08:04:58 4 Honor, plaintiffs last evening sent to us essentially 08:05:03 5 designations as opposed to redactions. So the marking in red is from the plaintiffs, and they circled in red what 08:05:07 6 08:05:11 7 they think should come in. 08:05:13 8 THE COURT: In? 08:05:13 9 MR. SHAPIRO: In. They did the reverse. They did 08:05:1710 a designation as opposed to a redaction. 08:05:1711 THE COURT: Okav. 08:05:1812 MR. SHAPIRO: They designated what they think 08:05:1813 should be allowed to be in the document published to the 08:05:2314 jury by circling it in red. So, consistent with that 08:05:2615 approach we added yellow to what we would like to see in. 08:05:3216 So conversely, anything that's not in yellow or not in red 08:05:3617 everyone agrees should be out. 08:05:3818 THE COURT: Okay. Then I will read this and mark 08:05:4019 it up accordingly. MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor. 08:05:4420 08:05:4421 THE COURT: I received plaintiffs' brief in 08:05:4822 opposition to the motion to decertify filed at 3:11 a.m. 08:05:5523 will be prepared to address that issue at the end of the day 08:05:5824 when we take up that motion and any Rule 50(a) motions.

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I also received a proposed curative instruction

08:06:0325

08:06:05 1 filed at 12:05 a.m. with regard to living benefits rider. 08:06:12 2 I don't know if you have seen that? 08:06:14 3 MR. MARTENS: I have talked about it with my team. 08:06:17 4 I guess that's the equivalent of seeing it in trial. 08:06:21 5 think the short answer is, as the Court knows, we continue 08:06:24 6 to believe that we should be able to discuss that topic. I 08:06:26 7 understand the Court's ruling. So having stated my 08:06:29 8 objection, I don't have a problem with a curative 08:06:32 9 instruction. 08:06:3310 THE COURT: Okay. Your objection is noted. 08:06:3611 Do you want this as part of the jury instructions, 08:06:3812 or do you want me to just give it orally? 08:06:4113 MR. BROSNAHAN: I think it makes just as much 08:06:4614 sense to have it as part of the instructions. 08:06:4815 THE COURT: Okay. We can discuss Exhibit 557. I 08:06:4916 received a separate filing with regard to Exhibit 557, filed 08:06:5417 at 4:40 a.m. I want to hear you out on that. But my 08:07:0218 inclination is to receive 557 with the instruction that I 08:07:0619 drafted this morning, but we can talk about that later when 08:07:1020 we get to the instructions generally. 08:07:1421 Anything else while we're waiting for the juror? 08:07:1722 MR. BROSNAHAN: I think the Court last night was 08:07:2123 reviewing 398. 08:07:2324 THE COURT: I'm going to exclude Exhibit 398. 08:07:2625 It seems to me there is a difference between

08:07:29 1	running Monte Carlos on a financial package which includes a
08:07:31 2	number of different components rather than just insurance
08:07:36 3	policies. So consistent with my ruling that evidence of a
08:07:38 4	Monte Carlo is relevant only as to insurance policies, I'm
08:07:43 5	excluding 398.
08:07:45 6	MR. BROSNAHAN: I take it the Court observed that
08:07:47 7	the assets to which the Monte Carlo analysis would be
08:07:49 8	subject included insurance policies.
08:07:52 9	THE COURT: Yes. It was part of the bundle, but
08:07:5510	it wasn't insurance policies only.
08:07:5911	MR. BROSNAHAN: I understand the Court's ruling.
08:08:0112	THE COURT: Okay.
08:08:0113	MR. BROSNAHAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
08:08:0414	MR. MARTENS: Did the Court I wasn't clear.
08:08:0415	Did the Court say that you wanted to hear us on Exhibit 557
08:08:1216	or because I would like to be heard on not only the
08:08:1517	instruction but on the exhibit, if I could.
08:08:1818	THE COURT: Fine.
08:08:1919	MR. MARTENS: I think the issue, Your Honor, is
08:08:2020	that I don't believe the financial statements of the
08:08:2421	consolidated company are relevant under California law.
08:08:2822	THE COURT: I agree.
08:08:2923	MR. MARTENS: So I would be concerned that if
08:08:3224	these statements come in, we are going to hear argument
08:08:3525	about them in closing, which would be improper. I think

08:08:38 1 California law is very clear in Tomaselli versus 08:08:44 2 Transamerica, 1994, that consolidated financial statement 08:08:48 3 for a parent insurance company is not evidence as to the 08:08:50 4 financial condition of the subsidiary. 08:08:52 5 So I think allowing that in when it, under 08:08:57 6 California substantive law, doesn't satisfy the element 08:09:00 7 would be improper. 08:09:02 8 THE COURT: Have you seen the curative instruction 08:09:04 9 that was handed out this morning? 08:09:0710 MR. MARTENS: Not yet. My team did but I didn't. 08:09:2511 THE COURT: Okav. 08:09:2512 MR. MARTENS: I think I still have a concern, Your 08:09:2613 Honor, because the Tomaselli case I think excludes it. 08:09:3414 Court allows it, you say, in the proposed instruction, and 08:09:3715 you use it to the extent it assists you in arriving at a 08:09:3916 reasonable of LSW's financial activities in California. 08:09:4517 don't think it does that. I don't think it can do that 08:09:4718 combined with any other evidence. 08:09:4919 THE COURT: Well, you can argue that. But it 08:09:5220 seems to me, particularly given the course of conduct and 08:09:5621 pointing the plaintiffs to LSW's website from which this 08:10:0422 comes, it casts it in a different light. But for that, I 08:10:1023 might have a different view. 08:10:1224 There is at least some evidence of what portion of

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National's business is attributable to LSW in California.

08:10:1425

It may be very thin evidence, but given the course of dealings, I'm not going to rely on the general principle that -- which I agree is a correct statement of law that a parent's financials cannot come in when a defendant is the subsidiary. But in the context of this case, with a limiting instruction I believe that I honor the general principle but allowing the jury to make such use as it may for a relevant purpose.

MR. MARTENS: If I could just state one other

MR. MARTENS: If I could just state one other response to that at least for the record.

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. MARTENS: In Adams versus Murakami, a
California case from 1991, the Court ruled that because the
punitive damages requirement of the financial condition of
the defendant is an issue that's in the public interest,
that the public interest cannot allow this to be forwarded
by the defendant's tactics.

In other words, if the defendant's tactics, whether at trial or otherwise, can't be a basis for allowing such evidence that would otherwise be insufficient to satisfy the standard.

So I would just respond that even if we had done something inappropriate during discovery -- I don't believe we have. But even if we had, I believe the case law is that that doesn't change the analysis.

08:11:40 1 THE COURT: I think the curative instruction that 08:11:43 2 I plan to give solves that. The jury could well find, you 08:11:49 3 now, one, they're instructed you can't base a punitive award 08:11:55 4 on the parent's financial condition. 08:11:57 5 Two, you can only use this to the extent it 08:11:59 6 informs you about the relevant corporate entity; namely, 08:12:02 7 LSW. It may tell them nothing; it may tell them something. 08:12:05 8 But I think that is to be argued to the jury. 08:12:09 9 MR. MARTENS: In that regard, Your Honor, with 08:12:1210 regard to that instruction, then would the Court be willing 08:12:1411 to instruct as to what California law does require; namely, 08:12:1612 that they must prove LSW's financial condition before the 08:12:2013 jury could award a punitive damages award? -- because I do 08:12:2514 believe that's what the law requires. 08:12:2815 THE COURT: That's in the basic instruction. 08:12:3116 MR. MARTENS: I think it's identified as a factor, 08:12:3217 but California law actually makes it more than a factor. 08:12:3518 They must affirmatively prove our financial condition before 08:12:4119 punitive damages could be awarded. So it is a factor, but 08:12:4420 it's also a prerequisite that they must prove our financial 08:12:4721 condition, and then that condition can be taken into account. I think the instructions need to make that clear. 08:12:4922 08:12:5323 THE COURT: What is your authority for that? 08:12:5524 MR. MARTENS: My authority for that, if the Court

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will give me a second --

08:12:5925

08:13:01 1 THE COURT: Or I should say: Who is your 08:13:03 2 authority for that? 08:13:04 3 MR. MARTENS: Well, it's not me. It's the case 08:13:08 4 law. I believe it's the Adams versus Murakami case. 08:13:15 5 THE COURT: And the cite again, please. 08:13:17 6 MR. MARTENS: Yes -- 54 Cal.3d, 105, pinpoint site 08:13:23 7 119. 08:13:24 8 There is also a Ninth Circuit case that I know I 08:13:28 9 I can get it if the Court will -have. THE COURT: Let me look at Murakami first. 08:13:3510 08:13:3911 MR. MARTENS: Thank you. 08:13:4012 MR. BROSNAHAN: Your Honor, if I may, I would like 08:13:4113 to take a look at the Adams case as well. I just want to 08:13:4514 observe that. Although we're not trying to pierce the 08:13:4815 corporate veil here, effectively they have ignored corporate 08:13:5216 distinctions throughout the case. 08:13:5317 THE COURT: We are not going to get to that issue 08:13:5518 at this point. 08:13:5619 MR. BROSNAHAN: I just want to make one other 08:13:5620 observation. When I tried to ask whether each corporation 08:14:0121 was -- whether any of the companies had liability for any of 08:14:0522 the other companies, they objected on relevance grounds and 08:14:0823 it was sustained. 08:14:0924 So I don't know how they can take the position 08:14:1325 that a question like that is irrelevant while at the same

08:14:17 1 time saying no, each company has to be regarded separately. 08:14:22 2 THE COURT: Okay. 08:14:22 3 MR. BROSNAHAN: Thank you. 08:14:23 4 THE COURT: I'm advised the jury is up here, so 08:14:27 5 are we ready for the jury? 08:14:33 6 Bring the jury in, please. 08:14:34 7 (Jury present) 08:15:25 8 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 08:15:28 9 We will resume with our video deposition. (Portion of videotaped deposition of 08:15:3110 08:15:3711 Michael Tivilini continued to be played) 08:48:3712 MR. BROSNAHAN: That concludes the video, Your 08:48:3813 Honor. 08:48:3914 THE COURT: Okay. 08:48:3915 MR. BROSNAHAN: At this point we would like to 08:48:4316 publish from Exhibit 312, which is in evidence. 08:48:4917 At the top we see the to and the from -- we will 08:48:5818 move to the text in a moment -- from Michael Tivilini to 08:49:0219 Mehran Assadi. And then further down in the text in the second paragraph it says: Provider was priced to generate 08:49:0220 08:49:1521 an ROI equal to 12.7 percent. Favorable experience, 08:49:2022 primarily a larger-than-expected average policy size, and a favorable refinement to the company's reserving methodology 08:49:2723 08:49:3224 have enhanced the product's profitability. Our baseline

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pricing models now suggest an ROI in excess of 17 percent.

08:49:3725

08:49:45 1 Then we would like also, Your Honor, to publish 08:49:47 2 from Exhibit 131, policies. If we could blow that up 08:49:57 3 perhaps a bit. It's the list of policies in the class. I 08:50:08 4 just want to publish ten of them. First one, policy 08:50:10 5 LS0175235, Enrique Baldonado; policy status is lapsed. 08:50:11 6 Secure-Plus Paragon gross premium, \$334,200. 08:50:28 7 Next, LS0179036, Jose Lopez; status, lapsed; 08:50:34 8 SecurePlus Paragon; gross premium, \$300,000. Then policy 08:50:40 9 number LS0189466, Depal Juananukawate; policy status, 08:50:5110 lapsed; SecurePlus Paragon; gross premium, \$252,304. 08:50:5911 Then LS0229373, Mosha Barkot; policy status, 08:51:0212 lapsed; SecurePlus Paragon, gross premium \$219,400; and 08:51:1713 LS0217797, Donald P. Pakosch; status, lapsed; SecurePlus 08:51:2614 Paragon; gross premium, \$210,350. 08:51:2915 Then LS0139718, Rick K. Smith; policy status, 08:51:3916 lapsed; SecurePlus Provider; gross premium, \$135,274.48. 08:51:5017 Then LS0131420, Eric Parks; policy status, lapsed; 08:52:0118 SecurePlus Provider; gross premium, \$123,500. 08:52:1019 Next, LS0159152, Stacey Fialcof; policy status, 08:52:1320 lapsed; SecurePlus Paragon; gross premium, \$120,000. Policy 08:52:1321 number LS0136604, Charles M. Burton; policy status, lapsed; 08:52:1322 SecurePlus Provider; gross premium, \$120,000. Then policy 08:52:2023 number LS0152071, Joy Compos; policy status, lapsed; 08:52:4224 SecurePlus Paragon; gross premium, \$110,000. 08:52:5725 With that, Your Honor, the plaintiffs will rest.

08:53:00 1 THE COURT: Very good. 08:53:01 2 MR. BROSNAHAN: Thank you. 08:53:02 3 THE COURT: Mr. Martens. 08:53:04 4 MR. MARTENS: We would make our motion under 50(a). 08:53:06 5 08:53:08 6 THE COURT: Your motion will be deemed to be made 08:53:09 7 at this time. We will take it up later. 08:53:13 8 MR. MARTENS: Thank you, Your Honor. 08:53:15 9 Mr. Shapiro is going to call the next witness. 08:53:3710 MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, to use the time 08:53:3811 efficiently, before we take the witness takes the stand may 08:53:4412 we be heard at sidebar for an offer of proof? 08:53:4713 THE COURT: Sure. 08:53:4714 (Sidebar conference) 08:56:2515 MR. SHAPIRO: Jeffrey Stemler was the same agent 08:56:2616 for Ms. Walker. Yesterday during cross-examination of 08:56:2717 Mr. DeSantos, plaintiff elicited repeatedly testimony about 08:56:2918 whether there would be a purpose in selling the Provider or 08:56:3019 Paragon policy if there wasn't a need for a death benefit. 08:56:3120 If asked why he sold a \$2.5 million death benefit policy to 08:56:3421 Ms. Walker who was engaged but single at the time -- if 08:56:3522 allowed to testify, I believe Mr. Stemler would say, No. 1, 08:56:3623 cash accumulation or for tax-free retirement; No. 2, an 08:56:3724 expressed need for living benefits. It's all over the 08:56:3825 documents. We understand Your Honor's ruling. We are not

08:56:42 1	trying to relitigate it.
08:56:43 2	THE COURT: But you are saying apart from the
08:56:43 3	rider?
08:56:44 4	MR. SHAPIRO: Long-term living benefit features.
08:56:45 5	We are not asking to go into the topic, but we don't want a
08:56:46 6	witness to be impeached
08:56:48 7	MR. FOSTER: We don't plan to ask him any
08:56:49 8	questions on that in terms of the size of the death benefit,
08:56:50 9	Your Honor.
08:56:5110	THE COURT: Okay. If you open up, we can come
08:56:5111	back to it.
08:56:5112	(End of sidebar conference)
08:56:5113	THE COURT: Call your next witness.
08:56:5114	JEFFREY STEMLER, DEFENDANT'S WITNESS, SWORN
08:56:5315	THE CLERK: Please state your full name and spell
08:56:5316	your last name for the record.
08:57:0617	THE WITNESS: Jeffrey Stemler, S-t-e-m-l-e-r.
08:57:1118	THE COURT: Mr. Shapiro.
08:57:1219	DIRECT EXAMINATION
08:57:1320	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
08:57:1421	Q Good morning, Mr. Stemler.
08:57:1522	A Good morning.
08:57:1623	Q What do you do for a living?
08:57:1824	A Financial planner.
08:57:1825	Q How long have you been a financial planner?

08:57:20 1	A It's going to be 47 years.
08:57:22 2	Q In your 47 years as a financial planner, is this the
08:57:25 3	first time you have testified in court?
08:57:27 4	A Yes.
08:57:28 5	Q Have you ever been sued, sir?
08:57:29 6	A No.
08:57:30 7	Q Have you ever sued anyone before?
08:57:31 8	A No.
08:57:33 9	Q So this is all new for you?
08:57:3410	A Yes.
08:57:3511	Q Did you sell a life insurance policy to Joyce Walker?
08:57:3812	A Yes.
08:57:4013	Q Near as you know, Mr. Stemler, is it that sale of that
08:57:4314	life insurance policy to Joyce Walker that brings us all
08:57:4615	here together?
08:57:4716	A Yes.
08:57:4717	Q We can go through it a bit later. But just to sort of
08:57:5118	get it out there, number one, did you deceive Ms. Walker in
08:57:5419	any way?
08:57:5520	A No.
08:57:5521	Q Did you mislead Ms. Walker in any way?
08:57:5822	A No.
08:57:5923	Q Did you conceal anything in any way, shape, or form
08:58:0224	from Ms. Walker?
08:58:0425	A No.

08:58:04 1	Q Are you aware of anyone on the planet who deceived,			
08:58:08 2	concealed, or lied to Ms. Walker?			
08:58:10 3	A No.			
08:58:10 4	Q Is it fair to say, sir, that you have been waiting five			
08:58:13 5	years to be able to say that in open court?			
08:58:16 6	A Yes.			
08:58:17 7	Q Did you go to college?			
08:58:17 8	A Yes.			
08:58:18 9	Q Where, sir?			
08:58:1810	A Kent State.			
08:58:2011	Q Did you obtain a degree?			
08:58:2212	A Yes.			
08:58:2213	Q What was your degree in?			
08:58:2414	A Bachelor of business administration.			
08:58:2615	Q What year did you obtain that degree?			
08:58:2916	A 1969.			
08:58:3017	Q After you graduated from Kent State, did you have			
08:58:3318	occasion to obtain some professional certifications or			
08:58:3719	designations?			
08:58:3820	A Yes.			
08:58:3821	Q What were those, sir?			
08:58:3822	A I'm a chartered financial consultant, chartered life			
08:58:4423	underwriter, chartered property and casualty underwriter, a			
08:58:4624	CFP, and a certified exit planner.			
08:58:5325	Q So in order to obtain those certifications or			

08:58:53 1	designations, did you need to pursue some education or take		
08:58:59 2	some courses?		
08:59:00 3	A Yes.		
08:59:00 4	Q What sort of training did you get to be able to hold		
08:59:04 5	those designations?		
08:59:05 6	A Each of those was ten courses. Several had final		
08:59:11 7	exams. Others there were ten exams, and two I had to		
08:59:14 8	produce full-blown exit plans for business owners.		
08:59:19 9	Q So if I'm hearing you right, those certifications or		
08:59:2210	designations required ten courses?		
08:59:2611	A Yes.		
08:59:2712	Q And any number of exams?		
08:59:2913	A Yes.		
08:59:2914	Q So once you take all those courses and pass all those		
08:59:3315	exams, are there any ongoing or continuing education		
08:59:3616	requirements?		
08:59:3617	A Yes.		
08:59:3718	Q Have you maintained your currency with those?		
08:59:4019	A Yes.		
08:59:4020	Q Do any of those designations bring with them a		
08:59:4421	professional code of conduct?		
08:59:4622	A Essentially they all have some form, yes.		
08:59:4823	Q Does code of conduct govern how you need to behave and		
08:59:5224	comport yourself to live up to professional obligations?		
08:59:5525	A Yes. Boil it down to two. One is: Always put the		

09:00:00 1	interests of the client first. And based on the fact and
09:00:04 2	circumstance, what would you do for yourself.
09:00:07 3	Q Always put your client ahead of yourself?
09:00:09 4	A Yes.
09:00:09 5	Q Would you do for them what you would do for yourself?
09:00:12 6	A Yes.
09:00:13 7	Q Now, in terms of both of those, did you always put
09:00:16 8	Ms. Walker first?
09:00:18 9	A Yes.
09:00:1810	Q Did you recommend or give any advice to Mr. Walker that
09:00:2211	you wouldn't recommend or give to yourself?
09:00:2312	A No.
09:00:2413	Q Or a loved one?
09:00:2514	A No.
09:00:2515	Q And there is no doubt in your mind about that, sir?
09:00:3016	A Correct.
09:00:3117	Q Do you own an indexed universal life policy?
09:00:3418	A No.
09:00:3519	Q Is there a reason?
09:00:3520	A Because the money I wanted to put into that I couldn't
09:00:3721	because it's inside my qualified plans. So I bought indexed
09:00:4422	annuities.
09:00:4423	Q Is it the case that the indexed annuities have indexing
09:00:4424	strategies, if you will, that are similar to the cash
09:00:5125	accumulation features of the universal life policy?

09:00:54 1	A They're identical.
09:00:56 2	Q Putting aside your own personal circumstances about the
09:00:58 3	qualified money, would you have any hesitance at all in
09:01:02 4	purchasing an indexed universal life for yourself?
09:01:05 5	A No.
09:01:06 6	Q Or recommending it to a loved one?
09:01:08 7	A No. I have.
09:01:09 8	Q Okay. Over the course of your career of 47 odd years,
09:01:14 9	have you worked for insurance companies?
09:01:1610	A Yes.
09:01:1711	Q What insurance companies have you worked for,
09:01:1812	Mr. Stemler?
09:01:2013	A Fidelity Mutual, New York Life, and Lincoln Financial.
09:01:2314	Q And for those insurance companies, you actually
09:01:2615	directly worked for them as an employee?
09:01:2816	A Correct.
09:01:2817	Q So in addition to the work you did directly for those
09:01:3218	insurance companies New York Life, Lincoln, and the
09:01:3519	others have you over the years been an appointed
09:01:3920	insurance agent for life insurance companies?
09:01:4221	A Yes.
09:01:4322	Q Can you ballpark how many life insurance companies over
09:01:4623	the years you have served as an agent?
09:01:4824	A Probably around 30.
09:01:5025	Q Do you consider yourself an independent agent?

09:01:52 1	A Yes.
09:01:53 2	Q Could you just tell the jury what an independent agent
09:01:55 3	is.
09:01:56 4	A We do not work for a specific insurance company. We
09:01:59 5	have licenses with many companies, so we have choices.
09:02:04 6	Q And, in fact, do you present different competitive
09:02:07 7	products to your clients from different carriers?
09:02:09 8	A Yes.
09:02:10 9	Q You are not wed to LSW or anyone in particular?
09:02:1310	A No.
09:02:1311	Q That's what it means to be independent?
09:02:1612	A Yes.
09:02:1613	Q So in addition to LSW, putting LSW aside, today are you
09:02:1914	appointed as an independent agent for other carriers?
09:02:2315	A Yes.
09:02:2316	Q Can you just name a couple of them.
09:02:2517	A Allianz, EquiTrust.
09:02:2518	Q So when you're working with a client for financial
09:02:3319	planning, is there a certain approach that you personally
09:02:3520	take to that client relationship?
09:02:3821	A Yes. We use the CFP model for planning. You first
09:02:4322	have a meeting to understand about their personal
09:02:4723	circumstance, know them as a person. Then we move to what
09:02:5324	are the financial goals they are trying to achieve. We then
09:02:5825	collect financial information; also, questionnaires filled

09:03:02 1	out and financial information.
09:03:05 2	Once we have that, we will do an analysis to see
09:03:07 3	if what they already have in place actually gets them to
09:03:12 4	where they want to be. If it doesn't, then we make
09:03:16 5	recommendations to change the mix or whatever we are going
09:03:19 6	to do. And then obviously if they decide to move forward,
09:03:24 7	we then place the product to enact the plan.
09:03:28 8	Q So that whole multi-step process that you just
09:03:32 9	described, I thought you said it was the approach that is
09:03:3510	embraced by the CFP?
09:03:4111	A Yes.
09:03:4212	Q And that's the certified
09:03:4313	A Certified financial planning.
09:03:4414	Q And this is a multi-step approach that you take in
09:03:4415	working with each individual client?
09:03:4416	A Yes.
09:03:4417	Q Could you give the jury just a sense of how long that
09:03:4818	whole process takes, you know, in a typical case if there
09:03:5219	is one.
09:03:5420	A At a minimum we are talking three to five meetings,
09:03:5721	because they run about an hour each. And in some cases it's
09:04:0422	much long 10, 12 meetings, depending on the complexity.
09:04:1023	Q When you say three to five meetings, these are
09:04:1024	in-person counseling sessions, if you will?

Yes.

09:04:1325

09:04:14 1	Q Are there typically phone calls or other communications
09:04:16 2	or homework between the meetings?
09:04:18 3	A Yes.
09:04:21 4	Q You are familiar with the LSW Provider policy?
09:04:24 5	A Yes.
09:04:25 6	Q Was Provider the policy that you sold eventually to
09:04:28 7	Ms. Walker?
09:04:29 8	A Yes.
09:04:29 9	Q Did you follow the same approach to Ms. Walker that you
09:04:3410	just described under the CFP approach?
09:04:3711	A Yes.
09:04:3812	Q Do you remember when you first met her?
09:04:4113	A The first time I met her was probably, that I remember,
09:04:4414	in November.
09:04:4615	Q Of two thousand and
09:04:5016	A 2007, I think.
09:04:5117	Q It's been a while?
09:04:5218	A Yes.
09:04:5319	Q Now, the Provider policy is an indexed universal life
09:04:5620	policy?
09:04:5721	A Yes.
09:04:5822	Q Are you familiar with indexed universal policies other
09:05:0123	than the LSW Provider?
09:05:0224	A Yes.
09:05:0325	Q Is the LSW Provider indexed universal life policy

09:05:07 1	similar to other indexed universal life policies?
09:05:11 2	A Yes.
09:05:12 3	Q In what ways is Provider similar to the competition?
09:05:16 4	A The basic chassis, the structure of the contract, is a
09:05:20 5	universal life contract that has variable premium choices
09:05:27 6	and face amounts and things of that nature. It has an
09:05:32 7	indexing crediting method, and all of them have exactly that
09:05:38 8	structure.
09:05:38 9	Q So all IULs with which you are familiar have flexible
09:05:4410	premiums?
09:05:4511	A Yes.
09:05:4512	Q Have indexed crediting methods?
09:05:4813	A Yes.
09:05:4814	Q Do the IULs with which you are familiar typically have
09:05:5115	the ability to take out loans?
09:05:5316	A Yes.
09:05:5417	Q The ability to take out loans, by the way, is that
09:05:5618	unique to an IUL?
09:05:5819	A No.
09:05:5820	Q Can you take loans out of a universal life policy?
09:06:0121	A Yes.
09:06:0222	Q How about a whole life policy?
09:06:0423	A Yes.
09:06:0424	Q So all permanent insurance products allow you to take
09:06:0825	loans?

09:06:09 1	A Yes.
09:06:09 2	Q The tax protected features of those loans, are they any
09:06:14 3	different, sir, for an IUL policy than a universal life
09:06:14 4	policy?
09:06:17 5	A No.
09:06:17 6	Q Any different for a whole life policy?
09:06:20 7	A No.
09:06:28 8	Q Under some circumstances can a Provider policy lapse?
09:06:34 9	A Yes.
09:06:3610	Q When I ask you lapse, what's your definition of lapse?
09:06:3911	A It means that it's no longer in existence. It's gone
09:06:4312	away.
09:06:4413	Q Terminated?
09:06:4514	A Could be.
09:06:4615	Q In your experience, sir, what would lead a universal
09:06:4916	life policy to lapse?
09:06:5317	A If somebody stopped paying premium and the cost of the
09:06:5818	insurance is still being deducted, so at some point it would
09:07:0219	run out. If somebody voluntarily just surrenders it. And
09:07:0720	then if you take too much money out, whether it's through
09:07:0921	withdrawals or loans, it can cause it to terminate.
09:07:1322	Q So if I heard you correctly, a policy terminates if
09:07:1723	someone voluntarily surrenders it? Yes, sir?
09:07:2024	A Yes.
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So putting that aside, in terms of the lapse I thought

09:07:2025

09:07:24 1	you said, number one, don't pay enough premiums?
09:07:27 2	A Correct.
09:07:28 3	Q Number two, take too much out in terms of loans and
09:07:31 4	withdrawals?
09:07:31 5	A Correct.
09:07:32 6	Q In terms of those two causes of lapse, is the Provider
09:07:35 7	policy in any way different than any other IUL with which
09:07:39 8	you are familiar?
09:07:40 9	A No.
09:07:4210	Q In terms of those two items that can cause the lapse
09:07:4511	number one, not paying enough, and number two, taking too
09:07:4912	much out is the Provider policy any different than any
09:07:5313	universal life policy with which you are familiar?
09:07:5614	A No.
09:07:5715	Q It's just sort of standard across, what did you say,
09:07:5916	the chassis of universal life?
09:08:0117	A Correct.
09:08:0318	Q Did LSW provide you with training about the Provider
09:08:0619	policy?
09:08:0720	A Yes.
09:08:0821	Q What kind of training?
09:08:1122	A Once we were introduced to it by the regional
09:08:1423	representative, we liked it, and so we contracted with them
09:08:2124	or asked them to send out trainers, and we had our agents
09:08:2725	attend various training sessions.

09:08:29 1	Q If I'm hearing right, you asked LSW for training and
09:08:32 2	LSW sent people to you?
09:08:33 3	A Yes.
09:08:34 4	Q To teach you about the product?
09:08:35 5	A Yes.
09:08:36 6	Q Have you ever asked for any training from LSW that you
09:08:41 7	didn't receive?
09:08:41 8	A No.
09:08:42 9	Q How does LSW's training sort of stack up against the
09:08:4610	other insurance companies with which you have worked over
09:08:4811	the years?
09:08:4912	A Most of the companies are pretty accommodating, but
09:08:5213	they have also been and they also maintain one of the
09:08:5714	high-end planning divisions which most companies have
09:09:0215	abandoned. So we like them a lot.
09:09:0416	Q So LSW in some form offers a step up in terms of
09:09:1017	training from your experience?
09:09:1218	A Yes.
09:09:1219	Q Now, does LSW require you to take training?
09:09:1620	A Not that I know of.
09:09:1721	Q Does LSW need to require you to take training?
09:09:1922	A No.
09:09:2023	Q Is that just part of the relationship?
09:09:2224	A Yes.
09:09:2325	Q Would you ever sell a product that you weren't sure you

09:09:26 1	understood and had the proper training in?
09:09:28 2	A No.
09:09:28 3	Q Would you ever let anyone in any office or group that
09:09:31 4	you worked in sell a product with which the selling agent
09:09:34 5	wasn't sufficiently educated?
09:09:36 6	A We can't force them either, but we definitely provide
09:09:40 7	the training and expect them to attend.
09:09:46 8	Q That's part of your job, sir?
09:09:50 9	A Yes.
09:09:5010	Q So if you met Joyce Walker in 2007, let me ask you a
09:09:5211	tough one: Where?
09:09:5512	A We put on public workshops on various topics. That
09:09:5913	particular topic was the risk faced by boomers facing
09:10:0514	retirement, which are different than faced by her parents,
09:10:0915	because her parents had pensions and things of this nature.
09:10:1416	We were trying to talk about the areas that really
09:10:1717	could destroy a retirement, such as longevity, losses just
09:10:2318	before you're retiring and during retirement, and taxes and
09:10:3019	inflation. And, of course, the 800-pound gorilla is the
09:10:3220	catastrophic cost of health care, the long-term care.
09:10:3721	Q Sure. So if I'm hearing you right, you first met
09:10:4022	Ms. Walker at a presentation or an educational program that
09:10:4323	you presented?
09:10:4424	A Yes.
09:10:4425	Q Were there folks in the audience other than Ms. Walker?

09:10:47 1	A Yes.
09:10:48 2	Q This wasn't one of those one-on-one counseling
09:10:51 3	sessions?
09:10:51 4	A No.
09:10:52 5	Q I think you said the program lasted, what?
09:10:54 6	A Just about an hour.
09:10:54 7	Q In this educational program did you talk about any
09:10:58 8	particular product?
09:10:59 9	A No.
09:10:5910	Q So you didn't talk about LSW?
09:11:0111	A No.
09:11:0112	Q You didn't talk about indexed UL or whatever?
09:11:0713	A No.
09:11:0814	Q Did you talk any particular client or customer?
09:11:0915	A No.
09:11:1016	Q So it was sort of a group setting in which you reviewed
09:11:1317	any number of other financial options?
09:11:1518	A Yes.
09:11:1619	Q At some point did Ms. Walker ask to have a follow-up
09:11:2020	session with you and your colleagues?
09:11:2121	A Yes.
09:11:2322	Q If you would, sir oh, I almost forgot your binder.
09:11:3823	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, may I approach the
09:11:3924	witness?
09:11:4025	THE COURT: You may.

09:11:40 1	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:11:51 2	Q Mr. Stemler, the court deputy has been kind enough to
09:11:57 3	hand you a binder which has your name on it. If you would
09:12:03 4	turn, please, to tab 867-C, and just tell me when you get
09:12:13 5	there.
09:12:14 6	A I'm there.
09:12:18 7	Q Okay.
09:12:32 8	Just looking, is Exhibit 867-C, which is at pages
09:12:37 9	63 through 65 of the exhibit, a response sheet completed by
09:12:4210	Joyce Walker, listed in her maiden name?
09:12:4811	A Yes.
09:12:4912	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, we would move into
09:12:5013	evidence Exhibit 867-C, which is 867, pages 63 through 65 of
09:12:5714	what had been marked for identification.
09:13:0115	MR. FOSTER: No objection.
09:13:0316	THE COURT: 867-C will be received.
09:13:0517	MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:13:0518	(Exhibit No. 867-C received in evidence)
09:13:0519	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:13:0520	Q Can you tell the jury what is 867-C.
09:13:2421	A This is a response sheet that we pass out at the
09:13:2722	workshop, and then it's turned in if they wish to go any
09:13:3323	further and have an appointment.
09:13:3424	Q So does Exhibit 867-C just ask some initial questions?
09:13:3925	A Yes.

09:13:42 1	Q Go to page 2. So Joyce Schmidtbauer, is that
09:13:49 2	Ms. Walker's maiden name?
09:13:53 3	A Yes.
09:13:54 4	Q Is it fair to say there's just some basic questions
09:13:54 5	here about financial planning objectives?
09:13:57 6	A Yes.
09:13:58 7	Q Is this an initial questionnaire that you use with your
09:14:00 8	clients?
09:14:00 9	A Yes.
09:14:0110	Q Is it the case, sir, that as the relationship
09:14:0311	continues, you ask for a greater level of detail?
09:14:0812	A Of course.
09:14:0913	Q If you would, sir, turn to what's marked as page 2, the
09:14:1414	next page.
09:14:1415	A Yes.
09:14:1716	Q Do you see a question where it says: Knowing what you
09:14:2217	know now, what would you have done differently with your
09:14:2518	money?
09:14:2519	A Yes.
09:14:2620	Q Did Ms. Walker answer that question?
09:14:2821	A Yes, she did.
09:14:2922	Q What did she say?
09:14:3123	A Move things out of bad stocks, et cetera, quicker.
09:14:3424	Q Did you discuss with Ms. Walker at some point in time
09:14:3725	her answer to that question?

09:14:39 1	A Yes.
09:14:39 2	Q What was the discussion that you had with Ms. Walker
09:14:42 3	about moving things out of bad stocks quicker?
09:14:45 4	A She did not want to lose money in the stock market.
09:14:48 5	Q Did Ms. Walker express to you in some form of words
09:14:53 6	that she was concerned about losing principal?
09:14:56 7	A That's what happens when you lose money in the stock
09:14:58 8	market.
09:14:59 9	Q Okay. Did she identify that as one of her planning
09:15:0410	goals?
09:15:0411	A Yes.
09:15:0512	Q So after you received 867-C, did you in fact or did
09:15:0713	your office in fact set up a meeting with Ms. Walker?
09:15:1014	A Yes.
09:15:1015	Q What happened next in the relationship?
09:15:1216	A Then the meeting, the first meeting, was scheduled. I
09:15:1717	did this in tandem with Mike Botkin. Mike actually held the
09:15:2318	first meeting.
09:15:2419	Q So could you just tell the jury who is Mike Botkin and
09:15:2820	what is his role in all of this?
09:15:3021	A Mike Botkin owns the firm that's called Preservation
09:15:3322	Financial. He was also a vice-president of asset marketing
09:15:4023	systems, which I am also. When we do retail work with
09:15:4524	clients or the public, the business runs through
09:15:4925	Preservation Financial so that when it's completed, they

09:15:53 1	would become clients of that firm.
09:15:55 2	Q So did Mr. Botkin have an initial meeting with
09:15:59 3	Ms. Walker?
09:16:01 4	A Yes.
09:16:01 5	Q In fact, did Mr. Botkin have more than one meeting with
09:16:05 6	Ms. Walker?
09:16:06 7	A Based on our log, it was three meetings he had with
09:16:10 8	her.
09:16:10 9	Q At some point did you also meet directly with
09:16:1410	Ms. Walker?
09:16:1511	A Yes.
09:16:1512	Q Just so we have the chronology right, Ms. Walker
09:16:1613	attends this program that you gave for education for a lot
09:16:1914	of people; right?
09:16:2015	A Correct.
09:16:2016	Q And there is no discussion about LSW at that meeting?
09:16:2417	A No.
09:16:2418	Q And there is no discussion about Ms. Walker in
09:16:2619	particular; right?
09:16:2720	A No.
09:16:2721	Q She fills in the form which we just saw and requests a
09:16:3022	meeting?
09:16:3123	A Yes.
09:16:3124	Q And then she met on a number of occasions with
09:16:3425	Mr. Botkin?

09:16:35 1	A Yes.
09:16:36 2	Q At some point did you also become involved in
09:16:39 3	counseling her directly?
09:16:40 4	A Yes.
09:16:42 5	Q Why was it that you became involved after Mr. Botkin's
09:16:45 6	initial meeting?
09:16:47 7	A The way we structure the firm is we specialize in what
09:16:50 8	we do. Mike held the first meeting, which was really the
09:16:56 9	get-acquainted meeting and going over the response sheet.
09:17:0010	Then once he took his notes, then he prepared for the second
09:17:0511	meeting, which was to talk over some basic concepts and also
09:17:1012	gather and present some of the results that we had from
09:17:1413	collecting financial information.
09:17:1814	At that point he presented several concepts, one
09:17:2215	of them being the insurance. And then I believe it was at
09:17:2716	the third meeting he walked through that in some detail.
09:17:3317	And when the decision was made that we should explore the
09:17:3818	insurance further, that's when he asked me to come in on, I
09:17:4119	believe, the fourth meeting and go through the insurance
09:17:4420	again but in depth.
09:17:4621	Q At that point you continued to meet with Ms. Walker,
09:17:4822	sometimes with Mr. Botkin and sometimes just the two of you,
09:17:5223	you and Ms. Walker?
09:17:5524	A Yes.

So sort of soup to nuts, how many meetings did you

09:17:5625

09:18:00 1	and/or Mr. Botkin have with Joyce Walker before you sold
09:18:03 2	Ms. Walker the Provider policy?
09:18:06 3	A If you include the workshop, it would have been five
09:18:11 4	five meetings over four and a half months.
09:18:13 5	Q So five meetings over the course of four odd months
09:18:18 6	before the policy?
09:18:19 7	A Yes.
09:18:19 8	Q And then after the policy was issued, was there another
09:18:22 9	meeting?
09:18:2210	A Yes.
09:18:2311	Q In which you discussed the policy at the delivery?
09:18:2912	A It's the delivery, yes.
09:18:3113	Q So if I heard you right, you became more involved with
09:18:3314	Ms. Walker after there was a decision to focus on a life
09:18:3715	insurance option?
09:18:3816	A Right, because we also proposed an annuity and another
09:18:4317	option. And if she would have chosen the annuity, Mike
09:18:4918	would have continued. That's his specialty. If it was the
09:18:5219	life, that's why I got involved.
09:18:5420	Q Is it fair to say that during the initial sessions with
09:18:5621	Ms. Walker, there wasn't a preordained decision that she
09:19:0122	would be a life insurance person?
09:19:0523	A No.
09:19:0524	Q What other options did you and Mike and your team
09:19:1025	present to Ms. Walker other than life insurance?

09:19:13 1	A For the qualified money we were looking at an indexed
09:19:15 2	annuity that had a special feature that provided a
09:19:20 3	guaranteed buildup and a guaranteed income, and you could
09:19:22 4	look up literally on the schedule and know five years from
09:19:27 5	now, 10 years from now, 20 years from now, exactly how much
09:19:30 6	would be there, what the income would be, and it would last
09:19:33 7	forever.
09:19:36 8	Then we started talking some alternative
09:19:39 9	investments like real estate investment trusts or something
09:19:4310	like that that were not correlated to the market.
09:19:4811	Q So if I'm hearing you right, you proposed an indexed
09:19:4912	annuity option?
09:19:5013	A Yes.
09:19:5114	MR. FOSTER: Objection, Your Honor. Could we have
09:19:5315	clarity as to who proposed these options, him or Mr. Botkin.
09:19:5516	MR. SHAPIRO: I can lay a foundation if you like.
09:19:5517	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:19:5618	Q Sir, did you and Mr. Botkin work as a team?
09:19:5819	A Yes.
09:19:5920	Q Did you have meetings together with Mr. Botkin and
09:20:0121	Ms. Walker?
09:20:0222	A Yes.
09:20:0323	Q During your meetings together with Ms. Walker, did you
09:20:0624	review the plan as it was evolving with her?

Yes.

09:20:1125

09:20:11 1	Q At some point did she make a choice to go forward with
09:20:15 2	an indexed universal life policy?
09:20:19 3	A Yes.
09:20:20 4	Q Is it the case, sir, that during your meetings with
09:20:22 5	Ms. Walker you also talked about, as you just said, an
09:20:25 6	annuity option?
09:20:28 7	A The first time it was brought up, it was by Mike. He
09:20:32 8	and I had met to say, all right, what possible things could
09:20:34 9	we do. So it was, I believe, that second meeting or the
09:20:3810	third meeting that he mentioned those.
09:20:4211	When she made the decision to move forward with
09:20:4712	the insurance, that's when I got involved. And it was later
09:20:5213	that I got involved with the annuities again when she called
09:20:5314	back.
09:20:5515	MR. FOSTER: Move to strike on what Mr. Botkin
09:20:5516	said, Your Honor. That's hearsay.
09:21:0017	MR. SHAPIRO: I think I can clean it up, Your
09:21:0018	Honor.
09:21:0019	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:21:0220	Q Without saying what Mr. Botkin said to Ms. Walker, did
09:21:0721	you and Mr. Botkin together work on a financial plan as
09:21:1022	colleagues for Ms. Walker?
09:21:1323	A Yes.
09:21:1324	Q Did that financial plan include a variety of options
00 01 1605	

09:21:1625 other than life insurance?

09:21:17 1	A Yes.
09:21:17 2	Q And one of them was the indexed annuity option?
09:21:22 3	A Yes.
09:21:22 4	Q What was Ms. Walker's reaction to the indexed annuity
09:21:25 5	option?
09:21:28 6	A It wasn't adverse. I wasn't there, so I can't tell you
09:21:32 7	why the decision was made to move with the life. But it
09:21:36 8	was.
09:21:37 9	Q At some point later on you did talk to her about an
09:21:3910	annuity option?
09:21:4111	A Yes.
09:21:4112	Q So there was a decision to move forward with the life
09:21:4413	option?
09:21:4414	A Yes.
09:21:4515	Q Is there any reason why you didn't recommend that
09:21:4716	Ms. Walker just invest directly in the S&P 500?
09:21:5017	A Because you can't.
09:21:5118	Q Why not?
09:21:5319	A It's an index, so you have to have a vehicle to get
09:21:5820	into it.
09:21:5921	Q Sure. So my question was imprecise. Is there any
09:22:0322	reason why you didn't recommend that she just buy a mutual
09:22:0723	fund?
09:22:0824	A If we were trying to minimize the potential for loss of
09:22:1425	principal, then that would not be an appropriate

09:22:16 1	recommendation.
09:22:17 2	Q Because that was one of her objectives that she
09:22:19 3	communicated to you?
09:22:20 4	A Lyes.
09:22:21 5	Q And something that would be a direct investment in the
09:22:23 6	market wouldn't achieve that?
09:22:25 7	A It ran the risk of losing substantial loss of
09:22:31 8	principal.
09:22:31 9	Q That is, going below zero?
09:22:3410	A Yes.
09:22:3611	Q If you would, sir, turn to Exhibit 774.
09:22:4912	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, we would move
09:22:5013	Exhibit 774 into evidence.
09:22:5214	I believe there is no objection.
09:22:5615	MR. FOSTER: No objection.
09:22:5616	THE COURT: 774 will be received.
09:22:5917	MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:22:5918	(Exhibit No. 774 received in evidence)
09:23:0019	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:23:0220	Q Second page third page. Mr. Stemler, do you
09:23:1821	recognize what has been marked as Exhibit 774 on page 3 as a
09:23:2222	drawing?
09:23:2223	A Yes.
09:23:2324	Q Is this a drawing that you did on the back of
09:23:2625	Ms. Walker's illustration?

09:23:29 1 09:23:29 2 09:23:31 3 09:23:38 4 09:23:40 5 09:23:45 6 09:23:49 7 09:23:54 8 09:23:56 9 09:24:0010 09:24:0411 09:24:0812 09:24:1413 09:24:1914 09:24:2215 09:24:2616 09:24:2717 09:24:2718 09:24:3619 09:24:3920 09:24:4321 09:24:4622 09:24:5023

09:24:5524

09:25:0025

A Yes.

Q Could you describe for the jury what you were trying to convey when you drew this drawing, Exhibit 774, on the back of her illustration.

A This is — when we are sitting down talking about insurance, we try to explain to the prospects exactly how the insurance works. So this is part of our talk that we give to explain how it works.

So this would be a build slide. This didn't just start there. I drew a line on the bottom and I said: When you buy insurance, there is a minimum amount that you must pay for insurance to pay for the costs and put the policy in force. And I drew the line and I wrote minimum, and I would ask who do you think sets that price.

Some people will say: I don't know. Others:
Well, the insurance company. I go, yes, you're correct.
And I said: They have actuaries, and the actuaries, their
job is to figure out how much they need to collect for any
given amount based on the age of the person so that they can
cover the risk and also still make a profit.

I said: But there's another line that we need to be concerned about, and then I draw the line up on top and I put the max there. And I say this is the maximum you can pay for a contract. I said: Do you know who sets that limit? People will often say: Well, the insurance company;

09:25:06 1 right? And I say: No. It's actually the government. 09:25:09 2 In the example we'll often say: Well, let's just 09:25:11 3 assume that this is \$500,000 that we are dealing with here 09:25:15 4 and the minimum premium is a thousand dollars and the 09:25:19 5 maximum premium is \$5,000. Why would anyone put \$5,000 into 09:25:27 6 a contract if you could buy the same amount of coverage for 09:25:30 7 only 1,000? 09:25:32 8 Well, the reason is because once you pay that 09:25:35 9 minimum premium, everything between there and the upper line 09:25:4010 receives substantial benefits, both taxes and other benefits 09:25:4511 in there. So that is -- so what we are trying to explain is 09:25:4912 why would we use life insurance as an accumulation vehicle? 09:25:5413 Why would we use life insurance as an income-generating 09:25:5714 vehicle? How would that actually be achieved? And that's 09:26:0215 what you see there. 09:26:0416 So you did this drawing while you were in the room with 09:26:0817 Ms. Walker? 09:26:0918 Yes. Α 09:26:1019 And Mr. Botkin was there as well? Q 09:26:1120 I believe so on this one, yes. 09:26:1221 And you did this on the back of the illustration? Q 09:26:1422 Α Yes. 09:26:1423 Maybe just to take a step back just to be clear. Q 09:26:1724 meeting that you are describing with Ms. Walker and

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Mr. Botkin in which you drew this illustration and in which

09:26:2125

09:26:24 1	you discussed it with her, was this the first time she had
09:26:28 2	been presented with that illustration?
09:26:30 3	A No. Mr. Botkin had done this illustration, I believe,
09:26:33 4	when he first brought up the concept in the second meeting.
09:26:38 5	Q So near as you now, Mr. Botkin had given Ms. Walker the
09:26:43 6	illustration. They had had discussion about it, and then
09:26:46 7	came back for a second meeting about the illustration?
09:26:49 8	A That's my understanding, yes.
09:26:50 9	Q So what you are describing is meeting number two about
09:26:5310	the illustration?
09:26:5411	A That's my understanding, yes.
09:26:5512	Q Okay. And what you're describing in terms of the max
09:26:5813	and the min, that's the permissible premium, the minimum
09:27:0114	you've got to pay?
09:27:0415	A Right. And then the MEC is a technical term that the
09:27:0616	government uses. It's called modified endowment contract.
09:27:0717	And if you put \$1 above that, then the tax benefits and a
09:27:1718	lot of the other benefits evaporate and it's treated very
09:27:1919	much like an annuity of an IRA for distribution.
09:27:2220	Q And you discussed those tax consequence with Ms. Walker
09:27:2521	in the room when your drew the diagram as well?
09:27:2922	A That's the point of the diagram.
09:27:3123	Q If you would, sir, turn to the next page.
09:27:3324	A Uh-huh.
09:27:3325	Q You are now in Exhibit 774, page 5?

09:27:40 1	A Yes.
09:27:40 2	Q Do you recognize this handwriting?
09:27:42 3	A Yes.
09:27:43 4	Q Is this more handwriting on the back of Ms. Walker's
09:27:48 5	illustration?
09:27:48 6	A Yes.
09:27:49 7	Q It's yours?
09:27:50 8	A Yes.
09:27:50 9	Q All right. Are these notes that you made while you
09:27:5210	were in the room with her?
09:27:5311	A Yes.
09:27:5412	Q Now, I recognize that I have taken away your pen. You
09:27:5713	can't write all over the document here. But just understand
09:27:5914	the dynamic. You were in the room writing these things
09:28:0215	down?
09:28:0316	A Yes.
09:28:0317	Q And you're explaining to them just like you're
09:28:0518	explaining them to us?
09:28:0619	A Yes.
09:28:0720	Q How long did this meeting go on for?
09:28:0921	A It was certainly an hour, probably an hour and a half.
09:28:1222	Q So it's you, Mr. Walker, and Mr. Botkin in the
09:28:1623	conference room?
09:28:1824	A Yes.
09:28:1825	Q Did Ms. Walker ask questions of you during your

09:28:20 1	meetings?
09:28:21 2	A Oh, yes.
09:28:21 3	Q Did she ask lots of questions?
09:28:25 4	A Not an inordinate amount, but she definitely asked
09:28:25 5	questions.
09:28:29 6	Q Do you have a memory of her coming to meetings prepared
09:28:29 7	with questions?
09:28:32 8	A Oh, yes.
09:28:33 9	Q Did you answer them?
09:28:3310	A Well, this is part of answering some of the questions.
09:28:3611	Q Is it your memory that some of the notes that are up on
09:28:3912	the jumbotron here from Exhibit 774 were you answering
09:28:4313	specific questions that she had posed to you?
09:28:4514	A And I'm not sure if it was right at this meeting or
09:28:4815	not, but I knew I wanted to walk through this so she had a
09:28:5316	better understanding how it would actually work.
09:28:5517	Q From time to time do clients ask you questions that you
09:28:5818	can't answer?
09:28:5919	A Yes.
09:29:0020	Q What do you do if a client asks you questions that you
09:29:0321	can't answer?
09:29:0522	A That's a good question. I will find the answer.
09:29:0623	Q And do you in fact find the answer?
09:29:0624	A Yes.
09:29:0625	Q But you don't have any memory of that being the case

09:29:06 1	with Ms. Walker?
09:29:06 2	A No.
09:29:09 3	Q So just looking quickly at this document, do you see
09:29:13 4	where it stays basic stat? Does this refer to the basic
09:29:18 5	strategy?
09:29:19 6	A Yes.
09:29:19 7	Q Did you discuss the basic strategy with Ms. Walker?
09:29:22 8	A Yes.
09:29:23 9	Q Did you tell her that all premiums go in for, what, 30
09:29:2810	days to the basic strategy?
09:29:2911	A The premiums go into the basic strategy. And depending
09:29:3412	on when it's called the sweep date. There is a date in a
09:29:3813	month when they take the money out of the strategy and put
09:29:4314	it into the index. If you get there a day after they're
09:29:4515	done it, it's 30 days. If you get there a day before, it
09:29:4916	will only be a day that it would sit in the basic strategy.
09:29:5217	Q Did you explain that level of detail to Ms. Walker?
09:29:5618	A Yes.
09:29:5619	Q So maybe just moving down the page, do you see a
09:29:5920	reference to number two, annual mortality costs?
09:30:0221	A Yes.
09:30:0222	Q Did you discuss the annual mortality costs of the
09:30:0623	policy with Ms. Walker?
09:30:0924	A This is hypothetical and generic, but the answer is
09:30:0925	yes.

09:30:10 1	Q When you say hypothetical and generic, you're saying
09:30:11 2	that the numbers that you put here aren't tied to her own
09:30:16 3	medical underwriting; right?
09:30:17 4	A Yes.
09:30:18 5	Q Because you didn't even know that at the time; right?
09:30:19 6	A Right.
09:30:20 7	Q But did you discuss with Ms. Walker that there were
09:30:22 8	mortality costs that would be assessed against her policy?
09:30:28 9	MR. FOSTER: Objection. Leading.
09:30:2910	THE COURT: Rephrase.
09:30:2911	MR. SHAPIRO: Fair enough.
09:30:2912	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:30:3013	Q Did you discuss that there would be mortality costs of
09:30:3214	some amount that would be taxed against Ms. Walker's policy?
09:30:3615	A That would come out of the policy, yes.
09:30:3916	Q Did you explain that to her clearly, sir?
09:30:4217	A That's what this was trying to illustrate.
09:30:4418	Q In the lower right-hand corner there's more numbers.
09:30:4519	There's a reference to a D.B. What does D.B. refer to?
09:30:5120	A The death benefit.
09:30:5221	Q And below that there is a reference to ACC?
09:30:5522	A That's the accumulation amount that's inside the
09:30:5823	contract.
09:30:5824	Q Okay. So that would be like a hypothetical amount of a
09:31:0125	cash value?

09:31:02 1	A Correct.
09:31:02 2	Q And then below that is there something that says pure
09:31:06 3	D.B.?
09:31:07 4	A Yes.
09:31:08 5	Q And what is that, sir?
09:31:08 6	A If she died in this example, the heirs or the
09:31:11 7	beneficiaries would receive \$2 million, but \$500,000 of that
09:31:17 8	two million was actually cash. So what's being charged for
09:31:21 9	the coverage is the difference between the cash and the
09:31:2410	death benefit, and that's the million five. As the cash
09:31:2911	continues to grow, the amount of pure death benefit starts
09:31:3412	to shrink and the cost goes down.
09:31:3713	Q So just to make sure that I'm understanding you
09:31:4014	correctly, are you referring to what sometimes is called the
09:31:4315	net amount at risk?
09:31:4516	A Yes.
09:31:4517	Q Is the net amount at risk the amount upon which the
09:31:4818	costs of insurance are calculated from time to time?
09:31:5219	A Yes.
09:31:5320	Q Did you explain that to Ms. Walker?
09:31:5521	A Yes.
09:31:5622	Q In that degree of detail?
09:31:5923	A That's what the graphic was for, yes.
09:32:0324	Q Turning now, if you will, Mr. Stemler, to Exhibit 781
09:32:0925	which is already in evidence, and in particular to an

09:32:14 1	illustration which I believe starts at page 20 of
09:32:18 2	Exhibit 781.
09:32:20 3	A Page 20 on the illustration?
09:32:30 4	Q Yes. It's the illustration. So it's 781, and there
09:32:31 5	will be, like, a .00, two zeros.
09:32:32 6	MR. FOSTER: Is that the October illustration?
09:32:47 7	MR. SHAPIRO: I think you introduced it into
09:32:48 8	evidence.
09:32:52 9	Is there one in yours, Your Honor?
09:32:5610	It's the October illustration.
09:33:0611	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:33:0812	Q It's 781. Do you have it, Mr. Stemler?
09:33:1313	A Which page?
09:33:1414	Q Page 20.
09:33:1615	MR. FOSTER: Actually we would object, Your Honor.
09:33:1816	This is not a complete illustration. The illustration is in
09:33:2117	the record at Exhibit 48.
09:33:2818	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, it's a complete
09:33:2919	illustration, number one. Number two, it's been stapled in
09:33:3320	the manner which it was produced. Number three, I believe
09:33:3721	it was introduced on the 16th of the month.
09:33:4022	THE COURT: Proceed.
09:33:4023	MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor.
09:33:4024	THE WITNESS: But is that 781-0039, and it would
09:33:4025	be 20 or 21? Is that what you're talking about?

09:33:40 1	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:33:41 2	Q 39 would be the last page.
09:33:53 3	A Right.
09:33:54 4	Q And then the first page would be 781-0020.
09:34:01 5	A Oh, okay. Got it.
09:34:06 6	Q As if the world weren't complicated enough, I
09:34:09 7	understand that the pages in the exhibit are out of order.
09:34:14 8	Do you recognize just the first page? Is this the
09:34:15 9	illustration that you and Mr. Botkin reviewed with
09:34:2010	Ms. Walker during the meeting you have been describing?
09:34:2311	A Yes.
09:34:2512	Q If you would, sir, turn to page 11 of the illustration,
09:34:2813	which is Exhibit 781-0030.
09:34:4014	A Yes.
09:34:4315	Q Can we agree, Mr. Stemler well, let me ask you this:
09:34:4716	Is there lots of handwriting all over this page?
09:34:5017	A Yes.
09:34:5118	Q Is some of it yours?
09:34:5519	A Yes.
09:34:5520	Q In addition to doing the drawings and writing out the
09:34:5521	information on the back of the illustration, when you
09:34:5522	reviewed it with her, did you make notations?
09:34:5823	A Yes.
09:34:5824	Q Did you explain them to her?
09:35:0025	A Yes.

09:35:00 1	Q And you recognize at least some of the handwriting on
09:35:02 2	the page as being yours?
09:35:04 3	A Yes.
09:35:04 4	Q When you reviewed the illustration with Ms. Walker, did
09:35:07 5	you discuss the planned premium payments that are in the
09:35:10 6	upper left-hand corner of the illustration?
09:35:13 7	A Yes.
09:35:15 8	Q What did you tell her?
09:35:16 9	A Well, based on the amount of money that she had set
09:35:2010	aside for retirement and we were going to place in here, we
09:35:2511	needed to divide it up into five installments so that it
09:35:3112	would give the maximum benefit to her as opposed to putting
09:35:3713	it in all at one time. So that's the premium payment right
09:35:4214	there.
09:35:4315	Q So this was a premium payment plan that you discussed
09:35:4616	with Ms. Walker?
09:35:4717	A Yes.
09:35:4818	Q And that it would call for her to make planned premium
09:35:5219	payments of \$112,637 for each of the first five years?
09:35:5720	A Yes.
09:35:5821	Q Now, just turning a little higher up on the page, is
09:36:0022	there a paragraph that begins: This illustration of LSW
09:36:0723	provider values?
09:36:0824	A Yes.
00 06 0005	

Q So just focusing on the first sentence, did you tell

09:36:0825

09:36:11 1	Ms. Walker that her entire illustration assumed that she
09:36:15 2	actually made those five premium payments?
09:36:18 3	A Yeah. I mean, that's the whole point.
09:36:21 4	Q That's the whole point of the illustration? Yes, sir?
09:36:24 5	A Yes.
09:36:24 6	MR. FOSTER: Objection. Leading.
09:36:26 7	THE COURT: Overruled.
09:36:26 8	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
09:36:26 9	Q Did you express that in a clear form of words to her?
09:36:3010	A Yes.
09:36:3011	Q Recognizing that you don't know what's in anyone else's
09:36:3512	head, in your own mind was there any doubt in your mind that
09:36:3813	she understood?
09:36:3914	A No, because we talked about the total amount that was
09:36:4215	going to go in here and here's how we had to put it in.
09:36:4716	Q This was a back-and-forth conversation?
09:36:4817	A Yes.
09:36:4918	Q So does the illustration that you reviewed with
09:36:5119	Ms. Walker, Exhibit 781, does it provide or offer different
09:36:5520	scenarios?
09:36:5721	A Yes.
09:36:5822	Q Is one of those scenarios the guaranteed scenario?
09:37:0123	A Yes.
09:37:0324	Q Are current basis A and current basis B two of the
09:37:0725	other scenarios?

09:37:08 1	A Yes.
09:37:09 2	Q Are current basis A and current basis B guaranteed or
09:37:12 3	non-guaranteed?
09:37:13 4	A They are non-guaranteed.
09:37:15 5	Q So just starting first with the guaranteed scenario or
09:37:17 6	guaranteed values?
09:37:19 7	A Yes.
09:37:19 8	Q Did you discuss the guaranteed values with Ms. Walker
09:37:23 9	as you reviewed the illustration with her?
09:37:2610	A Yes.
09:37:2611	Q What did you tell her?
09:37:3012	A Well, first, the guarantees, the actual guarantee is
09:37:3313	the worst case scenario. That means that the index has not
09:37:3914	performed and that the highest possible expenses that could
09:37:4215	be charged are reflected in that column. So it's the most
09:37:4816	conservative. But the real message of that column is that
09:37:5217	if that ever got invoked, there is a lot bigger problems in
09:37:5618	the financial world than this contract.
09:38:0019	Q So you discussed the guaranteed values in the context
09:38:0220	of not just this illustration but also financial planning
09:38:0521	overall?
09:38:0522	A Right. And that this but this was, if you will, the
09:38:1223	fail-safe. This was the bottom line what the company could
09:38:1924	guarantee.
00 00 1005	

Did you discuss with Ms. Walker whether there was a

09:38:1925

09:38:22 1	certain annual floor for the LSW Provider policy?
09:38:27 2	A Yes.
09:38:28 3	Q What did you tell her?
09:38:29 4	A Well, it's an indexed product, and the way indexing
09:38:33 5	works is if the index goes up, you receive either all of it
09:38:38 6	or a portion of it. If the market or the index goes down
09:38:43 7	like it did the second year of 30 percent, that did not get
09:38:49 8	credited. She got credited zero. So it went up. If it
09:38:54 9	goes down, the worst that can happen is that you don't get
09:38:5810	credited any interest, but you don't go negative.
09:39:0211	Q So you never do worse than zero in any year?
09:39:0512	A Correct.
09:39:0613	Q Did you make clear to Ms. Walker that she wouldn't do
09:39:1014	worse that zero in any year on an annual basis?
09:39:1215	A Yes.
09:39:1216	Q Mr. Stemler, the column says at the top guaranteed
09:39:1617	values at two percent?
09:39:1818	A Correct.
09:39:1819	Q Did you explain to Ms. Walker what guaranteed values at
09:39:2120	two percent mean?
09:39:2221	A Yes. Actually we explained another thing, is that when
09:39:2922	you put the premium in, this entire contract is based on
09:39:3323	what they call five-year segments. So if you put money in
09:39:3724	in year one, whatever crediting method you chose would be
00 00 4405	

09:39:4425 | you would stay in that crediting method for that amount of

09:39:47 1	money for five years. So that was important to understand.
09:39:51 2	Now, next year, year two, if you wanted to change
09:39:54 3	and go to a different crediting method, then that segment
09:39:58 4	would go in that bucket for five years. So in the context
09:40:02 5	of that, what this guarantee is trying to say is that, okay,
09:40:09 6	if in that let's just take the very first year you go
09:40:16 7	ahead and you put the money in there and over the next five
09:40:21 8	years, if the accumulation had not grown, if it had been
09:40:28 9	paid two percent every time and the amount was less than
09:40:3310	that at the end of the five-year period, they would make up
09:40:3811	the difference.
09:40:3912	So, for example, under this scenario I believe it
09:40:4313	would be accurate to say that if there was 446 was here?
09:40:4914	Q Yes, the cash surrender value. You're looking at year
09:40:5215	five?
09:40:5316	A Yes.
09:40:5317	Q That's the guarantee?
09:40:5418	A Yes. The actual accumulation due to the indexing was
09:40:5619	440, they would actually put in \$6,792 to true it up.
09:41:0720	Q At cash surrender if they surrendered at that point in
09:41:1021	the column?
09:41:1122	A Yes.
09:41:1223	Q Were you clear with Ms. Walker that the two percent
09:41:1424	was, as you described, a five-year look back?

Yes.

09:41:1725

09:41:18 1	Q No doubt in your mind that you were clear about that?
09:41:21 2	A Yes.
09:41:21 3	Q If you will, sir, if you look to where it says annual
09:41:26 4	loan.
09:41:26 5	A Yes.
09:41:27 6	Q Am I right in seeing that there is an annual loan
09:41:31 7	amount listed of \$93,167 at year 15?
09:41:36 8	A Yes.
09:41:37 9	Q According to the illustration on the guaranteed basis,
09:41:4010	what happens after the second year of that illustrated loan?
09:41:4611	A The contract would terminate.
09:41:4912	Q It would lapse?
09:41:5013	A It would lapse.
09:41:5114	Q Did you discuss with Ms. Walker that policies lapse if,
09:41:5415	as you said before, not enough premiums are paid or too many
09:41:5916	loans are taken?
09:42:0017	A Yes.
09:42:0018	Q Now, this \$93,167 loan that is illustrated, is that a
09:42:0819	number that you came up with with Ms. Walker?
09:42:1020	A No.
09:42:1221	Q Is that a number that you promised her that she would
09:42:1622	definitely be able to get?
09:42:1823	A No.
09:42:1824	Q What did you tell Ms. Walker about her ability to take
09:42:2125	loans in the future from her policy?

09:42:25 1	A That she could take loans in the future from her
09:42:28 2	policy.
09:42:29 3	Q Did you promise her that she would be able to take
09:42:31 4	loans in any particular amount?
09:42:33 5	A No.
09:42:34 6	Q Did you promise that she would be able to take loans in
09:42:34 7	any particular amount for any particular period of time?
09:42:38 8	A No.
09:42:38 9	Q Did you ever offer Ms. Walker a probability of her
09:42:4210	ability to take loans?
09:42:4411	A No.
09:42:4512	Q Did you ever say it's sort of likely you will be able
09:42:4713	to take loans?
09:42:4814	A No.
09:42:5315	Q Would you turn now to the current basis B values. Do
09:43:0616	you see a column that says weighted average interest rate?
09:43:1017	A Yes.
09:43:1118	Q That looks like it's around seven percent?
09:43:1419	A Correct.
09:43:1520	Q Then in the upper right-hand corner well, now it's
09:43:1821	in the left there is some handwriting that says index
09:43:2122	five percent, seven percent. Do you see that writing?
09:43:2423	A Yes.
09:43:2524	Q Is that yours?
09:43:2525	A Yes.

09:43:27 1	Q Did you make those notes while describing how current
09:43:31 2	basis B works for Ms. Walker?
09:43:33 3	A Yes.
09:43:33 4	Q What did you tell her?
09:43:34 5	A One of the features of the product we liked is it had a
09:43:36 6	140 percent participation rate. If the index actually only
09:43:41 7	went up five, the contract as it sat would actually credit
09:43:48 8	seven to the index rate. That would be the index rate. So
09:43:54 9	the index would actually go up five and the contract would
09:43:5810	credit seven.
09:43:5911	Q So you also discussed with Ms. Walker as you reviewed
09:44:0312	the illustration not just how the guarantees work but how
09:44:0513	participation rates work?
09:44:0514	A Correct.
09:44:0815	Q Participation rates guaranteed or non-guaranteed?
09:44:1116	A They're non-guaranteed.
09:44:1317	Q Did you tell her that as well?
09:44:1418	A Yes.
09:44:1519	Q So this weighted average interest rate of around seven
09:44:1720	percent, was that a number that LSW dictated that you use
09:44:2021	for this illustration?
09:44:2222	A No.
09:44:2323	Q Where did that number come from?
09:44:2424	A The number we could have used would have been 7.5. We
09:44:2925	just chose to back it down to be more conservative and we

09:44:33 1	dropped it down to seven.
09:44:35 2	Q So if I'm hearing you correctly and perhaps now turn
09:44:38 3	to page 9.
09:44:47 4	A Page 9.
09:44:48 5	Q I'm sorry. Page 9 of 21, which is Exhibit 781 on page
09:44:53 6	26.
09:45:03 7	A Which one is that now?
09:45:05 8	Q Page 26, 781, focusing on the paragraph beginning the
09:45:18 9	maximum illustration rate.
09:45:2210	A Yes.
09:45:3111	Q Is this what you were just referring to that the
09:45:3312	company's maximum illustration rate was 7.5 percent?
09:45:3713	A Yes.
09:45:3714	Q But you chose not to illustrate with 7.5 percent?
09:45:4115	A Correct.
09:45:4216	Q You chose seven percent?
09:45:4317	A Yes.
09:45:4318	Q Was seven percent in any way, shape, or form correlated
09:45:4819	to the past S&P?
09:45:5020	A I'm not sure I understand the question.
09:45:5221	Q Sure, sir. I thought your testimony was earlier that
09:45:5522	the insurance company would have allowed you to illustrate
09:45:5923	7.5 percent.
09:46:0024	A Correct.
09:46:0125	Q And you just chose to illustrate something lower?

09:46:04 1	A Yes.
09:46:05 2	Q Did you discuss that with Ms. Walker?
09:46:08 3	A Yes.
09:46:10 4	Q What did you tell her about why you were choosing to
09:46:11 5	illustrate at seven percent even though the company would
09:46:16 6	have allowed you to do 7.5?
09:46:18 7	A It was just a more conservative assumption than going
09:46:22 8	with the maximum that we could have quoted.
09:46:25 9	Q Did you explain that clearly to Ms. Walker on why you
09:46:2810	were doing that?
09:46:2911	A I believe so.
09:46:3012	Q As you know from how illustrations work, could you have
09:46:3313	picked seven and a quarter?
09:46:3614	A Yes.
09:46:3615	Q Could you have picked 6.85?
09:46:3916	A Yes.
09:46:4017	Q Do you have any idea what other agents do with other
09:46:4318	customers?
09:46:4419	A The ones we teach, we tell them to do just what I have
09:46:4820	outlined here. But some will go to the maximum.
09:46:5021	Q So am I hearing you right that in your experience, what
09:46:5222	you advise other agents in your group is to do something
09:46:5723	more conservative than what the company would allow?
09:47:0124	A Yes.
09:47:0125	Q And to explain that to the client?

09:47:03 1	A Yes.
09:47:04 2	Q Maybe go back to the illustration page, which is 11 of
09:47:08 3	21, 781-30. Did you in any way, shape, or form tell
09:47:22 4	Ms. Walker, Mr. Stemler, that she should assume that in the
09:47:26 5	future the S&P will return in a way that it had in the past?
09:47:33 6	A No, because you can't say that.
09:47:35 7	Q You can't say that, sir?
09:47:37 8	A No.
09:47:37 9	Q And you didn't say that?
09:47:3810	A No.
09:47:3911	Q Instead what did you tell her?
09:47:4112	A That it was back tested and that, you know, past
09:47:4813	performance is not a predictor of the future but it's all we
09:47:5114	have to go on. So that was also part of the reason we
09:47:5515	backed it down, because I don't know what's going to happen.
09:47:5816	Q It was your judgment to illustrate something even more
09:48:0217	conservative than what the company did because you don't
09:48:0518	know what the future will hold?
09:48:0719	A Right.
09:48:0820	Q And you expressed that in a clear form of words to
09:48:1221	Ms. Walker?
09:48:1222	A Yes.
09:48:1223	Q Now, before we leave the loans, did you ever discuss
09:48:1524	with Ms. Walker any process by which you would determine
09:48:1925	whether or not she would be able to take loans from her

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policy?

A Well, the point here is when you get to the point where it's time to take money out -- well, first off, the column there with the weighted average, the main point of that is that's not reality. That's never going to happen. Things are going to go up and things are going to go down.

The use of that column, where it is useful, is it becomes a barometer. So five years from now we can take a look at what's really happened and see are we above the, if you will, glide path or below it. When you get to the point where it's time to take out loans, what we have to look at there is specifically how much is in the contract at that point in relation to what the illustration said. Then at that point you actually have to start to manage how much you take out of there so that you don't become in jeopardy.

Q So how do you work with clients as a barometer to manage their policy and their finances?

A Well, the first thing when we start out with a brand new contract, there is not really much -- I say let's not get excited for about the first three years. We have got to see if there is a trend, if there's anything going on.

But after that, then that's when we start to either via phone at the anniversary or sit-down meetings have conversations to see how much is in there versus what we had hoped would be there.

09:49:58 1	Q Is this a discussion you had with Ms. Walker?
09:50:00 2	A Yes.
09:50:00 3	Q Did you suggest that you and Ms. Walker meet on some
09:50:03 4	regular basis?
09:50:03 5	A Well, like I say, after about the first two to three
09:50:07 6	years, then it is imperative that we get together and take a
09:50:12 7	look at this thing at least once a year.
09:50:16 8	Q What would be the purpose of that annual checkup?
09:50:19 9	A Just to make sure are we ahead of the game or are we
09:50:2310	behind the projections.
09:50:2511	Q Is that something you would do with your clients?
09:50:2812	A Yes.
09:50:2813	Q Would you be doing that with Ms. Walker today had she
09:50:3214	continued to pay?
09:50:3315	A Yes.
09:50:3416	Q At some point did Ms. Walker submit a life insurance
09:50:3717	application?
09:50:3718	A Yes.
09:50:3819	Q If you would, sir, turn to Exhibit 784. It may say
09:50:4120	784-R.
09:50:4421	THE COURT: Before you do that, why don't we take
09:50:4622	our first break of the day.
09:50:5023	Ladies and gentlemen, we will be in recess for 15
09:50:5024	minutes. Please remember the admonition.
09:51:0025	(Jury not present)

MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, may I be heard on the punitive damages issue again? I think it bears on our case in particular now that I have had an opportunity to read Mr. Brosnahan's motion.

In particular Mr. Brosnahan says that having put in the information that they've put in, including these financial statements of the parent company, the motion says it is up to LSW to put in more specific numbers if it has them and wishes to offer them.

THE COURT: That's an incorrect statement of the law. McConney clearly says that's not the law and it would be unfair if it were the law.

MR. MARTENS: That's what I wanted to point out, because with regard to my Rule 50(a), as the case law interprets Murakami going forward, I think it's clear that they failed as a matter of law on their punitive damages request. They have not put in a statement of our financial information, and the Court has made clear in the Reynolds case and in the Tomaselli case that they need LSW's specific financials. They actually need to point to our conduct in California. And that if they do not do that, as a matter of law the punitives fail. So I just want to make sure I'm not in a position where I'm being forced to put in financial information in my case.

THE COURT: You're not.

09:51:19 2 09:51:22 3 09:51:24 4 09:51:27 5 09:51:31 6 09:51:34 7 09:51:37 8 09:51:40 9 09:51:4310 09:51:4411 09:51:5012 09:51:5213 09:51:5314 09:51:5615 09:51:5616 09:52:0417 09:52:0718 09:52:0919 09:52:1620 09:52:2021 09:52:2222 09:52:2623 09:52:2824

09:52:2825

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09:52:29 1	MR. BROSNAHAN: We won't make that argument, Your
09:52:31 2	Honor. I think the Court's instruction sets the appropriate
09:52:36 3	balance. And I will remind counsel and the Court that in
09:52:40 4	our opening statement, we predicated our punitive damages
09:52:44 5	request on the fees received by LSW and LSW alone on these
09:52:48 6	two policies. So I think that it is very much tied to LSW's
09:52:55 7	business in California.
09:52:57 8	MR. MARTENS: That's a separate question. They
09:52:58 9	certainly have to limit their request to conduct in
09:53:0310	California, but the California case law makes clear they
09:53:0611	must prove our financial condition. And it's not something
09:53:0912	that we can even waive as the defendant because the case law
09:53:1313	says that the state of California
09:53:1514	THE COURT: The case doesn't say that you can't
09:53:2015	waive it.
09:53:2016	MR. MARTENS: I think it says my conduct cannot
09:53:2017	waive it, including my conduct at trial and my failure to
09:53:2218	put in financials. So just the language I'm referring to in
09:53:2219	Murakami
09:53:3020	THE COURT: Page?
09:53:3021	MR. MARTENS: It's footnote seven on page 115 of
09:53:3522	the decision.
09:53:3623	THE COURT: Just a minute, please.
09:53:3724	MR. MARTENS: Excuse me. Footnote five.
09:53:4225	THE COURT: Yeah.

09:53:43 1 MR. MARTENS: It says: Most important as we have 09:53:45 2 explained above, the primary interest that must be protected 09:53:49 3 is the public interest in punitive damages awards 09:53:52 4 inappropriate amounts. We cannot allow the public interest 09:53:55 5 to be thwarted by a defendant's oversight or tactics at 09:54:02 6 trial. 09:54:03 7 I believe the case law has interpreted that in 09:54:08 8 subsequent cases to say in effect that we cannot waive it. 09:54:15 9 So if I can --09:54:1710

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THE COURT: Well, I have added an additional sentence -- and I will print this out -- to the proposed instruction. Plaintiffs have the burden to prove LSW's financial condition. If you are unable to make a reasonable estimate of LSW's financial activities in California, you may not make an award of punitive damages.

MR. MARTENS: So just the Tomaselli case in particular, Your Honor, it does use the waiver language.

THE COURT: Well, I accept it's their burden. Any failure of proof on your part is irrelevant.

MR. MARTENS: I just wanted to make sure the Court knew that I was not overstating when I said we can't waive because it literally says a private litigant cannot by inaction waive the requirement of financial data as a prerequisite to any award.

They have to come forward with company-specific

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09:55:07 1
             information to get past Rule 50. I understand the Court's
             instruction, and I will take a look at that and let the
09:55:11 2
09:55:15 3
             Court know if we have any objection.
09:55:17 4
                       THE COURT: Okay.
09:55:18 5
                       Then we will be in recess.
09:55:19 6
                              (Recess taken at 9:55 a.m.;
10:00:43 7
                              proceeding resumed at 10:08 a.m.)
10:08:28 8
                              (Jury present)
10:08:28 9
                       THE COURT: Mr. Shapiro.
10:08:2910
                       MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:08:2911
             BY MR. SHAPIRO:
10:08:3012
             Q
                  Before we broke, Mr. Stemler, we were talking a little
10:08:3513
             bit about the potential to take loans in the policy? Yes,
10:08:3714
             sir?
10:08:3815
             Α
                  Yes.
10:08:3916
                  What did you tell Ms. Walker about how you and she
             Q
10:08:4517
             would plan to figure out her loans in the future?
10:08:5018
                  When the time came, we would have to get together and
             Α
10:08:5419
             take a look at how much money was actually in the contract
10:08:5720
             at that point and make a determination how much could be
10:09:0121
             reasonably taken out.
10:09:0322
                  Is that because, sir, that you didn't know what the S&P
10:09:0623
             would actually do between the point of sale and, say, the
10:09:1124
             next 15 years?
10:09:1225
                  No idea.
             Α
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10:09:14 1	Q Did you explain that clearly to Ms. Walker?
10:09:17 2	A Yes.
10:09:17 3	Q At some point Ms. Walker submitted an application to
10:09:26 4	LSW to buy a Provider policy?
10:09:32 5	A Correct.
10:09:33 6	Q Would you turn, sir, to Exhibit 784, which is already
10:09:35 7	in evidence.
10:09:36 8	A I'm there.
10:09:37 9	Q Is this Ms. Walker's life insurance policy?
10:09:4010	A It's the application for it.
10:09:4311	Q Is this Ms. Walker's application to purchase a life
10:09:4612	insurance policy?
10:09:4713	A Yes.
10:09:4814	Q Did you assist Ms. Walker in her completion of the
10:09:5115	application which is Exhibit 784-R?
10:09:5516	A Yes.
10:09:5617	Q Could you just tell the jury how the process goes of
10:09:5918	taking a life insurance application.
10:10:0419	A The top half was actually just the basic information,
10:10:0720	was filled in by our staff just to make it go quicker. If
10:10:1221	the decision at that meeting was to move forward, then I as
10:10:1722	the agent need to fill out ask the questions and do those
10:10:2123	things. And that's what we did.
10:10:2324	Q Because there's any number of questions about
10:10:2725	lifestyle, personal details, health, and so forth?

10:10:31 1	A Yes.
10:10:32 2	Q Did you get those answers did you fill in the
10:10:35 3	answers to those questions with Ms. Walker in the room?
10:10:38 4	A She is the one who gave me the answers. Yes.
10:10:41 5	Q Right. So you asked her the questions and she gave you
10:10:43 6	the answers, and then you wrote it in per her instructions?
10:10:48 7	A Yes.
10:10:48 8	Q At the end of the process, does she sign the
10:10:50 9	application?
10:10:5110	A Yes.
10:10:5111	Q Does Ms. Walker have an opportunity to read and review
10:10:5512	her application before she signs it?
10:10:5813	A Sure.
10:10:5814	Q You didn't hide any of the questions or answers before
10:11:0115	she did?
10:11:0216	A No.
10:11:0217	Q Did you take a check from Ms. Walker at the time of the
10:11:0518	application?
10:11:0619	A Actually, no. I don't believe so, no.
10:11:1020	Q So the application gets submitted and paying for it
10:11:1321	comes later?
10:11:1422	A Sometimes you do collect a check, but in this case we
10:11:1823	wanted to get the underwriting done to make sure we knew
10:11:2224	what the underwriting was.
10:11:2425	Q Is that because when you do the illustration, have the

10:11:24 1	discussions, you don't know what the medical underwriting is
10:11:28 2	going to be?
10:11:29 3	A Correct.
10:11:29 4	Q Did LSW accept or grant Ms. Walker's application for a
10:11:34 5	policy?
10:11:34 6	A Yes.
10:11:40 7	Q At some point did you deliver that policy to her?
10:11:43 8	A Yes.
10:11:45 9	Q If you would turn to Exhibit 676.
10:11:5310	A 676?
10:11:5611	Q Please, Mr. Stemler. What is 676?
10:12:0312	A It's the policy receipt.
10:12:0613	Q This is a policy receipt for the life insurance policy?
10:12:1214	A Yes.
10:12:1215	Q Did you deliver the policy to her?
10:12:1416	A Yes.
10:12:1517	Q Can you describe how that process goes.
10:12:1718	A If I remember correctly, I actually went down to her
10:12:2019	office. I had the policy. I had the other documents that
10:12:2320	were there, and we I met her at the office, gave her the
10:12:2821	policy. She signed the policy receipt, and I collected the
10:12:3222	first premium check.
10:12:3423	Q So you went to her office at a time that you and she
10:12:3824	had selected that works for both of you?
10:12:4225	A Yes.

10:12:42 1	Q You did this in person at her place of business?
10:12:45 2	A I believe that's correct.
10:12:46 3	Q And you brought the stack of material that's listed on
10:12:50 4	Exhibit 876?
10:12:52 5	A Yes.
10:12:52 6	Q And that includes, number one, the life insurance
10:12:55 7	policy itself?
10:12:56 8	A Correct.
10:12:56 9	Q A buyer's guide?
10:12:5810	A Correct.
10:12:5811	Q A second buyer's guide?
10:12:5912	A Yes.
10:13:0013	Q And also a proposal which matches the policy?
10:13:0314	A Yes.
10:13:0315	Q Is proposal which matches the policy another word for a
10:13:0816	new illustration that matches the policy?
10:13:0817	A Yes.
10:13:0918	Q Did you deliver all of these documents to Ms. Walker?
10:13:1319	A Yes.
10:13:1320	Q Did you tell Ms. Walker to read her policy?
10:13:1621	A Yes. And she had ten days to decide if she wanted to
10:13:2322	take it or not.
10:13:2523	Q So the ten days, is that sometimes referred to as a
10:13:2624	free look period?
10:13:2825	A Yes.

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10:13:28 1	Q Under a free look period can Ms. Walker or any
10:13:32 2	policyholder just decide not to take the product?
10:13:35 3	A Yes.
10:13:35 4	Q Is that why you told her to read it?
10:13:38 5	A Yes.
10:13:39 6	Q And you're sure you were clear in that way with her?
10:13:42 7	A Yes.
10:13:43 8	Q Do you know why you deliver strike that. The life
10:13:46 9	insurance buyer's guide and the IUL buyer's guide, these are
10:13:5110	documents you also provided?
10:13:5211	A Yes.
10:13:5212	Q You're familiar with those documents?
10:13:5413	A Yes.
10:13:5514	Q They all come in the same package that you delivered to
10:13:5815	Ms. Walker?
10:13:5916	A Yes.
10:14:0217	Q If you would turn to the buyer's guide which is Exhibit
10:14:1118	86. I believe you don't have a copy in your binder.
10:14:1719	MR. SHAPIRO: So if I may, Your Honor?
10:14:1920	THE COURT: You may.
10:14:2121	MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you.
10:14:2122	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
10:14:4023	Q Mr. Stemler, is Exhibit 86 the SecurePlus Provider
10:14:4524	buyer's guide that you gave to Ms. Walker?
10:14:4725	A Yes.

10:14:53 1	Q Turn if you will to page 4 of the buyer's guide. Do
10:15:03 2	you see on the right-hand side it says basic strategy?
10:15:07 3	A Yes.
10:15:08 4	Q Moving down under where it says point to average
10:15:18 5	crediting strategy, are you with me?
10:15:21 6	A Yes.
10:15:24 7	Q Is this where in the buyer's guide it describes the
10:15:26 8	point to average crediting strategy of the Provider policy?
10:15:33 9	A Yes.
10:15:3710	Q There and among any other number of other places?
10:15:4011	A Yes.
10:15:4112	Q Do you see the description where it says guarantees, no
10:15:4313	cap, zero percent floor, and two percent interest annually
10:15:4714	over five-year term?
10:15:4915	A Yes.
10:15:4916	Q Is that written description consistent with what you
10:15:5417	explained to Ms. Walker when you went through her
10:15:5618	illustration as you told us about before our break this
10:16:0119	morning?
10:16:0120	A Yes.
10:16:0421	Q Turning the page, Mr. Stemler, do you see a diagram
10:16:1622	that says option A level death benefit?
10:16:1923	A Yes.
10:16:2024	Q A little chart? Is that option A level death benefit
10:16:2625	that is depicted in that diagram on page 5 of Exhibit 86

10:16:31 1	another way to draw the same drawing that you did in the
10:16:35 2	room with her on the back of the illustration?
10:16:37 3	A Yes.
10:16:39 4	Q Is it the case that the white portion of that is the
10:16:43 5	net amount at risk that you described to her?
10:16:46 6	A Correct.
10:16:46 7	Q So what you described in the room on the back of her
10:16:49 8	illustration was just yet another explanation of what's also
10:16:54 9	here in her buyer's guide?
10:16:5610	A Yes.
10:16:5711	Q Is that information also in her policy, sir?
10:17:0212	A That I don't
10:17:0413	Q You would have to pull up the document?
10:17:0514	A I would have to pull up the document.
10:17:0815	Q Fair enough. Then if you look on the right-hand
10:17:1016	column, guaranteed interest rates.
10:17:1217	A Yes.
10:17:1618	Q Again, do you see the second paragraph, SecurePlus
10:17:2019	Provider guaranteed minimum interest is two percent?
10:17:2420	A Yes.
10:17:2521	Q Is this yet another description of how the two percent
10:17:2822	works on a five-year retroactive index basis?
10:17:3223	A Yes.
10:17:3224	Q In fact, it says 10.4 percent?
10:17:3525	A That' two percent compounded over five years.

10:17:39 1	Q If you wouldn't mind, sir, would you just read that
10:17:41 2	paragraph into the record.
10:17:43 3	A Sure. The SecurePlus Provider guaranteed minimum
10:17:46 4	interest is two percent annually for each five-year indexed
10:17:52 5	segment. At the end of each segment a test will compare the
10:17:56 6	actual indexed credits to the guaranteed interest rate of
10:17:59 7	two percent, 10.4 percent over a segment's five-year term.
10:18:06 8	If the indexed credits are less than the guaranteed rate,
10:18:10 9	the difference will be credited to the segment.
10:18:1210	Q And that language again is in the buyer's guide that
10:18:1711	you gave Ms. Walker with her policy?
10:18:1912	A Yes.
10:18:2013	Q At the time you told her about her ten-day free look
10:18:2414	period?
10:18:2415	A Yes.
10:18:2816	Q Following the delivery of Ms. Walker's policy in
10:18:3217	January 2008, did you have another meeting with her that
10:18:3718	year?
10:18:3719	A I believe we had one around April.
10:18:4320	Q April or so of 2008? I know it's been forever ago.
10:18:4821	Around April 2008?
10:18:4922	A I think.
10:18:5023	Q Did the purpose of that meeting have to do with her LSW
10:18:5324	policy?

A I don't believe so.

10:18:5425

10:18:55 1	Q What was just briefly, what was the purpose of that
10:18:57 2	meeting in April 2008?
10:19:00 3	A Without looking at our notes from the file, I think
10:19:03 4	that was the one that was the first discussion we had
10:19:07 5	regarding the annuity for the pension plan. I don't have
10:19:14 6	the notes here.
10:19:16 7	Q Would it refresh your memory to look at the log of your
10:19:21 8	meetings from your office file?
10:19:23 9	A Yes.
10:19:2410	Q If you would open your binder, Mr. Stemler, to what's
10:19:3011	in your binder as 867-D. Just tell me when you are there.
10:19:4612	A I'm there.
10:19:4813	Q Are the pages behind tab 867-D from a log that's
10:19:5514	maintained at the office of all the contacts with a client
10:20:0015	like Ms. Walker?
10:20:0116	A Yes.
10:20:0317	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, we would move into
10:20:0318	evidence Exhibit 867-D, which is pages 281 through 286.
10:20:1619	MR. FOSTER: Objection, Your Honor. This is
10:20:1620	hearsay upon hearsay.
10:20:2021	MR. SHAPIRO: I can lay the foundation.
10:20:2222	THE COURT: Lay the foundation.
10:20:2223	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
10:20:2324	Q Number one, Mr. Stemler, do you recognize
10:20:2725	Exhibit 867-D?

10:20:29 1	A Yes.
10:20:30 2	Q What is 867-D?
10:20:33 3	A It's the log that we keep of all contact with clients,
10:20:39 4	both personal and verbal.
10:20:41 5	Q When you say we, you're talking about at the insurance
10:20:46 6	office?
10:20:47 7	A At Preservation Financial. Marta Wood is charged with
10:20:51 8	maintaining this log.
10:20:52 9	Q Is this a business record of Preservation Financial.
10:20:5610	A Yes.
10:20:5611	Q Is Exhibit 867-D made and kept in the usual course of
10:21:0112	the Preservation Financial business?
10:21:0213	A Yes.
10:21:0314	Q Does Marta Wood have knowledge of the information she
10:21:0615	records on the log?
10:21:0716	A Yes.
10:21:0817	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, we would move
10:21:0818	Exhibit 867-D into evidence.
10:21:1319	MR. FOSTER: I don't think this is a business
10:21:1520	record, Your Honor.
10:21:1721	THE COURT: 867-D will be received.
10:21:1822	MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:21:1823	(Exhibit No. 867-D received in evidence)
10:21:1824	BY MR. SHAPIRO:
10:21:1925	Q So going back to the chronology, do you see on 867,

10:21:30 1	page 281, there are references to meetings in the spring of
10:21:43 2	2008?
10:21:45 3	A Yes.
10:21:49 4	Q Does that help refresh your memory that you met with
10:21:53 5	her at least at some point during that spring?
10:21:55 6	A Yes.
10:21:56 7	Q To your best memory just briefly what you talked about
10:22:00 8	that didn't have to do with the LSW policy.
10:22:05 9	A This appears at the point I think when we started
10:22:0810	having the discussions of what to do with the additional
10:22:1311	funds regarding retirement and things of that nature. If I
10:22:1712	am reading this correctly, we knew some money was going to
10:22:2913	be coming available, but we also knew she was planning to
10:22:3214	get married. And so we basically said, you know, let's wait
10:22:3615	until after you get married and things of that nature.
10:22:4016	Q Are you referring maybe to an entry that could have
10:22:4117	been July 2008?
10:22:4318	A Yes.
10:22:4419	Q I guess that's why we have logs. Yes, sir?
10:22:4620	A Yes.
10:22:4921	Q And your memory is she came back to the office to talk
10:22:5222	to you about some more financial planning?
10:22:5423	A Yes.
10:22:5824	Q As we see right here in the exhibit, she also let Jeff
10:23:0225	and Mike know that she's getting married in July? Is that

what you're referring to?
A Yes.
Q She said in some form of words: Go get married and
when things settle out, we will visit?
A Correct.
Q Does LSW send annual statements to policyholders?
A Yes.
Q Did LSW send Ms. Walker an annual statement after her
first year with the Provider policy?
A Yes.
Q Could you turn now to 867 could you turn, sir, to
Exhibit 94, which has already been admitted into evidence.
Before turning to the exhibit, how did the stock market do
in 2008?
A It went down about 30-plus percent.
Q What kind of impact did a decline of 30-plus percent in
2008 have on the Provider policy that you had sold to
Ms. Walker?
A It was credited with zero.
Q Why was it credited with zero when the market was down
30-plus percent?
A Because that's how indexing works. You can get some of
the upside, but you can't go below zero.
Q So in that first year she got very much the benefit of
the zero percent floor?

10:24:29 1	A Yes.
10:24:29 2	Q Did you discuss the annual statement that is Exhibit 94
10:24:33 3	with Ms. Walker?
10:24:35 4	A Yes.
10:24:37 5	Q Do you remember discussing with her how the market did
10:24:40 6	in 2008?
10:24:44 7	A It was ugly.
10:24:49 8	Q So the best you can, just tell the jury what you said
10:24:51 9	to her and what she said to you around the time she got the
10:24:5610	annual statement.
10:24:5711	A I don't remember the conversation, per se. The fact
10:25:0012	was the good news was she didn't lose 34 percent on that
10:25:0613	amount of money.
10:25:0614	Q You conveyed that in some form of words to her?
10:25:0915	A Yes.
10:25:1016	Q At the time she discussed the performance of her
10:25:1117	insurance policy after her first year, did she complain to
10:25:1518	you?
10:25:1519	A No. She was asking just how did it work; did I get
10:25:1820	credited anything. And we said no, not from the index.
10:25:2521	There was a small crediting
10:25:2722	Q \$435?
10:25:2923	A Because that was when the money sat in that basic
10:25:3324	account until they put it into the index.
10 05 0505	

So she got a few hundred dollars. She did a little bit

10:25:3525

10:25:37 1	better than zero?
10:25:39 2	A A little bit better.
10:25:40 3	Q And after a year and the market did a little bit worse
10:25:41 4	than 30 percent down?
10:25:46 5	A Yes.
10:25:47 6	Q Did you explain that to her?
10:25:48 7	A Yes.
10:25:48 8	Q Did Mr. Walker say in any form of words to you:
10:25:52 9	Mr. Stemler, you promised me two percent?
10:25:5410	A No.
10:25:5511	Q Did she say in any form of words to you: This is not
10:25:5912	the product that I thought I was buying?
10:26:0113	A No.
10:26:0114	Q Did she express in any way, shape, or form any
10:26:0315	dissatisfaction with the LSW policy?
10:26:0616	A No.
10:26:0717	Q How about with the customer service you were providing?
10:26:1018	A She didn't mention anything at that point.
10:26:1219	Q So just looking at the annual statement that was sent,
10:26:1720	it says beginning accumulated value of zero?
10:26:2121	A Correct.
10:26:2122	Q That's because this was the first year, right, so she
10:26:2423	started with zero?
10:26:2724	A Yes.
10:26:2725	Q Then \$112,000, that was the premium payment; right?

10:26:30 1	A Yes.
10:26:30 2	Q Withdrawals, zero?
10:26:33 3	A Right.
10:26:33 4	Q Monthly deductions?
10:26:33 5	A Correct.
10:26:33 6	Q Is that the cumulative, you know, costs, charges, and
10:26:33 7	so forth that are taken out of the policy?
10:26:38 8	A Correct.
10:26:39 9	Q Did Ms. Walker complain in any way, shape, or form
10:26:4310	about the fact that there was 20,000 or 19,606.58 taken out
10:26:5111	of the policy?
10:26:5212	A No. When the original illustration shows that number,
10:26:5413	so that would have already been factored in.
10:26:5814	Q It should have been of no surprise to her; right?
10:27:0115	A Correct.
10:27:0116	Q And she certainly didn't suggest that she was
10:27:0317	dissatisfied or surprised by that either?
10:27:0518	A No, not that I know of.
10:27:0619	Q And then below it says the \$435.11?
10:27:1220	A Correct.
10:27:1321	Q And that's what she got?
10:27:1522	A Correct.
10:27:1523	Q Now, if you just turn two pages in the annual
10:27:2024	statement. Is this the breakout or itemization of the
10:27:2825	premiums received?

10:27:29 1	A Yes.
10:27:31 2	Q Is there also an itemization of the expense charges?
10:27:35 3	A Yes.
10:27:35 4	Q And they are listed, what, to the penny, sir, for every
10:27:38 5	month?
10:27:39 6	A That's correct.
10:27:39 7	Q And then those expense charges amount to how much?
10:27:45 8	A I believe it's the 19,000 on the other page.
10:27:49 9	Q Right. And there's actually two columns; right?
10:27:5010	There's one for expense charges and there is one for cost of
10:27:5611	insurance?
10:27:5712	A Correct.
10:28:0013	Q How much were the total expense charges?
10:28:0514	A \$18,526.04.
10:28:1015	Q And then there's also a separate column for cost of
10:28:1316	insurance?
10:28:1317	A Yes.
10:28:1418	Q And that adds up to the 19,000 plus that's on the front
10:28:1919	page?
10:28:1920	A It should.
10:28:2021	Q So it shows it actually twice in the annual statement?
10:28:2622	A Yes.
10:28:2623	Q She didn't complain about any of these expenses either?
10:28:3024	A That I remember, no.
10:28:3525	Q If you would, Mr. Stemler, now turn to Exhibit 867-A,

10:28:43 1	which has previously been admitted into evidence. In
10:28:54 2	addition to the conversation you had with Ms. Walker and in
10:28:58 3	addition to the annual statement about the zero or the \$435
10:29:05 4	she received, did your office also send her a letter telling
10:29:08 5	her what the interest that had been credited to her policy
10:29:11 6	was?
10:29:13 7	A I believe that's what this letter is.
10:29:16 8	Q Is this letter from Marta Wood?
10:29:19 9	A Yes.
10:29:2810	Q Marta Wood is the woman you referred to earlier who is
10:29:3111	part of your team?
10:29:3212	A Yes.
10:29:3313	Q Could you read for the jury what Ms. Wood wrote in her
10:29:3914	letter on your behalf to Ms. Walker, the second paragraph.
10:29:4315	A Jeff also asked that I obtain the amount of interest
10:29:4816	earned on your policy during 2008. The interest earned is
10:29:5217	credited to your policy each year on the 21st of January,
10:29:5618	and for 2008 it was zero. To obtain the amount of interest
10:30:0019	credited for your policy each year, you can call LSW
10:30:0620	customer service, 800-732-8939, after January 21. You will
10:30:1421	need to reference your LSW policy number, LS 0156670. If I
10:30:2222	can be of further assistance or if you have any other
10:30:2423	questions, please call us at 800-303-8754, extension 5415.
10:30:3324	Q So is it the case, according to this letter, that the
10:30:3325	interest crediting is done on the 21st of January?

10:30:37 1	A That's the end of the 30 days, if you will. So by then
10:30:42 2	it has been credited.
10:30:44 3	Q That's how the system works?
10:30:45 4	A Yes.
10:30:46 5	Q And then here six days later your office is actually
10:30:49 6	sending her a letter saying it was zero?
10:30:52 7	A Confirming it, yes.
10:30:53 8	Q After this letter went out, did you ever hear back from
10:30:56 9	Ms. Walker saying no, no, I was due two percent?
10:30:5910	A No.
10:30:5911	Q And no other memory of any complaints whatsoever?
10:31:0212	A No. Actually I remember I think we have she said
10:31:0613	the second premium.
10:31:0914	Q So after the conversation you had with her about how
10:31:1315	the policy did with the zero, after the annual statement,
10:31:1416	and then after this additional letter, the next thing that
10:31:1417	happened is she paid another premium?
10:31:2918	A I believe so.
10:31:2919	Q Was that another \$112,000?
10:31:3120	A Again, I believe so.
10:31:3221	Q After Ms. Walker paid her second premium of \$112,000 in
10:31:3722	February 2009, did you see her again that year?
10:31:4123	A That's when I would again need to go back to the log.
10:31:4724	Q Sure.
10:31:4925	A That's 867; right?

10:31:52 1	Q 867-D. I believe there is a reference to a meeting on
10:32:07 2	April 15th.
10:32:12 3	A Jeff met with her Jeff met with Joyce today at her
10:32:19 4	office. He has scheduled an appointment to meet with her
10:32:23 5	again with Mike next week, April 22nd, at her office.
10:32:28 6	Q Is this a memory of meeting with her in the spring?
10:32:32 7	A Yes.
10:32:32 8	Q At that meeting did she complain in any way, shape, or
10:32:37 9	form about her LSW policy?
10:32:4010	A No.
10:32:4211	Q At that meeting did she complain in any way, shape, or
10:32:4312	form about the customer service that you and Marta and Mike
10:32:4513	were providing to her?
10:32:4814	A No.
10:32:4915	Q Is it the case, sir, that she then filed a complaint
10:32:5316	with LSW about the policy and your conduct in selling it?
10:32:5917	A Yes.
10:33:0018	Q Was that in June of 2009?
10:33:1219	A I believe it is, but I just can't find it.
10:33:1520	Q Sure. Putting aside the precise date, in that
10:33:1821	complaint did Ms. Walker make some very serious allegations
10:33:2222	about you, sir?
10:33:2323	A Yes.
10:33:2324	Q Now, that was sort of five years ago in which she first
10:33:2925	questioned your integrity?

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10:33:30 1
                  Yes.
             Α
10:33:31 2
             Q
                  One more time, did you do anything wrong to or with
10:33:34 3
             Ms. Walker?
10:33:35 4
             Α
                  No.
10:33:36 5
                  Did you lie to her?
             0
10:33:37 6
             Α
                  No.
10:33:37 7
             0
                  Did you hide anything from her?
10:33:39 8
             Α
                  No.
10:33:40 9
             0
                  Did you always treat her with integrity?
10:33:4310
             Α
                  Yes.
10:33:4411
                                      Thank you, sir.
                       MR. SHAPIRO:
10:34:1312
                       THE COURT: Mr. Foster.
10:34:1613
                       MR. FOSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
10:34:1814
                       May I approach the witness with a binder, Your
10:35:2715
             Honor?
10:35:2916
                       THE COURT: You may.
10:35:2917
                                    CROSS-EXAMINATION
10:35:3018
             BY MR. FOSTER:
10:35:4319
                  Good morning, Mr. Stemler.
             Q
10:35:4520
             Α
                 Good morning.
10:35:4621
                  We have met before; correct?
             Q
10:35:4822
             Α
                  Yes.
10:35:4923
                   I took your testimony at a deposition here in Irvine;
             Q
10:35:5124
             correct?
10:35:5325
                  That's correct.
             Α
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10:35:55 1	Q And you are an executive vice-president of sales at
10:35:58 2	Asset Marketing Systems; correct?
10:36:01 3	A Yes.
10:36:01 4	Q And Asset Marketing Systems has approximately 600
10:36:09 5	agents nationwide who place life insurance policies;
10:36:13 6	correct?
10:36:14 7	A Correct.
10:36:15 8	Q In talking about this specific insurance policy, the
10:36:20 9	LSW Provider policy, LSW did not ever provide you with any
10:36:2410	information related to the chance that Ms. Walker's policy
10:36:2711	would lapse before her life expectancy; did it?
10:36:3212	A Other than the standard information that if they don't
10:36:3713	pay premiums, it will lapse.
10:36:3914	Q So other than if you don't pay premiums, it will lapse,
10:36:4315	LSW did not provide you any information related to the
10:36:4616	probability that Ms. Walker's policy would lapse before her
10:36:5017	life expectancy?
10:36:5118	A I believe that's correct.
10:36:5319	Q And since LSW never provided you with any information
10:36:5720	like that at all, you never provided it to Ms. Walker; did
10:37:0021	you?
10:37:0122	A No.
10:37:0523	Q And have you ever been provided with any numbers or
10:37:1024	heard any numbers outside the context of this litigation
10:37:1425	related to the probability that the Provider policy would

10:37:17 1	lapse before the end of an insured person's life expectancy?
10:37:22 2	A No.
10:37:24 3	Q LSW never provided you with any such numbers?
10:37:28 4	A The likelihood of it lapsing?
10:37:32 5	Q Before an insured person's life expectancy.
10:37:37 6	A Not that I know of.
10:37:39 7	Q And you did not provide them to Ms. Walker?
10:37:42 8	A Correct.
10:37:42 9	Q So I'm going to show you slide 205-01. This is a
10:37:5710	calculation of the lapse probability for all policies in a
10:38:0211	sample with loans and withdrawals as illustrated in the
10:38:0512	illustration, and the calculation is that for SecurePlus
10:38:1013	Provider 59.8 percent chance of lapse at or before life
10:38:1514	expectancy; do you see that?
10:38:1715	A Yes.
10:38:1716	Q And LSW never provided you with any numbers like this
10:38:2117	at all; did they?
10:38:2218	A No.
10:38:2319	Q And since you were not aware of any such numbers, you
10:38:2720	did not provide them to Ms. Walker; did you?
10:38:3021	A No.
10:38:3122	Q So when you discussed the potential to use the Provider
10:38:3423	policy to take loans or withdrawals, these types of lapse
10:38:4024	probability statistics were not in way part of the
10:38:4325	conversation you had with Ms. Walker; were they?

10:38:46 1	A No.
10:38:46 2	Q Now, did LSW ever tell you a percentage of Provider
10:38:52 3	policies that it expected to lapse?
10:38:56 4	A No.
10:38:56 5	Q And since LSW never provided you with that information,
10:38:58 6	of course you couldn't provide it to Ms. Walker; correct?
10:39:02 7	A Correct.
10:39:03 8	Q And since LSW didn't provide you with that information,
10:39:07 9	none of the agents that worked for Asset Marketing Systems
10:39:1010	could provide it to Ms. Walker; correct?
10:39:1311	A Correct.
10:39:1712	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, Your Honor, as to other
10:39:1713	agents.
10:39:1914	MR. FOSTER: He runs a marketing organization of
10:39:2215	600 agents, Your Honor.
10:39:2416	THE COURT: Overruled.
10:39:2417	BY MR. FOSTER:
10:39:2518	Q And you are aware of course that the Provider
10:39:2719	illustrations, they project non-guaranteed values using an
10:39:3120	essentially constant rate of return without any year-to-year
10:39:3621	variability; correct?
10:39:3722	A Correct.
10:39:4423	Q But is there a risk that the Provider policy might
10:39:4824	lapse if the S&P 500 performed just as well in the future as
10:39:5125	it did in the past on average?

10:39:56 1	A I know of nothing that would support that.
10:39:58 2	Q You have no idea about that whatsoever?
10:40:02 3	A That it would lapse, no.
10:40:03 4	Q So if individuals at LSW were aware that the sequence
10:40:17 5	of returns would have an impact on the values depicted in
10:40:23 6	the illustration, that was never anything that they shared
10:40:26 7	with you; correct?
10:40:27 8	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, Your Honor. We're not
10:40:28 9	sure there is a basis for that question.
10:40:3110	MR. FOSTER: It's Ms. MacGowan's testimony.
10:40:3511	THE COURT: Overruled.
10:40:3612	THE WITNESS: Can you say that again.
10:40:3913	BY MR. FOSTER:
10:40:3914	Q Yes. If it was known to individuals at LSW that the
10:40:4615	sequence of returns would have an effect on the likelihood
10:40:4816	that the Provider policy would lapse even if S&P 500
10:40:5117	performed on average in the future as it did in the past,
10:40:5418	that was information that was not shared with you; correct?
10:40:5919	A No.
10:40:5920	Q And was not shared as far as you know with any of the
10:41:0321	agents that work under you?
10:41:0622	A No.
10:41:0623	Q As far as you know, it was not shared with any agents
10:41:1024	across this country?

Correct.

10:41:1225

10:41:14 1	Q And since it was never shared with you, you never
10:41:17 2	discussed such matters with Ms. Walker; correct?
10:41:21 3	A Correct.
10:41:25 4	Q And you never told her about the possibility that the
10:41:29 5	Provider policy might lapse even if the S&P 500 performed
10:41:33 6	just as well on average in the future as it did in the past;
10:41:36 7	correct?
10:41:38 8	A I have no reason to believe that, so, no.
10:41:40 9	Q You have no reason to believe that sitting here today?
10:41:4310	A Correct.
10:41:4411	Q And LSW has never transmitted to you any information
10:41:4712	about that possibility; correct?
10:41:4913	A Correct.
10:41:4914	Q They have never transmitted that information to any of
10:41:5415	the individuals in your agent force; correct?
10:41:5616	A Correct.
10:41:5717	Q Now, you are familiar with the concept of Monte Carlo
10:42:0018	simulations; correct?
10:42:0119	A Yes.
10:42:0120	Q Now, Monte Carlo simulations are not part of the basic
10:42:0721	LSW Provider illustration; are they?
10:42:1022	A Not that I know of.
10:42:1123	Q Okay. And as far as you know, there is no supplemental
10:42:1524	illustration or optional report that includes any sort of
10:42:1925	Monte Carlo analysis; correct?

10:42:21 1	A Correct.
10:42:22 2	Q If I can put up slide 102-01. It's a Monte Carlo
10:42:31 3	analysis conducted for Ms. Walker's policy. It's based on
10:42:37 4	her illustration, the illustration you discussed earlier
10:42:39 5	today. It shows that even if all of her premiums are paid
10:42:47 6	just as depicted in the illustration, she would have a
10:42:51 7	61 percent chance of lapse before her life expectancy of 84
10:42:56 8	years even if the S&P 500 performed on average in the future
10:43:00 9	as it has in the past just because of market volatility. Do
10:43:0610	you understand that?
10:43:0711	A I understand what you said.
10:43:0812	Q And this information in form or substance was never
10:43:1613	provided to you by LSW; correct?
10:43:1814	A Correct.
10:43:1915	Q And since LSW never provided you with it, you never
10:43:2216	provided it to Ms. Walker?
10:43:2417	A Correct.
10:43:2518	Q So these types of risks were not part of the discussion
10:43:2819	at all that you had with Ms. Walker about taking loans or
10:43:3220	withdrawals; correct?
10:43:3321	A Correct.
10:43:3322	Q And if LSW required use of lapse risk statistics,
10:43:3923	stochastic scenarios, or Monte Carlo simulations with its
10:43:4424	Provider illustrations, would you have used those

simulations?

10:43:4725

10:43:50 1	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, Your Honor. Compound.
10:43:52 2	THE COURT: Overruled.
10:43:53 3	THE WITNESS: If they required it, I would have
10:43:57 4	presented it.
10:43:57 5	BY MR. FOSTER:
10:43:57 6	Q So if they had required Monte Carlo simulations, you
10:44:01 7	would have presented it?
10:44:02 8	A Yes.
10:44:02 9	Q And if they had required stochastic analysis, you would
10:44:0610	have presented it?
10:44:0711	A If they required it, yes.
10:44:0912	Q And if they just required disclosure that the policy
10:44:1313	had a risk of lapse or reduced value even if the S&P 500
10:44:1714	returned on average the amount depicted in the current basis
10:44:2115	B values in the illustration, you would have made that
10:44:2416	disclosure?
10:44:2517	A If that was required, yes.
10:44:2818	Q And you would have provided all those disclosures with
10:44:3219	Ms. Walker if LSW had required it; correct?
10:44:3520	A Yes.
10:44:3621	Q As far as you know, does LSW quantify the effect on
10:44:4322	policy values that results from returns not being constant
10:44:4723	in the real world?
10:44:5124	A As far as I know, no.
10:44:5525	Q Putting up Exhibit 565-58, reduced value to volatility

10:45:05 1 And this is a sample of all policyholders with 10:45:05 2 Providers who had sales illustrations, and it looked at the 10:45:05 3 value depicted in the current basis B columns of their 10:45:05 4 illustrations and compared it to how the policies would 10:45:20 5 actually function with market volatility even if the S&P 500 10:45:23 6 returned on average the same in the future as it did in the 10:45:28 7 past and found that Provider policies had a 95 percent 10:45:33 8 likelihood of having reduced value as compared to the 10:45:38 9 current basis B values in the illustration. 10:45:4010 The question for you is that LSW never provided 10:45:4311 you with any information of this sort or substance; correct? 10:45:4712 Α As far as I know, correct. 10:45:5013 And LSW never provided you with any information related 10:45:5314 to the possibility that the policies would suffer reduced 10:45:5715 value even if the S&P 500 returned on average the rate 10:46:0316 depicted in the current basis B values of the illustration? 10:46:0617 Α Repeat that question. 10:46:0918 LSW never provided you with any information of 10:46:1319 this sort regarding reduced policy value as compared to the

Q Yeah. LSW never provided you with any information of this sort regarding reduced policy value as compared to the current basis B values depicted in the illustration that could result if the S&P 500 performed on average in the future as the rate used to calculate the current basis B values shown in the illustration?

- A They didn't quantify it with a percentage.
- Q Thank you. Since they didn't quantify it in any way,

SHARON SEFFENS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT REPORTER

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10:46:43 1	that was not a part of your discussion of the Provider
10:46:46 2	policy with Ms. Walker or anything like this type of
10:46:47 3	quantification?
10:46:51 4	A The conversation that I had with her is that the real
10:46:53 5	world is not seven percent constant. It was going to be up
10:46:58 6	and down. That's why we had to get together eventually to
10:47:03 7	determine where did it end up.
10:47:05 8	Q Exactly. So in the real world, you know, we know that
10:47:08 9	the S&P 500, according to the historical back testing you
10:47:1310	talked about, was 7.5 percent; correct? And if we add a lot
10:47:1611	of years in the future that unfortunately were like 2008,
10:47:1912	the market could return lower than 7.5 percent; correct?
10:47:2413	A Correct.
10:47:2414	Q Or if we add a lot years that hopefully were like last
10:47:2915	year, the market could return on average higher than
10:47:3116	7.5 percent; correct?
10:47:3317	A Correct.
10:47:3318	Q And that's true of the seven percent that you used to
10:47:3819	make it a little more conservative; correct? The market
10:47:4120	could be higher on average in the future or lower on average
10:47:4321	in the future; correct?
10:47:4622	A Correct.
10:47:4623	Q But your testimony is that you have no idea about the
10:47:4924	risk to the Provider policy even if the S&P 500 performed

just as well in the future as it did on average in the past;

10:47:5525

10:47:57 1	correct?
10:47:59 2	A Correct.
10:47:59 3	Q So that was the type of risk that was not discussed
10:48:02 4	with Ms. Walker; correct?
10:48:03 5	A Correct.
10:48:08 6	Q If I told you that that risk would produce a reduced
10:48:13 7	expected value of well, let me ask you something else.
10:48:20 8	When Ms. Walker later filed her complaint and complained
10:48:23 9	about the policy and the projections of the values, you said
10:48:2610	that the values that you were depicting were supported by
10:48:2911	the historical back testing that LSW had conducted;
10:48:3212	correction?
10:48:3413	A Yes.
10:48:3514	Q So you relied on the historical back testing and the
10:48:4015	calculations that LSW engaged in to present the illustration
10:48:4416	in the policy to Ms. Walker; correct?
10:48:4617	A Correct.
10:48:5118	Q And you testified before that you wouldn't sell a
10:48:5419	policy or you wouldn't be comfortable selling a policy if
10:48:5820	you weren't sure that you understood the policy; correct?
10:49:0121	A Correct.
10:49:0222	Q So if this information is true and you testified that
10:49:0623	you didn't understand these types of lapse probabilities
10:49:1024	because they weren't provided to you, you would not sell the
10:49:1525	Provider policy unless you could come to understand this;

10:49:18 1	correct?
10:49:19 2	A I have no belief that these are credible.
10:49:23 3	Q Well, assuming these are credible and there is a
10:49:28 4	95 percent chance of reduced value and LSW required you to
10:49:34 5	provide that information whether numerically or in narrative
10:49:39 6	form, you would provide that disclosure to policyholders;
10:49:43 7	correct?
10:49:43 8	A It depends.
10:49:45 9	Q If they required it?
10:49:4610	A If they required it, yes.
10:49:4811	Q You would follow LSW's guidelines for marketing and
10:49:5212	selling these policies; correct?
10:49:5313	A Of course.
10:49:5614	Q Now, I want to talk to you about what you refer to as
10:50:0315	the multi-step process. Do you remember that testimony?
10:50:0816	A Yes.
10:50:1017	Q And that's a CFP approach; is that correct?
10:50:1418	A Correct.
10:50:1619	Q You testified that you followed the CFP approach with
10:50:2020	Ms. Walker; correct?
10:50:2221	A Yes.
10:50:2322	Q The CFP approach you said involves three to five
10:50:2723	meetings; correct?
10:50:2924	A Yes.
10:50:2925	Q And it involves phone calls; correct?

10:50:32 1	A If they are necessary, sure.
10:50:33 2	Q But isn't it true that prior to her purchase of the
10:50:37 3	policy, you were only involved in this initial dinner and
10:50:42 4	then one meeting on November 14 when she came in and filled
10:50:46 5	out the application; isn't that correct?
10:50:49 6	A Yes.
10:50:49 7	Q So those are two meetings; correct?
10:50:51 8	A Correct.
10:50:52 9	Q Mr. Botkin conducted the other meetings; correct?
10:50:5410	A Correct.
10:50:5611	Q And you had no phone calls with Ms. Walker ever, did
10:50:5912	you, before the sale of the policy to her?
10:51:0413	A No.
10:51:0414	Q No e-mails with her at all before the sale of the
10:51:0615	policy?
10:51:0616	A Not that I remember.
10:51:0717	Q And the first meeting we're talking about, that was a
10:51:1118	dinner; correct?
10:51:1219	A Yes.
10:51:1220	Q And there were a lot of people at the dinner; correct?
10:51:1421	A Correct.
10:51:1522	Q And you don't specifically recall talking to Ms. Walker
10:51:1923	at that dinner; do you?
10:51:2124	A No.
10:51:2125	Q Okay. So taking that dinner out of the equation, there

10:51:24 1	is only one meeting that you ever had with Ms. Walker prior
10:51:27 2	to the sale of the policy; correct?
10:51:30 3	A Correct.
10:51:30 4	Q And as we discussed before, at the dinner you didn't
10:51:35 5	even discuss the Provider policy or LSW product; correct?
10:51:38 6	A Correct.
10:51:38 7	Q It was just about general retirement concepts; correct?
10:51:43 8	A Yes.
10:51:43 9	Q And we looked before at a response sheet that she
10:51:4910	filled out at that dinner. It was Exhibit 867. I will put
10:51:5911	up page 867-04. It's a bunch of financial planning
10:52:0612	objectives, and I have highlighted one. Do you see that,
10:52:1213	safety of retirement money?
10:52:1314	A Yes.
10:52:1415	Q So she marked a nine; correct?
10:52:1616	A Correct.
10:52:1717	Q And that indicates that the safety of her retirement
10:52:2018	money was extremely important to her; correct?
10:52:2319	A Correct.
10:52:2420	Q Now, going to the next page, which is 867-65, it says:
10:52:4121	What is the main concern for your money? Her main concern
10:52:4622	was enough for retirement, be able to retire early; is that
10:52:5123	correct?
10:52:5224	A Yes.
10:53:0225	Q But you did not discuss this particular sheet with

10:53:04 1	Ms. Walker; correct?
10:53:07 2	A I do not discuss that sheet with Ms. Walker.
10:53:10 3	Q Because when Ms. Walker came in for meetings with
10:53:15 4	Preservation Financial, she dealt with Mr. Botkin initially;
10:53:21 5	correct?
10:53:22 6	A That's correct.
10:53:23 7	Q And you didn't attend the first scheduled meeting which
10:53:27 8	was on August 20, 2007; did you?
10:53:30 9	A No.
10:53:3010	Q Mr. Botkin and Ms. Walker were the only attendees at
10:53:3411	that meeting?
10:53:3612	A Correct.
10:53:3813	Q And you didn't attend the second scheduled meeting
10:53:4114	which was on September 19, 2007; did you?
10:53:4515	A Correct.
10:53:4516	Q And Mr. Botkin and Ms. Walker were the only attendees
10:53:5017	at that meeting; correct?
10:53:5118	A Correct.
10:53:5119	Q And you didn't attend the third scheduled meeting which
10:53:5120	occurred on October 16th, 2007, either; did you?
10:53:5821	A Correct.
10:53:5922	Q Mr. Botkin and Ms. Walker were the only attendees at
10:54:0423	the meeting; correct?
10:54:0624	A I believe so.
10:54:0625	Q And you testified previously, I believe, that this was

10:54:07 1	the first meeting where the Provider illustration was gone
10:54:11 2	over with Ms. Walker; correct?
10:54:13 3	A Correct.
10:54:13 4	Q So we have seen illustrations that predate
10:54:16 5	October 16th, and in that meeting your understanding is that
10:54:19 6	Mr. Botkin went over the Provider illustration with her;
10:54:22 7	correct?
10:54:22 8	A Yes.
10:54:22 9	Q And the fourth meeting occurred on November 14, 2007;
10:54:2610	correct?
10:54:2811	A I believe that's correct.
10:54:2912	Q And so and you were present at that meeting?
10:54:4013	A Yes.
10:54:4314	Q I believe you testified with Mr. Shapiro that you
10:54:4915	remembered that the meeting was at least an hour, possibly
10:54:5416	an hour and a half; is that right?
10:54:5717	A I believe so.
10:54:5818	Q And you were asked a question about that topic at your
10:55:0119	deposition; weren't you?
10:55:0420	A I may have been.
10:55:0521	Q And you were asked a question at your deposition
10:55:1022	well, let's take a look at the transcript. Do you have the
10:55:1223	transcript up there?
10:55:1424	A Yes.
10:55:2225	Q If we go to page 40 of the transcript and look at lines

10:55:31 1	9 to 11. If you would read those to yourself.
10:55:39 2	A (Witness reading document) Do you remember how long
10:55:40 3	the November 14th meeting was? The answer is no.
10:55:44 4	Q So that was your answer that you gave at your
10:55:46 5	deposition, correct, that you did not remember how long that
10:55:49 6	meeting was?
10:55:52 7	A Exactly. Correct.
10:55:54 8	Q And your testimony today here is directly inconsistent
10:55:58 9	with that; correct?
10:55:5810	A No.
10:55:5911	Q You said you remembered that it was an hour and a half?
10:56:0412	A An hour to an hour and a half. I don't know the exact
10:56:0713	time.
10:56:0914	Q Were you asked at your deposition the exact time the
10:56:1215	meeting ran, or were you just asked if you remember how long
10:56:1516	the meeting was?
10:56:1617	A I answered I don't know. The answer I just gave you is
10:56:2218	the same answer. I didn't know if it was an hour, hour and
10:56:2519	a half, or what.
10:56:2620	Q So you're saying that at your deposition your answer
10:56:2921	was I don't know?
10:56:3122	A I didn't know the exact length of the meeting.
10:56:3523	Q And it's true that at your deposition what you actually
10:56:3824	said was the answer is no; correct?

The answer is I do not know the exact length of the

10:56:4225

10:56:45 1	meeting, and that's why I said no.
10:56:47 2	Q But you didn't include any of that qualification in
10:56:51 3	your deposition?
10:56:52 4	A No.
10:56:52 5	Q Okay. Were there any documents that you recall that
10:56:57 6	you reviewed or that were used at all in that November 14th
10:57:04 7	meeting besides the LSW Provider illustration and the
10:57:08 8	application?
10:57:09 9	A Did I review documents before? Is that what you're
10:57:1410	asking?
10:57:1511	Q With Ms. Walker were there any documents involved in
10:57:1812	that November 14th meeting besides the illustration and the
10:57:2113	application?
10:57:2214	A I think that was the focal point of the meeting.
10:57:2515	Q Okay. No other LSW marketing materials or anything
10:57:2816	like that?
10:57:2917	A I don't remember any.
10:57:2918	Q And Mr. Botkin, he was present at that meeting;
10:57:3319	correct?
10:57:3420	A Yes.
10:57:3421	Q And he was there as the meeting occurred with
10:57:4022	Ms. Walker?
10:57:4123	A Yes.
10:57:5124	Q And Mr. Botkin, would you say he is a man of integrity?
10:57:5625	A Yes.

Q You have worked with him for a long time?
A About 12 years.
Q And you have never known him to be dishonest in any
way?
A No.
Q And you understand that he said in a statement that at
the meeting none of the things that Ms. Walker alleges
should be disclosed were actually disclosed to her; correct?
MR. SHAPIRO: Objection. Rank hearsay.
THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge.
MR. FOSTER: There's lots of discussion about what
him and Mr. Botkin have talked about.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. FOSTER:
Q You don't recall being provided with a declaration that
Mr. Botkin offered that was sworn and related to this case?
A No.
MR. FOSTER: May I approach the witness, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
BY MR. FOSTER:
Q Do you see that's a declaration of Mr. Botkin?
MR. SHAPIRO: Do you have a copy?
MR. FOSTER: Sure.
BY MR. FOSTER:

10:59:17 1	Q I'm sorry. Go ahead. Do you see that's a declaration
10:59:20 2	of Mr. Botkin?
10:59:21 3	A Yes.
10:59:21 4	Q And you were scheduled for a deposition in this action;
10:59:23 5	correct? Do you remember that?
10:59:25 6	A Yes.
10:59:26 7	Q And there was some discussion, you recollect, over
10:59:30 8	whether you would provide a declaration yourself for the
10:59:32 9	deposition; correct? Do you remember that?
10:59:3410	A Yes.
10:59:3511	Q And you eventually indicated that you would sit for a
10:59:3812	declaration because you weren't willing to provide a
10:59:4113	declaration like Mr. Botkin's which said that none of the
10:59:4514	information that Ms. Walker alleges was not disclosed was
10:59:4915	actually disclosed to her?
10:59:5216	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, Your Honor. Totally
10:59:5317	improper.
10:59:5418	THE COURT: Sustained.
11:00:0119	Next question, please.
11:00:0120	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:00:0221	Q You have discussed the meetings that you and Mr. Botkin
11:00:0522	both sat in on; correct?
11:00:0723	A Yes.
11:00:1324	Q And Mr. Botkin, he's expressed the view that the
11:00:2225	subjects that Ms. Walker alleges should be disclosed about

11:00:27 1	volatility defect, tax defect, guaranteed minimum fees,
11:00:31 2	monthly administrative charge, that those were never
11:00:34 3	disclosed or discussed to Ms. Walker; correct?
11:00:39 4	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection.
11:00:40 5	THE COURT: Sustained.
11:00:40 6	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:00:57 7	Q Now, you talked about topics that were covered with
11:01:05 8	Ms. Walker when Mr. Shapiro was questioning you; correct?
11:01:09 9	A Yes.
11:01:0910	Q And you mentioned annuities; correct?
11:01:1711	A Yes.
11:01:1712	Q Isn't it true that annuities were never discussed with
11:01:2213	Ms. Walker at the November 14th meeting?
11:01:2714	A That would be correct, I believe.
11:01:2815	Q Okay. So your only understanding about annuities comes
11:01:3216	from what Mr. Botkin told you about his discussions with
11:01:3417	Ms. Walker?
11:01:3818	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection. Misstates his earlier
11:01:4019	testimony.
11:01:4120	THE COURT: Overruled.
11:01:4121	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:01:4222	Q Your understanding of the discussion about annuities
11:01:4623	comes from what Mr. Botkin told you about his discussions
11:01:4924	with Ms. Walker; correct?
11:01:5025	A When Mike would finish his meetings, we would meet and

11:01:54 1	that's where we would have our discussion on designing the
11:01:57 2	case and stuff like that. So that's how I heard that he had
11:02:00 3	the conversations with her.
11:02:01 4	Q So that understanding comes from discussions that you
11:02:04 5	had, oral conversations with Mr. Botkin; correct?
11:02:07 6	A Yes.
11:02:08 7	Q Similarly with real estate investments, that's never
11:02:13 8	anything that was discussed in that November 14 meeting;
11:02:16 9	correct?
11:02:1810	A I believe that's correct.
11:02:1911	Q So your only understanding of that comes from oral
11:02:2312	conversations with Mr. Botkin; correct?
11:02:2413	A Yes.
11:02:2414	Q Now, when you talked about annuities, the annuities
11:02:3615	discussed with Ms. Walker, they were discussed in the
11:02:3916	context of her fully qualified IRAs, individual retirement
11:02:4817	accounts; correct?
11:02:4818	A Correct.
11:02:4919	Q So that was an entirely different pot of money or
11:02:5220	source of money than was being discussed for the LSW
11:02:5721	<pre>product; correct?</pre>
11:02:5822	A Yes.
11:03:0223	Q But when you told the jury about all these alternatives
11:03:0724	that Ms. Walker was presented with, you didn't tell them
11:03:1025	that they were being presented for completely different

11:03:14 1	sources of revenue. They weren't competing with each other
11:03:18 2	in any way; correct?
11:03:20 3	A I thought I made that clear.
11:03:22 4	Q You thought you made that clear?
11:03:24 5	A Yes. The annuities and the alternatives were for the
11:03:29 6	qualified plans.
11:03:32 7	Q And you talked about annuities and existence of indexed
11:03:39 8	annuities; correct?
11:03:40 9	A Yes.
11:03:4110	Q Well, let me back up. Your understanding from what
11:03:4511	Mr. Botkin told you is that Ms. Walker didn't want to use
11:03:4912	she didn't want to pull money out of her individual
11:03:5313	retirement accounts to use on a new investment of annuities;
11:03:5614	correct?
11:03:5815	A No. That's not my understanding.
11:04:0016	Q Okay. Well, let me ask you this about indexed
11:04:0717	annuities in relation to the LSW product. For indexed
11:04:1518	annuities I think you testified the index strategy is the
11:04:1819	<pre>same; correct?</pre>
11:04:1820	A The basic structure is the same, yes.
11:04:2121	Q For indexed crediting; correct?
11:04:2322	A Yes.
11:04:2323	Q But the fees are different for indexed annuities as
11:04:2724	compared to indexed universal life insurance; correct?
11:04:3225	A They are totally different products. Yes.

11:04:35 1	Q So, for example, indexed annuities don't have any cost
11:04:39 2	of insurance charges; correct?
11:04:42 3	A Correct.
11:04:51 4	MR. FOSTER: Would this be a good time to take a
11:04:54 5	break?
11:04:55 6	THE COURT: That's fine. We will take our second
11:05:00 7	break of the day, ladies and gentlemen.
11:05:29 8	(Jury not present)
11:05:31 9	MR. FOSTER: May we excuse the witness, Your
11:05:3310	Honor?
11:05:3411	THE COURT: You may be excused.
11:05:5312	MR. FOSTER: Your Honor, with this witness we have
11:05:5613	heard significant amounts in direct examination of hearsay
11:06:0114	about what Mr. Botkin said or did not say to Ms. Walker. I
11:06:0715	think that opens the door to a line of examination about the
11:06:1016	fact that he's aware that Mr. Botkin has provided a sworn
11:06:1417	declaration. He has seen it before. He has reviewed it and
11:06:1718	he knows that Mr. Botkin maintains under penalty of perjury
11:06:2219	that none of this information was disclosed.
11:06:2420	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, three things. First
11:06:2521	off, I believe my questions were quite clear about the basis
11:06:2822	for his knowledge, and that was that he actually worked with
11:06:3223	Botkin to present the plan. That's number one.
11:06:3424	Number two, it was all for his of mind what he
11:06:3825	understood when he went back into the room and he was called

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11:06:42 1
             in as a specialist to address this particular product on a
11:06:46 2
             second pass. And he testified to just that.
11:06:48 3
                       Third, the issue with this affidavit is they went
11:06:49 4
             to these gentlemen and said we will forgive you from
11:06:53 5
             deposing if you sign this. One of them said: I want to be
11:06:55 6
             heard. And the one who wanted to be heard is the one who's
11:06:55 7
             testifying in this court today. So that's the back story to
11:07:05 8
             this affidavit.
11:07:07 9
                       THE COURT: The ruling stands.
11:07:1010
                             (Recess taken at 11:07 a.m.;
11:07:1011
                             proceeding resumed at 11:22 a.m.)
11:07:1112
                             (Jury present)
11:22:0413
                       THE COURT: Mr. Foster.
11:22:0514
                       MR. FOSTER: Thank you.
11:22:0815
             BY MR. FOSTER:
11:22:1016
                  Mr. Stemler, we talked a little bit about back testing.
11:22:1517
             What do you mean by back testing?
11:22:1618
                  My understanding is that what the companies will do is
             Α
11:22:2119
             they take a look at the crediting method that's in force and
11:22:2720
             they compare if the product had existed 20, 30 years ago and
11:22:3421
             what would have been the crediting on the contract.
                  And that allows them to derive a maximum illustrated
11:22:4022
             0
11:22:4323
             rate; is that correct?
11:22:4524
                  That's correct.
             Α
11:22:4525
                  In the case of Ms. Walker's policy, the maximum
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11:22:49 1	illustrated rate was 7.5 percent; correct?
11:22:53 2	A Correct.
11:22:54 3	Q And that was based on the historical performance of the
11:22:56 4	S&P 500; correct?
11:22:57 5	A Correct.
11:22:57 6	Q But you chose to use seven percent to be a little more
11:23:02 7	conservative; correct?
11:23:04 8	A Yes.
11:23:05 9	Q And your testimony was that you typically reduce the
11:23:0610	maximum illustrated rate by .5 percent in the illustrations;
11:23:0911	correct?
11:23:0912	A Correct. Could be more.
11:23:1113	Q But you reduce it a little bit from the maximum
11:23:1414	illustrated rate; correct?
11:23:1615	A Yes.
11:23:1616	Q But the maximum illustrated rate is still the reference
11:23:1917	point from which you reduce it; correct?
11:23:2218	A No.
11:23:2319	Q Well, you're starting with the maximum illustrated rate
11:23:2620	and you're reducing it by a little bit; correct?
11:23:2921	A Correct.
11:23:2922	Q So you start with the back testing the company has done
11:23:3123	about the historical performance of the S&P 500; correct?
11:23:3624	A Yes.
11:23:3625	Q And from that you reduce it a little bit to be a little

11:23:39 1	more conservative in terms of the annual rate of return;
11:23:39 2	correct?
11:23:45 3	A That's correct.
11:23:45 4	Q So the number you portray in the illustration is still
11:23:48 5	related to the historical performance of the S&P 500;
11:23:51 6	correct?
11:23:51 7	A Yes.
11:23:52 8	Q When you reduce it a little bit, like down to
11:23:54 9	seven percent like you did in Ms. Walker's illustration,
11:23:5710	you're still using a constant rate of return; correct?
11:24:0111	A That's what's required on the illustration.
11:24:0312	Q Okay. So LSW's illustration software doesn't allow you
11:24:0813	to depict a volatile rate of return; correct?
11:24:1214	A I don't think it has anything to do with LSW.
11:24:1515	MR. FOSTER: Move to strike, Your Honor.
11:24:1816	THE COURT: It will be stricken.
11:24:1917	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:24:2018	Q Did you understand the question, Mr. Stemler?
11:24:2219	A Yes.
11:24:2220	Q So the illustration software that LSW provides, as far
11:24:2521	as you know, that doesn't allow you to depict volatile
11:24:2922	non-constant rate; does it?
11:24:3123	A No.
11:24:3924	Q Now, I think you testified that the historical
11:24:4225	performance of the S&P 500 is, quote, all we have to go on;

11:24:46 1	correct?
11:24:47 2	A Yes.
11:24:48 3	Q But the historical performance of the S&P 500, that's a
11:24:51 4	volatile performance; it's not constant? Correct?
11:24:55 5	A Correct.
11:24:55 6	Q Now, you talked about the possibility that Ms. Walker
11:24:59 7	could decrease the amount of loans she took in the future.
11:25:02 8	Do you remember that?
11:25:03 9	A Yes.
11:25:0410	Q Now, if Ms. Walker wanted to know the likelihood of the
11:25:0811	success of the financial plan that was depicted in her
11:25:1312	Provider illustration based on the premiums that she
11:25:1813	anticipated to pay and based on the income withdrawals that
11:25:2214	she anticipated taking out and as shown in the illustration,
11:25:2515	if she wanted to know the probability that that financial
11:25:3016	plan would succeed, wouldn't you have to assume that both
11:25:3217	the premiums paid and the loans taken out were exactly what
11:25:3718	was depicted in that illustration?
11:25:4019	A I'm sorry. Say that again.
11:25:4220	Q Sure. If she was asking the question of will the
11:25:4521	financial plan depicted in this illustration succeed based
11:25:4922	on the premiums that are shown and the loans taken out, you
11:25:5323	would have to assume that the loans were taken out in the
11:25:5624	amount depicted in the illustration; correct?
11:25:5825	A Yes.

11:25:59 1	Q And you're familiar in comparing different types of
11:26:03 2	investment products, you wanted to freeze certain
11:26:06 3	assumptions to understand how they perform; correct?
11:26:09 4	A Correct.
11:26:09 5	Q So if you wanted to know the likelihood that the loans
11:26:13 6	would be taken out as illustrated in the illustration, you
11:26:16 7	would have to freeze the amount of those loans that were
11:26:19 8	shown in the illustration; correct?
11:26:21 9	A I would assume so.
11:26:2410	Q That's pretty basic; right?
11:26:2611	A I assume so.
11:26:2712	Q And if she had to take less loans in the future, for
11:26:3413	example, the policy would have been less valuable for her
11:26:3814	than what was shown in the illustration because she would be
11:26:4015	taking less loans; correct?
11:26:4316	A It would be definitely less.
11:26:5317	Q Now, when Ms. Walker filed a written complaint, you
11:26:5718	prepared a response which sort of laid out the sequence of
11:27:0019	events; correct?
11:27:0120	A Yes.
11:27:0421	Q And you tried to make that written response complete
11:27:0722	and accurate; correct?
11:27:0723	A Yes.
11:27:0724	Q And there is nothing in it that you believe is
11:27:1225	inaccurate; correct?

11:27:13 1	A Not that I know of.
11:27:15 2	Q And the response lays out a timeline of events related
11:27:18 3	to Ms. Walker's claim; correct?
11:27:19 4	A Yes.
11:27:21 5	Q And you referenced the client log that we heard about
11:27:24 6	in developing the timeline; correct?
11:27:26 7	A Yes.
11:27:26 8	Q And it has detailed descriptions of the meetings
11:27:29 9	between Mr. Botkin and Ms. Walker; correct?
11:27:3510	A Yes.
11:27:3511	Q And it has a description of this November 14th, 2007,
11:27:3912	meeting, the one that we were talking about; correct?
11:27:4013	A I believe so.
11:27:4114	Q And that was the only meeting that you attended with
11:27:4715	Ms. Walker prior to the sale; correct?
11:27:4916	A Correct.
11:27:5117	Q In the description of the timeline that was in your
11:27:5518	written complaint, nowhere in your description of that
11:28:0019	November 14th meeting does it state anything about
11:28:0120	disclosure of the guaranteed minimum values; does it?
11:28:0721	A I have no idea.
11:28:0822	Q Would it refresh your recollection to take a look?
11:28:1023	A Sure.
11:28:1524	Q There is one in your binder actually. If you look at
11:28:1925	77. I don't want you to read it out loud, but just take a

11:28:24 1	look and see if that refreshes your recollection at page
11:28:28 2	PRF0439.
11:28:33 3	A I'm sorry. What tab?
11:28:35 4	Q Tab 77. Do you have that there in your binder? It
11:28:40 5	should be at the front, I think.
11:28:41 6	A And which one?
11:28:43 7	Q Tab 77, if you go to PRF0439. Do you see that?
11:29:02 8	A Yes.
11:29:02 9	Q Does that refresh your recollection that your response
11:29:0610	to the written complaint didn't say anything about
11:29:0911	disclosing the calculation of the guaranteed values to
11:29:1412	Ms. Walker?
11:29:1513	A No.
11:29:1514	Q It doesn't say anything about any of her other claims
11:29:1815	in this case the monthly administrative charge reduction,
11:29:2316	fees, volatility, tax consequences, being disclosed in there
11:29:2717	either; does it?
11:29:2818	A No.
11:29:3019	Q Now, I want to talk to you about how you marketed the
11:29:3420	policy to Ms. Walker. You used what's called a tax-free
11:29:3921	retirement concept to market the policy to Ms. Walker;
11:29:4222	correct?
11:29:4323	A Yes.
11:29:4324	Q And that tax-free retirement concept, that came out of
11:29:5025	training that LSW conducted; correct?

11:29:54 1	A Two years later.
11:29:56 2	Q Well, the tax-free retirement concept that you used
11:29:59 3	with Ms. Walker was the same as tax-free retirement concepts
11:30:02 4	that are used in LSW's trainings that you've been present
11:30:05 5	at?
11:30:05 6	A Yes.
11:30:06 7	Q And at the trainings that you have been present at,
11:30:09 8	there was a gentleman by the name of Mr. Kelly who was
11:30:11 9	present; correct?
11:30:1310	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, Your Honor. I think you
11:30:1311	addressed this yesterday in the context of a different
11:30:1312	event.
11:30:2013	MR. FOSTER: I'm not sure what he's referring to,
11:30:2114	Your Honor.
11:30:2215	THE COURT: Proceed.
11:30:2316	MR. FOSTER: Thank you.
11:30:2317	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:30:2318	Q In the trainings conducted by Mr. Kelly, he reviewed
11:30:2819	his book about tax-free retirement and discussed how the
11:30:2920	Provider policy could be used to produce tax-free retirement
11:30:2921	income; correct?
11:30:3022	A Yes.
11:30:3623	Q And in the training he stated the Provider policy, that
11:30:3824	could provide the tax benefits that are outlined in his book
11 00 0005	

11:30:3825 correct?

11:30:39 1	A Yes.
11:30:44 2	Q And LSW funded regional meetings held by AMS with
11:30:50 3	agents and paid for the rooms and lunch and the drinks where
11:30:53 4	Mr. Kelly spoke; correct?
11:30:54 5	A Yes.
11:30:55 6	Q In the meetings Mr. Kelly spoke to agents and he
11:30:57 7	featured the LSW product; correct?
11:31:01 8	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, Your Honor. This is two
11:31:03 9	years later.
11:31:0410	MR. FOSTER: I think there is foundation for this.
11:31:0611	THE COURT: Lay the foundation.
11:31:0712	MR. FOSTER: All right.
11:31:0713	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:31:0714	Q Now, did you use LSW's tax-free retirement marketing
11:31:1215	concept with Ms. Walker?
11:31:1416	A Yes.
11:31:1617	Q Did you tell Ms. Walker under current law loans are
11:31:1918	treated as tax free?
11:31:2219	A That's correct.
11:31:2220	Q And your meeting with Ms. Walker, that November 14
11:31:2721	meeting, one thing that you do recall about that meeting is
11:31:3022	that it was specifically focused on using the insurance as
11:31:3523	supplemental retirement income; correct?
11:31:3824	A Yes.
11:31:3825	Q And the use of insurance for supplemental retirement

11:31:42 1	income, that's the topic of these regional meetings paid for
11:31:47 2	by LSW featuring Mr. Kelly and the Provider product?
11:31:51 3	A That's part of it, yes.
11:31:53 4	Q And isn't it true that Provider policies need to remain
11:31:59 5	in force until the death of the insured to avoid tax
11:32:02 6	consequences of policy loans taken in excess of the basis of
11:32:08 7	the policy?
11:32:09 8	A Yes.
11:32:09 9	Q And if a Provider policy lapses with a loan
11:32:1210	outstanding, that would be very negative for the
11:32:1511	policyholder; correct?
11:32:1612	A That's correct.
11:32:1813	Q And the reason for that is that the loans would be
11:32:2014	deemed what you referred to in your deposition as phantom
11:32:2315	income; correct?
11:32:2516	A Correct.
11:32:2617	Q And what did you mean when you discussed phantom
11:32:2718	income?
11:32:3019	A If the loans are outstanding and the policy lapses, the
11:32:3420	client doesn't have to pay the loan back because the
11:32:3721	insurance company wouldn't have loaned the money they didn't
11:32:4122	already secure, but it would be deemed income to the client.
11:32:4623	Q And they would owe taxes on that income amount?
11:32:5024	A Yes.
11:32:5025	Q Do you know at what rate the taxes would be owed?

11:32:54 1	A Whatever the ordinary income tax rate is.
11:32:57 2	Q And if a policyholder invested in a mutual fund and the
11:33:01 3	mutual fund went up in value and they took out money, do you
11:33:04 4	know what tax rate they would owe taxes on?
11:33:07 5	A If they're selling it off, it would probably be capital
11:33:11 6	gains.
11:33:12 7	Q And is the capital gains tax rate lower than the
11:33:15 8	ordinary income tax rate?
11:33:16 9	A Yes if it's long term. If it's short term, it's the
11:33:1910	same.
11:33:2011	Q Okay. But if it's over a year or so, it's lower;
11:33:2212	correct?
11:33:2213	A Correct.
11:33:2314	Q So if a policyholder lapsed with a loan outstanding
11:33:2715	with the Provider product and there was loans in excess of
11:33:3116	the basis, they would owe taxes at a higher rate than if
11:33:3517	they had invested in a mutual fund over a period of time and
11:33:3918	there was a gain; correct?
11:33:4019	A Yes.
11:33:4020	Q And as we discussed before, LSW did not tell you any
11:33:4521	information regarding the probability that the Provider
11:33:4822	policy would remain in force until Ms. Walker's life
11:33:5223	expectancy if she took loans as illustrated; correct?
11:33:5724	A Correct.

Now, when Ms. Walker complained, isn't it true that you

11:33:5825

11:34:06 1	expressed the view that LSW had to take her complaint head
11:34:12 2	on or every producer for LSW would be faced with the same
11:34:17 3	assertion in the complaint?
11:34:20 4	A Yes.
11:34:21 5	MR. SHAPIRO: Objection, Your Honor. This is just
11:34:23 6	like Exhibit 408 yesterday.
11:34:26 7	THE COURT: Overruled.
11:34:26 8	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:34:28 9	Q And you expressed the view if we take a look at
11:34:3410	Exhibit 80. Can you take a look at that in your binder.
11:34:3611	A (Witness complies.)
11:34:4212	Q Do you recognize that as an e-mail you sent to a number
11:34:4513	of individuals at LSW?
11:34:4614	A Uh-huh.
11:34:4715	Q And you expressed the view that it was especially
11:34:4916	important that Ms. Walker's complaint be dealt with
11:34:5317	definitively in light of your, open parens, LSW, close
11:34:5818	parens, desire to promote overfunding life insurance as a
11:35:0319	source of retirement income?
11:35:0420	A Yes.
11:35:0521	Q Is that what you wrote? Do you recognize that?
11:35:0822	A Yes.
11:35:1123	MR. FOSTER: I would move Exhibit 80 into
11:35:1224	evidence, Your Honor.
11:35:1425	MR. SHAPIRO: No objection to this one, Your

11:35:14 1	Honor.
11:35:15 2	THE COURT: Exhibit 80 will be received.
11:35:18 3	MR. FOSTER: I would like to publish it, Your
11:35:20 4	Honor.
11:35:21 5	THE COURT: You may.
11:35:21 6	(Exhibit No. 80 received in evidence)
11:35:21 7	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:35:43 8	Q Is that the e-mail you wrote? Yes?
11:35:49 9	A Yes.
11:35:4910	Q And LSW was promoting overfunding life insurance as a
11:35:5411	source of retirement income; correct?
11:35:5512	A It's one of the uses, yes.
11:35:5913	Q And LSW was promoting that use; correct?
11:35:5914	A Yes.
11:35:5915	Q And you said that Ms. Walker's complaint takes this
11:36:0216	concept head on; correct?
11:36:0317	A Correct.
11:36:0318	Q And that LSW needed to deal with it definitively;
11:36:0519	correct?
11:36:0620	A Yes.
11:36:0821	Q And LSW's need to deal with it definitively, that's one
11:36:1322	reason we are here a couple years later; correct?
11:36:1623	A That I can't answer.
11:36:1824	Q Fair enough. You also expressed the view that if
11:36:3725	Ms. Walker's complaint wasn't dealt with, that the tax-free

11:36:41 1	retirement concept that LSW was marketing the policy with
11:36:46 2	was, quote, out the window; correct?
11:36:47 3	A I don't remember saying that, but I may have.
11:36:50 4	Q Would it refresh your recollection to look at 574 in
11:36:53 5	your binder? Do you recognize Exhibit 574 as an e-mail you
11:37:10 6	sent to Mike Duncan, an employee of National Life and LSW?
11:37:16 7	A Right.
11:37:21 8	MR. FOSTER: I would move 574 into evidence, Your
11:37:24 9	Honor.
11:37:2610	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, we object to 574.
11:37:2911	Hearsay and hearsay within hearsay.
11:37:3912	MR. FOSTER: Offering it for LSW's intent, Your
11:37:4113	Honor.
11:37:4314	MR. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, he can't achieve that
11:37:4515	with this witness, I don't think.
11:37:4816	MR. FOSTER: Well, this e-mail has gone to
11:37:5017	employees at LSW, a number of them, telling them that
11:37:5718	THE COURT: Sir, if I want an argument, I will ask
11:37:5919	you.
11:38:0120	MR. FOSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
11:38:1421	THE COURT: Overruled, and 574 will be received.
11:38:1822	MR. FOSTER: May I publish, Your Honor?
11:38:2023	THE COURT: You may. Anytime an exhibit is in
11:38:2224	evidence, you may publish without asking.
11:38:2725	MR. FOSTER: Thank you.

11:38:27 1	(Exhibit No. 574 received in evidence)
11:38:28 2	BY MR. FOSTER:
11:38:39 3	Q Do you remember that this e-mail is about Ms. Walker's
11:38:43 4	complaint; correct? Do you recall that?
11:39:06 5	A Yes.
11:39:06 6	Q And you wrote to LSW that the comments that there was
11:39:15 7	misrepresentation and a lack of full disclosure creates a
11:39:18 8	fundamental problem for all producers who rely on
11:39:22 9	illustrations provided by LSW/National Life. Since there
11:39:2610	was never any question that the insured had full
11:39:3011	illustrations, several, and signed the final illustration
11:39:3212	upon policy delivery, the implication by Ms. Wilton is that
11:39:3513	all the disclaimers, explanations, and various hypothetical
11:39:3814	scenarios are no value.
11:39:3915	And you go on to say: In my opinion this needs to
11:39:4216	be addressed head on or no agent can ever place a policy and
11:39:4617	rely on the illustration to be compliant and provide full
11:39:5018	disclosure. Do you see that? Did I read that correctly?
11:39:5419	A Yes.
11:39:5420	Q That was the e-mail you sent to a number of individuals
11:39:5721	at LSW?
11:39:5722	A Yes.
11:39:5823	Q Do you know whether LSW changed its illustrations in
11:40:0124	any way in response to this e-mail?
11:40:0425	A I have no idea.

11:40:05 1	Q You're not aware of any changes in LSW's illustrations
11:40:08 2	in response to this e-mail?
11:40:12 3	A No.
11:40:12 4	Q And you're referring to a comment by Ms. Wilton. What
11:40:17 5	are you referring to there?
11:40:21 6	A That was somebody associated with the California
11:40:25 7	Department of Insurance, I believe.
11:40:27 8	Q And if we move up, there is other e-mails in the chain
11:40:35 9	between you and Mike Duncan. Who is Mike Duncan?
11:40:4010	A He is the regional representative that calls on our
11:40:4511	firm.
11:40:4712	Q And you wrote to Mr. Duncan that if the view of the
11:40:5813	individual at the Department of Insurance about Ms. Walker's
11:41:0114	complaint was true, then tax-free retirement was out the
11:41:0515	window; is that correct?
11:41:0716	A Correct.
11:41:4617	Q Now, we talked a little bit about your delivery
11:41:5418	actually before we talk about that, I have one question
11:42:0319	about that document. Do you see where you say tax-free
11:42:0820	retirement? Do you see how that's in all caps and in
11:42:1121	quotation marks?
11:42:1322	A Right.
11:42:1423	Q Why is that?
11:42:1924	A This was tax-free retirement was the term that
11:42:2525	Patrick Kelly used with his book.

11:42:29 1	Q And that was the marketing strategy used by LSW as
11:42:33 2	well; correct?
11:42:34 3	A Part of theirs.
11:42:37 4	Q And they used it with Mr. Kelly's book; correct?
11:42:42 5	A Yes.
11:42:42 6	Q So they sent copies of Mr. Kelly's book to you;
11:42:46 7	correct?
11:42:47 8	A Mr. Duncan was requested; he did not. I had to order
11:42:52 9	them separately.
11:43:0310	Q Now, moving on to the guarantees of the policy, you
11:43:0911	testified that you had a conversation with Ms. Walker about
11:43:1412	the guarantees. Do you remember that?
11:43:1513	A Yes.
11:43:1614	Q And LSW never required you to disclose to policyholders
11:43:2115	that the two percent guarantee is not provided every year;
11:43:2416	correct?
11:43:2617	A Not that I know of.
11:43:2718	Q Okay. And you don't have any clue who started this
11:43:3319	conversation you recounted about the guarantees; do you?
11:43:3620	A No.
11:43:3821	Q And you can't recall exactly the words that you used
11:43:4222	when talking to Ms. Walker about the guarantees; can you?
11:43:4523	A No.
11:43:4724	Q And you can't recall anything that Ms. Walker
11:43:4925	specifically said; can you?

11:43:51 1	A No.
11:43:57 2	Q I think we looked at a page of Ms. Walker's
11:44:01 3	illustration before. This is the page of the illustration
11:44:12 4	that you went over with her; correct?
11:44:13 5	A Yes.
11:44:17 6	Q Is it fair to say there's a lot of notes on this page?
11:44:20 7	A Yes.
11:44:22 8	Q And there are notes about a lot of different things,
11:44:25 9	but there's no notes about five-year buckets on here; are
11:44:2910	there?
11:44:3011	A Not that I see.
11:44:3112	Q And there's no notes about the guarantee being an
11:44:3413	average retrospective calculation; are there?
11:44:3914	A There are no notes to that effect.
11:44:4215	Q Okay. You testified that you talked about the net
11:44:4616	amount at risk with Ms. Walker; correct?
11:44:4817	A Yes.
11:44:5018	Q But isn't it true that you did not discuss anything
11:44:5819	related to the net amount at risk in relation to how the
11:45:0320	guarantee is was calculated for the Provider product?
11:45:0621	A I don't understand the question.
11:45:0722	Q Well, you understand that the cost of insurance charge
11:45:1223	can be based on the net amount at risk; correct?
11:45:1424	A Yes.
11:45:1525	Q So if the policy value is lower, the net amount of risk

11:45:20 1	goes up; correct?
11:45:22 2	A Yes.
11:45:23 3	Q And if the net amount at risk goes up, the cost of
11:45:27 4	insurance charges can be higher; correct?
11:45:28 5	A Yes.
11:45:29 6	Q And if there was a true annual guarantee provided, for
11:45:36 7	example, in a year where the S&P 500 returned let's say
11:45:43 8	in year one of the policy the S&P 500 returned zero percent.
11:45:48 9	If the product had a true annual guarantee of two percent,
11:45:5210	in that scenario the policyholder would gain two percent;
11:45:5611	correct? Would receive a credit of two percent?
11:45:5912	A They would receive a credit of two percent.
11:46:0113	Q But under the method that LSW uses to calculate the
11:46:0414	guarantee, the policyholder would not receive any guaranteed
11:46:0715	interest in that year; correct?
11:46:0916	A Correct.
11:46:1017	Q So comparing the true annual guarantees to the way that
11:46:1318	LSW calculates the interest, isn't it true that all other
11:46:1719	things being equal, a policyholder's cost of insurance
11:46:2020	charges would be higher because their net of amount at risk
11:46:2421	would be higher in the scenario that I described?
11:46:2722	A In the scenario you described, yes.
11:46:3023	Q And you didn't discuss anything related to that
11:46:3224	scenario or its implications for guaranteed values on the
11:46:3625	Provider product with Ms. Walker; did you?

11:46:39 1	A No.
11:46:41 2	Q And you don't know whether LSW goes back and
11:46:44 3	recalculates the cost of insurance charge rate if the index
11:46:49 4	returns are below the guaranteed rate; do you?
11:46:51 5	A No.
11:46:52 6	Q When you spoke about that at your deposition, you said
11:46:55 7	the reason you don't understand it is because you don't
11:46:58 8	understand what LSW does internally; correct?
11:47:01 9	A Correct.
11:47:0210	Q You don't have an understanding of what they're doing
11:47:0511	internally with their crediting rates and mechanisms;
11:47:0812	correct?
11:47:0913	A That I do.
11:47:1014	Q In regards to the net amount at risk and the guarantee?
11:47:1415	A Net amount of risk, correct.
11:47:1616	Q And since you don't understand that aspect of the
11:47:1817	policy, this wasn't anything that you ever shared with
11:47:2118	Ms. Walker?
11:47:2219	A Correct.
11:47:2920	Q Just a couple more things. You talked about a policy
11:47:3321	delivery?
11:47:3422	A Yes.
11:47:3623	Q When you delivered the policy, wasn't Ms. Walker
11:47:3824	standing in her office building in the lobby?
11:47:4225	A I have no idea.

11:47:43 1	Q Do you remember that meeting being about two minutes?
11:47:47 2	A No.
11:47:50 3	Q Is it fair to say that you don't remember ever going
11:47:52 4	over the buyer's guide with her at that policy delivery
11:47:57 5	meeting?
11:47:57 6	A No.
11:47:58 7	Q You talked about the annual statement, and Mr. Shapiro
11:48:04 8	had to refresh your recollection about the various meetings.
11:48:07 9	Isn't it true that you don't remember specifically what was
11:48:1110	discussed with Ms. Walker about the annual statement?
11:48:1411	A Other than we reviewed it.
11:48:1712	Q Okay. You don't remember anything specifically that
11:48:2013	she said?
11:48:2014	A No.
11:48:2415	Q The one thing that we do know is she asked how her
11:48:2816	policy was performing; correct?
11:48:2917	A Correct.
11:48:3018	Q And there was a letter sent back to her, and it said
11:48:3519	that the interest earned the interest earned is credited
11:48:3920	to your policy each year on the 21st of January, and for
11:48:4321	2008 it was zero; correct?
11:48:4522	A Correct.
11:48:4523	Q But isn't it true that even though the interest earned
11:48:5024	was zero that year, her policy had actually declined in
11:48:5325	value by about 15 to 20 percent in terms of its cash value?

11:48:59 1	A Yes.
11:49:00 2	Q And your letter to her did not mention that, did it,
11:49:02 3	that we just looked at?
11:49:05 4	A She asked about the crediting.
11:49:10 5	Q Mr. Shapiro also showed you an annual statement that's
11:49:23 6	been marked as Exhibit 94, I believe. Do you remember he
11:49:32 7	asked you about the expense charges?
11:49:34 8	A Yes.
11:49:34 9	Q Now, I don't see any monthly administrative charge on
11:49:3910	here. Do you see that?
11:49:4311	A No.
11:49:4412	Q Nowhere the monthly administrative charge is on this
11:49:4613	annual statement?
11:49:5014	A I don't see that.
11:49:5515	Q Now finally, you mentioned a number of insurance
11:49:5916	companies that you are licensed with; correct?
11:50:0117	A Yes.
11:50:0318	Q But if you wanted to get licensed by an insurance
11:50:0519	company, you could do what's called activate when necessary;
11:50:0920	correct?
11:50:1021	A Yes.
11:50:1222	Q And by activate when necessary, you mean that if there
11:50:1523	is a policy you want to sell to a consumer and you're not
11:50:1924	licensed as an agent with the company, the company then
11:50:2225	licenses you; correct?

11:50:23 1	A Yes.
11:50:23 2	Q And that process is instantaneous; correct?
11:50:27 3	A Yes.
11:50:27 4	Q It's done simultaneously with the policy you're selling
11:50:34 5	to a consumer?
11:50:36 6	A With the application.
11:50:36 7	Q With the application that's going in?
11:50:38 8	A Yes.
11:50:39 9	Q And there's no training that's required in any way with
11:50:4210	that simultaneous licensing?
11:50:4411	A We have to be qualified to sell insurance in the state
11:50:4712	of California.
11:50:4813	Q Okay. So as long as you have a general insurance
11:50:5114	license in California, there is no additional requirements
11:50:5415	when LSW imposes when it licenses you simultaneously?
11:51:0016	A Initially, no.
11:51:0117	Q Okay. And after you're licensed, there is no required
11:51:0518	trainings that LSW does on its illustration system; are
11:51:0819	there?
11:51:1020	A No.
11:51:1021	Q And they didn't require any training before you became
11:51:1222	an agent with LSW?
11:51:1423	A No.
11:51:1424	Q They didn't require any training after you became an
11:51:1825	agent with LSW?

11:51:19 1	A No.
11:51:20 2	Q You testified that you have agents under you, but
11:51:23 3	you're also involved with some individual sales to
11:51:26 4	consumers; correct?
11:51:27 5	A Yes.
11:51:27 6	Q And you have been directly involved in the sale of
11:51:30 7	equity-indexed universal life policies; correct?
11:51:33 8	A Yes.
11:51:34 9	Q And those include sales of this Provider product;
11:51:3710	correct?
11:51:3811	A Yes.
11:51:3812	Q And you have sold those to other consumers besides
11:51:4213	Ms. Walker; correct?
11:51:4314	A Yes.
11:51:4315	Q And isn't it true at your deposition that when you were
11:51:4616	asked whether you even remembered the name of a single other
11:51:5117	policyholder that you had sold the Provider product to
11:51:5318	besides Ms. Walker, you said no?
11:51:5719	A Correct.
11:51:5820	MR. FOSTER: No further questions, Your Honor.
11:52:0321	THE COURT: Mr. Shapiro.
11:52:0722	MR. SHAPIRO: Nothing from us, Your Honor.
11:52:0923	THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
11:52:0924	Sir, you may step down. Thank you.
11:52:1825	MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, LSW calls Craig Smith.

And while he's coming, I will publish a couple of documents to the jury if that's okay.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, I think Mr. Brosnahan published for the jury from Exhibit 131 the list of the top ten premium payors that lapsed, and I just want to provide a couple additional columns on that that weren't on the exhibit that Mr. Brosnahan showed.

So, for example, with regard to Baldonado, the premium payment was \$334,200, I believe. Mr. Brosnahan showed that. What he didn't show was that the person was 54 years old and had a face amount of \$18 million. For each of these individuals that was on Mr. Brosnahan's list, we have the age and the face amount of the policy. So, for example, Ms. Campos, who is 66 years old, she got a policy for a million five almost, and that's the premium.

We just want to provide additional information for each of those policyholders.

Additionally from Exhibit 131, I just wanted to publish for the jury the 36 pages of lapsing policyholders who paid premiums of a hundred dollars or less. I won't go through all 36 pages, but Mr. Brosnahan can surely double-check me on that. Gross premium column shows for each person on these 36 pages that lapsed, they paid a hundred dollars or less. Going all the way to page 36,

11:52:45 4 11:52:46 5 11:52:52 6 11:52:56 7 11:53:02 8 11:53:02 9 11:53:0210 11:53:1111 11:53:1512 11:53:1713 11:53:1714 11:53:1715 11:53:1716 11:53:2217 11:53:2218 11:53:4019 11:53:4520 11:53:5121 11:53:5922 11:54:0023

11:54:0024

11:54:0025

11:52:22 1

11:52:26 2

11:52:27 3

11:54:23 1	where the amount of premium goes down to as low as \$11.
11:54:44 2	THE CLERK: Sir, you are reminded that having been
11:54:48 3	previously sworn, you are still under oath. Do you
11:54:52 4	understand that?
11:54:52 5	THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
11:54:55 6	THE CLERK: Please state your name for the record.
11:54:56 7	THE WITNESS: My name is Craig Allen Smith.
11:54:59 8	DIRECT EXAMINATION
11:54:59 9	BY MR. MARTENS:
11:54:5910	Q Hello, Mr. Smith.
11:54:5911	A Hello.
11:54:5912	Q You and I have met before; correct?
11:55:0113	A That's correct.
11:55:0214	Q Where are you currently employed?
11:55:0415	A I'm currently employed at National Life Insurance
11:55:1016	Company in Montpelier, Vermont.
11:55:1317	Q And you came out here to testify; is that correct?
11:55:1318	A That's correct.
11:55:1319	Q What's your title at National Life Insurance Company?
11:55:1520	A My title is vice-president, strategic analysis and
11:55:1921	appointed actuary.
11:55:2222	Q Now, is National Life Insurance Company, the
11:55:2523	organization with which you are employed, is that different
11:55:2824	than LSW, Life Insurance Company of the Southwest?
11:55:3325	A LSW is an another company, a distinct legal entity.

11:55:39 1	However, it is one percent owned by National Life Insurance
11:55:43 2	Company.
11:55:44 3	Q And is National Life Insurance Company part of National
11:55:48 4	Life Group?
11:55:50 5	A Yes, it is.
11:55:50 6	Q Also based in Vermont?
11:55:51 7	A That's correct.
11:55:52 8	Q How long have you been with National Life?
11:55:54 9	A I have been with National Life for 31 years.
11:55:5810	Q And I think you said your title was vice-president of
11:56:0111	strategic analysis and appointed actuary?
11:56:0412	A Yes.
11:56:0413	Q So that means you're an actuary?
11:56:0614	A Yes, it does.
11:56:0815	Q What was your educational background?
11:56:1016	A I graduated from the University of Illinois with a
11:56:1617	bachelor of science degree in actuarial science.
11:56:2018	Q And what year did you graduate from the University of
11:56:2219	Illinois?
11:56:2320	A 1981.
11:56:2521	Q By my math that means you started at LSW around 1983?
11:56:3022	A I started at National Life in 1983.
11:56:3323	Q Sorry. Thank you for correcting me on that. So what
11:56:3624	did you do between 1981 when you graduated and 1983 when you
11:56:4025	joined National Life?

11:56:42 1	A I worked as an actuary for Hewlett Associates, which
11:56:46 2	was a pension consulting firm.
11:56:49 3	Q And where was that located?
11:56:50 4	A I work in the Newport Beach, California, office.
11:56:53 5	Q So 33 years later you made it back?
11:56:56 6	A Here I am.
11:56:57 7	Q All right. Do you hold any professional designations
11:57:02 8	as actuary?
11:57:03 9	A Yes, I do.
11:57:0310	Q What designations do you hold?
11:57:0511	A I'm a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries, and I'm also
11:57:0812	a member of the American Academy of Actuaries.
11:57:1313	Q To be a Fellow in the Society of Actuaries, are there
11:57:1714	requirements or prerequisites to joining that organization?
11:57:2115	A Yes. Becoming a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries
11:57:2516	required me to pass a series of actuarial exams.
11:57:3317	Q How many exams?
11:57:3518	A About ten.
11:57:3519	Q Now, going back to 2005 and 2006, did you have the same
11:57:4320	title at National Life?
11:57:4621	A No, I did not.
11:57:4722	Q What was your title back in 2005 and 2006?
11:57:5123	A At that time my title was vice-president and chief
11:57:5424	actuary.
11:57:5625	Q What does that mean?

11:57:57 1	A As chief actuary, in addition to actuarial
11:58:06 2	responsibilities such as being the appointed actuary, I
11:58:09 3	managed the corporate actuarial department at the company.
11:58:14 4	Q Can you explain to us what is the corporate actuarial
11:58:18 5	department.
11:58:18 6	A Yes. The corporate actuarial department is the
11:58:24 7	actuarial area that tends to work on financial matters such
11:58:31 8	as calculating reserves that are more related to the
11:58:37 9	accounting side of the house.
11:58:4010	Q Is that different than the actuarial department where
11:58:4411	Ms. MacGowan works?
11:58:4512	A Yes, it is.
11:58:4613	Q In what way is it different?
11:58:4814	A The department Ms. MacGowan works is does work in
11:58:5315	the areas of product development and pricing, and they tend
11:58:5916	to work more with the marketing areas and the company's
11:59:0417	distribution network.
11:59:0618	Q So doing actuarial work for totally different issues?
11:59:1219	A In general, yes.
11:59:1320	Q When did you assume your current role as vice-president
11:59:1621	of strategic analysis and appointed actuary?
11:59:1922	A In 2012.
11:59:2123	Q Now, are you familiar with the products known as
11:59:2524	Paragon and Provider?

A Yes, I am.

11:59:2725

11:59:28 1	Q How are you familiar with those?
11:59:30 2	A I served as illustration actuary for those products
11:59:36 3	when they were introduced, and I'm also familiar with them
11:59:40 4	in my current role as appointed actuary.
11:59:44 5	Q Can you just tell the jury what it means when you say
11:59:46 6	you were the illustration actuary for Paragon and Provider
11:59:50 7	when they were launched.
11:59:52 8	A Yes, I can. Under state law there is an illustration
11:59:59 9	law which requires certification by an illustration actuary
12:00:0510	that the scales used to illustrate non-guaranteed elements
12:00:0911	meet the requirements of the law.
12:00:1012	Q So when you say you have to certify the scales that are
12:00:1513	used to illustrate non-guaranteed elements, can you put that
12:00:2014	in little bit more layman's terms for the jury.
12:00:2515	A Sure. Those scales would include things such as the
12:00:2816	interest rate being illustrated to be credited on the
12:00:3217	policies, the cost of insurance charges being made to the
12:00:3918	policyholder to pay for the cost of providing the life
12:00:4419	insurance benefit, and things like that.
12:00:4720	Q So it's my understanding that with regard to the
12:00:5021	non-guaranteed elements of an illustration, you have to make
12:00:5322	this certification?
12:00:5423	A The certification is done for the policy as a whole,
12:00:5824	but it's done in the case the policy has non-guaranteed

12:01:0225

elements.

12:01:03 1	Q And one of the non-guaranteed elements might be, for
12:01:05 2	example, the interest rate used to illustrate current basis
12:01:08 3	B values?
12:01:09 4	A That's correct.
12:01:10 5	Q And when you're making this certification, what are you
12:01:12 6	certifying?
12:01:14 7	A I'm certifying that the scales used in the illustration
12:01:20 8	meet the requirements of the law.
12:01:22 9	Q When you say the requirements of the law, what law in
12:01:2510	particular are you referring to?
12:01:2711	A There is a specific law that in California is a law
12:01:3312	pertaining to the illustration of life insurance policies.
12:01:3713	Q Do you consider any other professional standards in
12:01:4114	making such a certification?
12:01:4315	A Yes, I do.
12:01:4516	Q For example, what do you consider?
12:01:4917	A As an actuary, we practice under a set of guidelines
12:01:5618	known as actuarial standards of practice that we are obliged
12:01:5919	to follow, and there is a specific actuarial standard of
12:02:0520	practice related to policy illustrations.
12:02:0921	Q Do you also consider the NAIC model regulation in
12:02:1322	making a certification?
12:02:1523	A Yes, I do.
12:02:1624	Q In what way?
12:02:1725	A Well, the model regulation is let me back up a

12:02:23 1	second. The illustration filings are done in various
12:02:29 2	states, and typically a state will adopt what is known as
12:02:34 3	the model regulation that is developed by the NAIC.
12:02:40 4	The state of California in most states it's
12:02:45 5	adopted as a regulation. In the state of California
12:02:48 6	effectively the same regulation was adopted in the form of a
12:02:56 7	law.
12:02:57 8	Q Have you ever had a situation where you need to make a
12:03:00 9	certification with regard to a particular illustration, and
12:03:0410	there is not a law directly on point to a particular issue?
12:03:1111	A Yes, I have.
12:03:1112	Q In that instance what do you do?
12:03:1413	A In that instance I use my professional judgment to best
12:03:1814	meet the spirit of which was intended by the law.
12:03:2215	Q Do you look to related regulations or standards of
12:03:2416	practice to try to exercise that judgment?
12:03:2817	A Yes, I do.
12:03:2818	Q Would that include the model regulation?
12:03:3019	A Yes, it would.
12:03:3120	Q I would like to show you Exhibit 226. I'm going to
12:03:3721	give you a binder.
12:03:4722	MR. MARTENS: May I approach, Your Honor?
12:03:4923	THE COURT: You may.
12:03:5024	BY MR. MARTENS:

It's a relatively thin binder, so that's a little

12:04:0025

12:04:02 1	unique in this case. Do you have it there in front of you?
12:04:04 2	A I do.
12:04:05 3	Q Have you been able to find Exhibit 226?
12:04:07 4	A Yes, I have.
12:04:10 5	Q I think 226 is in evidence, so why don't we put it up
12:04:15 6	on screen so the jury can follow along.
12:04:28 7	Do you recognize Exhibit 226?
12:04:30 8	A Yes, I do.
12:04:31 9	Q What is it?
12:04:3410	A It is my it is the illustration actuary
12:04:3711	certification that I provided upon the introduction of the
12:04:4012	Provider policy.
12:04:4113	Q And if we just go to the second page in fact, it
12:04:5114	might be just easier if we use the elmo on this one since
12:04:5415	it's a small document.
12:04:5716	Is this Exhibit 226 on the screen here?
12:05:0017	A Yes, it is.
12:05:0218	Q And there is a signature on the back?
12:05:0719	A Yes.
12:05:0720	Q That's yours?
12:05:0821	A That's correct.
12:05:0922	Q Back in 2005?
12:05:1123	A That's correct.
12:05:1124	Q And it indicates that you were the illustration actuary
12:05:1425	for LSW?

12:05:16 1	A That's correct.
12:05:18 2	Q And then so what's the purpose of Exhibit 226?
12:05:25 3	A The purpose of Exhibit 226 was to certify that the
12:05:37 4	illustrations of LSW complied with the illustration
12:05:42 5	regulation.
12:05:43 6	Q And in particular the illustration for the Provider
12:05:45 7	product?
12:05:45 8	A That's correct.
12:05:47 9	Q Now, I have highlighted here on the middle of this page
12:05:5010	some language. Can you read what that says.
12:05:5211	A Yes. The disciplined current scales for these plans
12:05:5712	are in conformity with the actuarial standard of practice
12:06:0213	for compliance with the NAIC life insurance illustration
12:06:0414	model regulation, ASOP-24, promulgated by the Actuarial
12:06:1215	Standards Board.
12:06:1316	Q Is that what you were referring to earlier when you
12:06:1517	said that you had to certify compliance of the disciplined
12:06:1718	current scale?
12:06:2019	A Yes, it is.
12:06:2020	Q Including the interest rate that would be used to
12:06:2221	credit the current basis B interest on the illustration?
12:06:2722	A That's correct.
12:06:2823	Q You were certifying that it was done in conformance
12:06:3224	with the regulations?
12:06:3325	A That's correct.

12:06:36 1	Q Now, I think down below there's a sentence in the next
12:06:40 2	paragraph that begins "however." Do you see that?
12:06:42 3	A Yes, I do.
12:06:43 4	Q Could you just read that for the jury.
12:06:45 5	A However, the regulation and ASOP-24 were developed
12:06:51 6	before equity-indexed universal life products emerged in the
12:06:57 7	marketplace. It is not possible to provide meaningful
12:07:00 8	illustrations of such products that are fully in accordance
12:07:03 9	with the regulation.
12:07:0510	Q Can you explain to the jury what that means.
12:07:0811	A The illustration regulation was developed prior to the
12:07:1212	emergence in the marketplace of indexed universal life
12:07:1813	products, and the wording of the regulation was written in
12:07:2214	such a way that it clearly assumed that for a life insurance
12:07:3115	product, the company will have declared a fixed rate of
12:07:3716	interest to be credited for the policyholder in a given
12:07:4117	here.
12:07:4218	It did not contemplate the possibility of a
12:07:4619	product such as the indexed universal life product where the
12:07:5120	interest to be credited to the policyholder would depend
12:07:5521	upon something like the movement of the S&P 500 index.
12:07:5922	Q Now, this Exhibit 226 is being sent to whom?
12:08:0323	A This is being sent to the state regulators.
12:08:0624	Q In California?
12:08:0725	A In California, yes.

12:08:09 1 So why did you include this sentence in here explaining 12:08:13 2 to the state of California that the regulation didn't apply 12:08:16 3 precisely? 12:08:17 4 Α Because the regulation did not apply precisely, and it 12:08:25 5 was not precisely clear what to do in terms of illustrating 12:08:30 6 for a product such as indexed universal life. What I did 12:08:36 7 was first apply my professional judgment to meet the spirit and intent of the regulation or, in the case of California, 12:08:42 8 12:08:46 9 the law, to the extent possible. But in doing so, I wanted 12:08:5410 to make sure that I disclosed to the regulator exactly what 12:09:0011 we were doing, given this situation. 12:09:0412 Can you read after the sentence that's highlighted the 12:09:0713 next sentence that begins "with regard" through the end of 12:09:1014 the paragraph. 12:09:1115 Yes. With regard to the ASOP where a question arises Α 12:09:1816 with regard to the applicability of a standard of practice 12:09:2017 or where no applicable standard exists, an actuary is 12:09:2618 directed to use professional judgment taking into account 12:09:2919 generally accepted actuarial principles and practices. 12:09:3420 Consistent with this charge, it is the opinion of 12:09:3621 the undersigned that when provided in conjunction with 12:09:3922 appropriate disclosure, these illustrations comply with the 12:09:4323 spirit and intent of the stated goals of the regulation to 12:09:4624 ensure that illustrations do not mislead purchasers of life 12:09:5025 insurance and to make illustrations more understandable.

12:09:54 1	Q Was that in fact your intent back in 2005 when you
12:09:58 2	signed as illustration actuary for the Provider product?
12:10:01 3	A Yes, it was.
12:10:02 4	Q Was it your intent to comply with both the spirit and
12:10:06 5	intent of the regulation?
12:10:06 6	A Yes, it was.
12:10:09 7	Q Do you believe you did that?
12:10:10 8	A Yes, I do.
12:10:11 9	Q Do you still believe that today?
12:10:1210	A Yes, I do.
12:10:1311	Q Did you continue to be the illustration actuary for the
12:10:1712	Provider product after 2005?
12:10:2013	A Yes, I did.
12:10:2014	Q Were there continuing obligations in that role each
12:10:2315	year?
12:10:2316	A Yes, there were.
12:10:2517	Q Including what?
12:10:2618	A Including an annual certification to the regulator that
12:10:2819	the illustrations continued to be in compliance with the
12:10:3120	illustration law and regulation.
12:10:3221	Q Did you make those certifications each year?
12:10:3422	A Yes, I did.
12:10:3523	Q Did you believe them to be true?
12:10:3724	A Yes, I did.
12:10:3825	Q Did you act at all times in good faith?

12:10:41 1	A Yes, I did.
12:10:42 2	Q How long did you continue in that role as illustration
12:10:45 3	actuary providing certifications for the Provider product?
12:10:47 4	A I continued in that role until 2011.
12:10:51 5	Q So any policies sold between 2005 and 2011, Provider
12:10:57 6	policies, would have been sold based in part on your
12:11:00 7	certification?
12:11:00 8	A That's correct.
12:11:04 9	Q Now, it also says at the bottom of this page there
12:11:0710	are two additional sentences. Do you see that?
12:11:1111	A Yes, I do.
12:11:1112	Q Could you read the first sentence for the jury.
12:11:1513	A Yes. Non-guaranteed elements illustrated for new
12:11:1814	policies are consistent with those illustrated for similar
12:11:2115	in-force policies.
12:11:2416	Q What's the purpose of that part of the certification?
12:11:2617	A The purpose is there is an obligation to disclose if
12:11:3618	the case is that you are illustrating something that is not
12:11:4219	consistent with a similar in-force policy.
12:11:4620	Q So this relates to non-guaranteed elements; is that
12:11:5121	fair?
12:11:5122	A Yes.
12:11:5223	Q So are you saying if you're doing something in this
12:11:5524	product, Provider, that's not consistent with what you're

doing on a non-guaranteed basis in another product, you need

12:12:0025

12:12:04 1	to say so?
12:12:06 2	MR. BROSNAHAN: Objection. Leading.
12:12:07 3	THE COURT: Rephrase the question.
12:12:07 4	BY MR. MARTENS:
12:12:08 5	Q If you're doing something different with a similar
12:12:12 6	product on a non-guaranteed basis, are you required to
12:12:16 7	disclose that?
12:12:17 8	A Yes, we are.
12:12:18 9	Q Are you certifying here whether or not there is
12:12:2110	anything to disclose?
12:12:2211	A I'm certifying that there is nothing to disclose in
12:12:2612	that regard.
12:12:2613	Q Now, it refers to similar in-force policies. Do you
12:12:3014	see that?
12:12:3015	A Yes, I do.
12:12:3116	Q Did you at the time have to determine whether there
12:12:3317	were similar in-force policies?
12:12:3618	A I did not have to determine that.
12:12:3819	Q Why not?
12:12:3920	A Because the disclosure is required in the event that
12:12:4421	there are inconsistencies with similar in-force policies. I
12:12:4922	had the knowledge that there were no inconsistencies with
12:12:5323	any policies that could plausibly be considered to be a
12:12:5924	similar policy; therefore, I concluded there was nothing to
12:13:0325	disclose.

12:13:03 1	Q In other words, you just determined whether there were
12:13:05 2	inconsistencies with anything that might even possibly be
12:13:09 3	similar?
12:13:09 4	A That's correct.
12:13:10 5	Q And you didn't think there were any inconsistencies?
12:13:13 6	A That's correct.
12:13:13 7	Q So you didn't have to sort out whether there was
12:13:17 8	something similar?
12:13:18 9	A That's correct.
12:13:1810	Q Now, on the next sentence, can you read that.
12:13:1911	A Yes. Illustrated non-guaranteed elements for new and
12:13:2712	in-force policies subject to this regulation are consistent
12:13:3013	with the non-guaranteed elements amounts actually credited
12:13:3314	or charged to the same or similar forms.
12:13:3615	Q Can you explain to us what you're doing in this
12:13:3916	sentence.
12:13:3917	A Yes. That expands it's pretty much the same concept
12:13:5118	as the sentence before, but it expands it to include
12:13:5519	in-force policies subject to the regulation and not
12:13:5920	necessarily limited to new policies as the first sentence
12:14:0221	is.
12:14:0322	Q So the first sentence refers to illustrated elements
12:14:0723	for new policies?
12:14:0824	A Yes.
12:14:0925	Q And the second one refers to in-force policies?

12:14:12 1	A In-force policies or new policies, yes.
12:14:16 2	Q What is an in-force policy?
12:14:18 3	A An in-force policy is generally viewed to be a policy
12:14:21 4	that was issued more than a year ago.
12:14:27 5	Q And how did you well, where does the requirement
12:14:29 6	that this certification be made come from?
12:14:35 7	A The requirement of disclosing any inconsistencies comes
12:14:40 8	from the illustration regulation and law.
12:14:44 9	Q Similarly, with regard to this sentence did you need to
12:14:4710	determine whether there were same or similar forms?
12:14:4911	A No, I did not.
12:14:5012	Q Why not?
12:14:5313	A It was the same reasoning as for the first sentence.
12:14:5314	Q Meaning you knew there were no inconsistencies whether
12:15:0015	the form was similar or not?
12:15:0216	A That's correct.
12:15:0217	Q That language in that second sentence, did you make up
12:15:0518	that language?
12:15:0619	A No, I did not.
12:15:0720	Q Where did that language in the second sentence actually
12:15:1021	come from?
12:15:1022	A I used the language that was provided within a life
12:15:1523	practice note that I obtained from the American Academy of
12:15:2124	Actuaries.
12:15:2125	Q What do you mean by a life practice note?

12:15:24 1	A A life practice note is something written by groups
12:15:30 2	within the American Academy of Actuaries to offer guidance
12:15:39 3	to actuaries practicing in a given field.
12:15:41 4	Q Do those life practice notes provide guidance as to how
12:15:44 5	to make the specific certification required in this
12:15:47 6	sentence?
12:15:48 7	A This particular life practice note did provide a
12:15:53 8	language an example of the wording of the certification
12:15:58 9	that an actuary could use, and I followed that wording.
12:16:0110	Q How closely did you follow the wording from that
12:16:0511	actuarial practice note in writing this sentence? How
12:16:0812	closely did you follow it?
12:16:0913	A I followed their wording word for word.
12:16:1214	Q So, for example, where it says in the next to the last
12:16:1615	line are consistent with the non-guaranteed elements amounts
12:16:2016	actually credited, did you actually, even that awkward
12:16:2217	phrasing, copy exactly from the practice note?
12:16:2618	A Yes, I did.
12:16:2719	MR. BROSNAHAN: Objection. Best evidence rule,
12:16:2720	Your Honor.
12:16:3121	THE COURT: Overruled.
12:16:3222	BY MR. MARTENS:
12:16:3523	Q Your answer?
12:16:3524	A My answer was yes, I did.

Do you have any concerns about the accuracy of this

12:16:3625

12:16:38 1	document at all?
12:16:39 2	A No, I do not.
12:16:45 3	Q Now I would like to show you Exhibit 225 from your
12:16:48 4	binder. Do you recognize Exhibit 225?
12:17:02 5	A Yes, I do.
12:17:03 6	Q What is Exhibit 225?
12:17:05 7	A 225 is the illustration actuary certification for the
12:17:11 8	initial submission of the Paragon product.
12:17:18 9	Q And the signatory on the certification is whom?
12:17:2210	A That's me.
12:17:2311	Q And does it state that you're the illustration actuary
12:17:2612	for LSW for this product?
12:17:2913	A Yes, it does.
12:17:3014	Q The date of the signature?
12:17:3115	A December 19, 2006.
12:17:3416	Q So were you the illustration actuary only in the 2006
12:17:4017	year for the Paragon product or for subsequent years as
12:17:4318	well?
12:17:4319	A I was the illustration actuary for the Paragon product
12:17:4720	starting in 2006 through the beginning of 2011.
12:17:5321	Q And similarly to the Provider product, did you have to
12:17:5822	make a certification each year?
12:17:5923	A Yes, I did.
12:18:0024	Q So if a Paragon product was sold between 2006 and 2011,
12:18:0525	it was based on your certification as an illustration

12:18:07 1	actuary?
12:18:08 2	A Yes, it was.
12:18:09 3	Q With regard to this Paragon certification, did you at
12:18:12 4	all times act in good faith in making this certification?
12:18:16 5	A Yes, I did.
12:18:17 6	Q Did you consider your professional obligations as an
12:18:19 7	actuary?
12:18:20 8	A Yes, I did.
12:18:21 9	Q Did you consider the relevant model regulations?
12:18:2310	A Yes, I did.
12:18:2411	Q Did you consider the relevant California state law?
12:18:2712	A Yes, I did.
12:18:2813	Q Did you at the time you signed it believe you were
12:18:3114	complying with all of those laws in making that
12:18:3415	certification?
12:18:3616	A Yes, I did.
12:18:3617	Q And is that true with regard to Provider as well?
12:18:3818	A Yes.
12:18:3819	Q Do you have any doubt about whether you were accurate
12:18:4020	in making this certification back in 2006?
12:18:4421	A I fully believe I was accurate in making that
12:18:4722	certification.
12:18:4823	Q Again, we could go through all of the relevant
12:18:5224	paragraphs, and I'm sure it would be as exciting the second
12:18:5725	time through as the first time. But is it fair to say that

12:19:00 1	all the same language that we just looked at with regard to
12:19:05 2	the Provider certification is in the Paragon one as well?
12:19:08 3	A Yes, it is.
12:19:32 4	Q I think there was some questioning in this trial about
12:19:33 5	an Exhibit 227. I'm going to show you Exhibit 227. You can
12:19:55 6	flip to it in your binder. I will put it up on the elmo as
12:19:57 7	well for the benefit of everyone else in the courtroom.
12:20:03 8	Just let me know when you're there?
12:20:05 9	A I don't see it in my binder.
12:20:0810	Q 227?
12:20:1111	A Correct.
12:20:1112	Q Well, we will just use the one up on the screen, then.
12:20:1513	Okay? Make it go a little easier; all right? And we'll
12:20:1514	look to see if we can get you a copy as well.
12:20:2115	Do you recognize this exhibit?
12:20:2216	A Yes, I do.
12:20:2317	Q Is it an e-mail to you from a Brett Anderson?
12:20:2718	A That's a part of it, yes.
12:20:2919	Q Down at the bottom?
12:20:3020	A Yes.
12:20:3221	Q Can you just read Brett Anderson's e-mail address.
12:20:3822	A It looks like BrettAnderson1@gmail.com.
12:20:4523	MR. MARTENS: If I can approach, Your Honor?
12:20:5224	THE COURT: You may.
12:20:5225	MR. MARTENS: We'll keep a copy up on the screen

12:20:52 1	for everybody else.
12:20:52 2	BY MR. MARTENS:
12:20:53 3	Q So this BrettAnderson1@gmail.com begins his e-mail to
12:20:53 4	you in February of 2010 with the salutation: Hi, Craig. Do
12:21:17 5	you see that?
12:21:18 6	A I see that.
12:21:19 7	Q Were you in 2010 on a first-name basis with
12:21:22 8	Mr. Anderson?
12:21:23 9	A No, I was not.
12:21:2510	Q Do you even know who Brett Anderson is?
12:21:2811	A No, I do not.
12:21:2912	Q Do you have any idea how he got your e-mail address?
12:21:3213	A No, I do not.
12:21:3314	Q So you get this e-mail. What did you do with it?
12:21:3715	A I quickly reviewed the content of the e-mail. I was
12:21:4616	able to quickly determine that the subject matter was
12:21:5017	properly in Elizabeth's MacGowan's area and not my own, so I
12:21:5818	forwarded the e-mail to Elizabeth.
12:22:0019	Q And I think you said the other day you made a
12:22:0220	light-hearted comment when you forwarded it to her?
12:22:0721	A Yes, I did.
12:22:0822	Q Why did you forward it to Ms. MacGowan let me
12:22:0923	rephrase. did you have any concerns that Ms. MacGowan would
12:22:1524	address this e-mail if it needed to be addressed?
12:22:1925	A I had full confidence that Ms. MacGowan would address

12:22:23 1	the e-mail if it needed to be addressed.
12:22:26 2	Q Have you had a chance since 2010 to go back and look at
12:22:31 3	the letter attached to the e-mail?
12:22:33 4	A Yes, I have.
12:22:33 5	Q Was that in the course of this litigation?
12:22:35 6	A Yes, it was.
12:22:36 7	Q And having looked through that letter that's attached
12:22:40 8	to the e-mail, I think we saw the other day that there is
12:22:42 9	some allegations made by this Brett Anderson1@gmail.com who
12:22:5010	you don't know?
12:22:5111	A Correct.
12:22:5212	Q And have you been able to look over those allegations?
12:22:5513	A Yes, I have.
12:22:5514	Q Including allegations that there's errors in your
12:22:5815	illustrations?
12:22:5916	A I have looked over them, yes.
12:23:0017	Q And based on looking over those allegations, do you
12:23:0418	have any opinion about the accuracy of the allegations?
12:23:0719	A Yes, I do.
12:23:0820	Q And what is that?
12:23:0921	A I believe his allegations are totally inaccurate.
12:23:1322	Q Why do you say that?
12:23:1423	A It is based on analysis that he did that is badly
12:23:2224	flawed.
12:23:2325	Q Is it based on a misunderstanding of how the products

12:23:28 1	work based on your reading of the e-mail?
12:23:31 2	A Yes, it is.
12:23:32 3	Q Have you ever heard anybody describe Brett Anderson
12:23:35 4	around the office?
12:23:36 5	A Not that I can recall.
12:23:38 6	Q You haven't heard the description that he's a type of
12:23:40 7	person who is always certain but rarely correct?
12:23:44 8	A I don't recall hearing that.
12:23:55 9	Q I think there is one more exhibit I want to show you,
12:23:5910	Exhibit 87. I'm just going to put this one up on the
12:24:1211	screen. I don't think we have your binder from the other
12:24:1612	day.
12:24:1813	So Exhibit 87, I'll just start on the front page.
12:24:2214	Do you recognize this as the California state filing for the
12:24:2415	Provider product?
12:24:3216	A Let's see.
12:24:3817	Q Why don't I bring it up to you so you can take a look.
12:24:3818	A Sure. Okay.
12:24:4219	MR. MARTENS: May I approach, Your Honor?
12:24:4420	THE COURT: You may.
12:24:4521	BY MR. MARTENS:
12:25:0522	Q Do you recognize that as the California state filing
12:25:0723	for the Provider product?
12:25:0824	A Yes, it is.
12:25:0925	Q Did you have some involvement with that filing?

12:25:14 1	A Yes, I did.
12:25:14 2	MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, just in case the witness
12:25:14 3	has some trouble, I'm going to leave that copy up there.
12:25:14 4	THE COURT: That's fine.
12:25:14 5	BY MR. MARTENS:
12:25:28 6	Q I would like you to turn to the page Bates number
12:25:33 7	ending in 147. Are you there?
12:25:47 8	A I am.
12:25:48 9	Q I'm going to put it up here on the screen as well.
12:25:5110	Do you know what this document is?
12:25:5511	A Yes, I do.
12:25:5612	Q What is it?
12:25:5713	A It is a document speaking to the reserve methodology
12:26:0614	and computations that would be done on the Provider product.
12:26:1315	Q And can you just explain to the jury what it means to
12:26:1616	have a reserve methodology and computation.
12:26:1917	A Yes. For life insurance policies, we as an insurance
12:26:2618	company are required to hold reserves under the state law to
12:26:3419	provide for the future payment of benefits under the
12:26:3820	policies. So this memo would be speaking to the regulator
12:26:4321	about how the reserves for the Provider product are to be
12:26:4822	calculated.
12:26:4923	Q So this is about how you determine whether there is
12:26:5624	enough money being held at the company to make sure you can
12:26:5925	pay the policyholders?

12:27:00 1	A How we determined that we are holding the appropriate
12:27:04 2	level of reserves, yes.
12:27:05 3	Q And is that a matter of, again, state regulation, how
12:27:08 4	much money needs to be held?
12:27:10 5	A Yes, it is, right. Regulation and law.
12:27:12 6	Q And there is a signature down at the bottom. Do you
12:27:14 7	see that?
12:27:15 8	A Yes, I do.
12:27:15 9	Q Whose signature is that?
12:27:1710	A That would be mine.
12:27:1811	Q And the date again?
12:27:2012	A The date is March 30, 2005.
12:27:2513	Q Do you remember that there were some questions the
12:27:2814	other day about stochastic analysis?
12:27:3415	A Yes, I do.
12:27:3716	Q Is there some type of stochastic analysis that goes
12:27:4117	into making this certification?
12:28:1618	A I'm not seeing it on this particular document.
12:28:2019	Q Well, there would be a reason for that, and that's
12:28:2520	because I showed you the wrong page.
12:28:2821	A Okay.
12:28:2822	Q So why don't we get you on the right page. Turn to
12:28:3023	page 153, which I will put up on the screen. Do you see
12:28:4024	page 153?
12:28:4125	A Yes.

12:28:42 1	Q What is page 153?
12:28:45 2	A Page 153 is the final page of a document titled indexed
12:28:55 3	interest crediting and investment procedures for
12:28:58 4	equity-indexed universal life pertaining to the Provider
12:29:02 5	product.
12:29:04 6	Q Can you just tell us in layman's terms what that means.
12:29:07 7	A Yes. It was a memo to the regulators included within
12:29:13 8	the filing to describe to them how we credited interest on
12:29:19 9	the Provider product and how we planned to invest for the
12:29:2510	Provider product.
12:29:2611	Q Again, this is all part of the state filing that is
12:29:2912	Exhibit 87?
12:29:3113	A That's correct.
12:29:3114	Q Who is the signatory on this document?
12:29:3315	A That is me.
12:29:3516	Q And what's the date?
12:29:3617	A March 30, 2005.
12:29:3918	Q And there is a section on page that ends in Bates
12:29:4119	number 153 that refers to asset adequacy testing?
12:29:4720	A That's correct.
12:29:4821	Q And there were some questions I believe when you
12:29:5222	previously testified about the section that deals with
12:29:5323	randomized economic scenarios?
12:29:5824	A That's correct.
12:29:5925	Q What is the purpose of that part of the certification?

12:30:02 1	A That part of the certification speaks to part of what
12:30:06 2	we do in ensuring that the reserves we are holding for these
12:30:12 3	products meet the requirement of the law.
12:30:16 4	Q When it talks about economic scenarios that are
12:30:19 5	randomized, do you see that in the second sentence under
12:30:22 6	asset adequacy testing?
12:30:24 7	A Yes, I do.
12:30:25 8	Q Is that a Monte Carlo analysis?
12:30:27 9	A I do not consider it to be, no.
12:30:3010	Q Is there any effort made in this type of testing to
12:30:3211	project the probability that the S&P 500 will perform in any
12:30:3612	way in the future?
12:30:3813	A No, there is not.
12:30:3914	Q Is projections about likelihoods any part of this
12:30:4415	analysis?
12:30:4516	A No, it is not.
12:30:4717	Q Is Monte Carlo any part of this analysis?
12:30:4918	A No, it is not.
12:30:5019	Q Is it a stochastic analysis?
12:30:5220	A Yes, it is.
12:30:5321	Q What does that mean?
12:30:5422	A Stochastic in my mind is more or less just a different
12:31:0023	fancier way to say randomized.
12:31:0524	Q Is the type of stochastic analysis that is conducted
12:31:0525	for purposes of this certification the type of thing that

12:31:12 1	you believe you could apply in disclosures to potential
12:31:16 2	policyholders?
12:31:18 3	A No, it is not.
12:31:20 4	Q Why not?
12:31:22 5	A Well, one reason is attempting to include anything
12:31:27 6	related to a process like this in a policy illustration
12:31:32 7	would violate the illustration law.
12:31:36 8	Q Would you, back in 2005 through 2011 when you were an
12:31:41 9	illustration actuary, be willing, consistent with the
12:31:4410	relevant laws and your professional responsibilities, to
12:31:4711	certify an illustration for purposes of distribution to
12:31:5112	potential policyholders that included this type of
12:31:5413	stochastic analysis in the interest rate section?
12:31:5814	A No, I would not.
12:32:0015	Q Do you believe you could do that?
12:32:0116	A I do not believe I could do that.
12:32:0317	MR. MARTENS: Just one second, Your Honor.
12:32:1718	(Defense counsel conferring)
12:32:2019	BY MR. MARTENS:
12:32:2220	Q This issue that we are looking at on page 153 of
12:32:2621	Exhibit 87, is Elizabeth MacGowan at all involved in that
12:32:3222	process?
12:32:3223	A No, she is not.
12:32:3424	Q I think you said you're in the corporate actuarial
12:32:3725	department?

12:32:37 1	A That's correct.
12:32:38 2	Q And she's in product?
12:32:40 3	A That's correct.
12:32:41 4	Q Does the product group have any involvement with this
12:32:43 5	type of analysis?
12:32:45 6	A No, they do not.
12:32:47 7	MR. MARTENS: No further questions.
12:32:49 8	THE COURT: We will take our last break of the day
12:32:51 9	here, ladies and gentlemen. We will be in recess for 15
12:32:5410	minutes. Please remember the admonition.
12:32:5511	(Recess taken at 12:33 p.m.;
12:33:0712	proceeding resumed at 12:47 p.m.)
12:47:1513	THE COURT: Mr. Martens, how much more do you have
12:47:1814	with Mr. Smith?
12:47:2015	MR. MARTENS: I think I completed right before the
12:47:2116	break, Your Honor. After their examination I have a few
12:47:2417	documents I'd like to have admitted into evidence. I don't
12:47:2518	think the jury needs to hang around for that. I don't need
12:47:2519	to publish any of them.
12:47:2520	THE COURT: All right.
12:47:2621	MR. MARTENS: I would be happy to conditionally
12:47:2822	rest after the cross of Mr. Smith.
12:47:3223	THE COURT: Okay.
12:47:3224	Let's bring the jury in, please.
12:47:3525	(Jury present)

MR. FOSTER: May I approach the witness with a
binder, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. FOSTER: Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FOSTER:
Q Mr. Smith, we spoke the other day; correct?
A That's correct.
Q And do you remember that after we spoke, your counsel
did not ask you any questions? Do you remember that?
A I do remember that.
Q In the intervening days, have you had time to meet with
your counsel?
A Yes, I have.
Q And without telling me the contents of any
communications that you had with your counsel, you had the
opportunity to meet with Mr. Martens?
A Yes, I did.
Q And are there others in this room that you had the
opportunity to meet with?
A Yes, I did.
Q How many others in this room did you have the
opportunity to meet with?
A I don't recall exactly. I guess maybe one or two.
Q One or two?

12:49:53 1	A Yes, in addition to Mr. Martens.
12:49:57 2	Q In addition to Mr. Martens. Okay. I want to ask you
12:50:01 3	about one aspect of your testimony.
12:50:05 4	And how long did you meet with others in this
12:50:08 5	room?
12:50:10 6	A You mean after Tuesday?
12:50:11 7	Q Yes.
12:50:14 8	A Maybe an hour at most.
12:50:18 9	Q You testified that you looked over Mr. Anderson's
12:50:2310	analysis and you found that it was deeply flawed; correct?
12:50:3011	A That's correct.
12:50:3112	Q Now, when you were here the other day, didn't I ask
12:50:3113	you, quote: Well, you don't recall ever doing anything in
12:50:3414	response to this e-mail other than forwarding it to
12:50:3815	Elizabeth MacGowan; correct? And you said: That's correct?
12:50:4116	A That sounds correct.
12:50:4217	Q You didn't tell the jury that you looked over
12:50:4518	Mr. Anderson's analysis and found it deeply flawed; did you?
12:50:5019	A No, I did not.
12:50:5220	MR. MARTENS: Objection. Misstates what he just
12:50:5321	testified to.
12:50:5422	THE COURT: Overruled.
12:50:5623	BY MR. FOSTER:
12:50:5624	Q Weren't you also asked you said, quote: I'm fully
12:51:0125	confident that Ms. MacGowan knows the appropriate amount of

12:51:04 1	work to devote to any specific correspondence she receives.
12:51:08 2	And I asked you: But your confidence doesn't bear
12:51:12 3	any relationship to the subject matter of this communication
12:51:14 4	because you already testified that you didn't actually look
12:51:18 5	or do any analysis of the subject matter of the
12:51:22 6	communication; did you?
12:51:23 7	Your answer was: I did no further analysis of
12:51:26 8	Mr. Anderson's letter beyond forwarding it to Ms. MacGowan.
12:51:29 9	That was your answer; correct?
12:51:3210	A That sounds correct.
12:51:3311	Q Okay. But you came here today and you testified that
12:51:3512	you did do further analysis and you found that it was deeply
12:51:4013	flawed; correct?
12:51:4114	A That's correct.
12:51:4115	Q So your testimony here today is directly contrary to
12:51:4416	your testimony two days ago; correct?
12:51:4617	A No, that is not correct.
12:51:4818	Q Well, two days ago you testified that you did no
12:51:5119	further analysis, and today you're here telling the jury
12:51:5520	that you did further analysis and Mr. Anderson's letter was
12:51:5921	deeply flawed; correct?
12:52:0122	A That's correct.
12:52:0223	Q And those two statements, they cannot be squared; can
12:52:0624	they?

They can very easily be squared.

12:52:0625

10 50 00 1	
12:52:08 1	Q When you testified that you did no further analysis of
12:52:09 2	Mr. Anderson's letter the other day, do you think the jury
12:52:12 3	would understand that you were saying that you did further
12:52:14 4	analysis and found it deeply flawed?
12:52:19 5	A As of Tuesday the jury would probably have understood
12:52:24 6	me to have said that I had done no further analysis as of
12:52:27 7	that time.
12:52:28 8	Q And what you're testifying here today that as of
12:52:28 9	Tuesday that would have been misleading because you did do
12:52:3410	further analysis?
12:52:3511	A I'm saying no such thing.
12:52:3712	Q Well, you testified that they would have an
12:52:3813	understanding as of Tuesday based on your testimony, and
12:52:4114	you're coming here today stating that that understanding
12:52:4415	they would have gotten from your testimony under oath would
12:52:4816	have been wrong; correct?
12:52:4917	A I don't understand the sentence you just said, but I'll
12:52:5018	point out that two days have elapsed between Tuesday and
12:52:5719	today.
12:52:5720	Q So what you're telling me is that in the two days that
12:52:5921	have elapsed, you went back and did analysis on this letter?
12:53:0522	A That's correct.
12:53:0523	Q So to be clear, this letter was sent to you and at the
12:53:1124	time you did no analysis; correct?

That's correct.

12:53:1425

12:53:16 1	Q And you were asked about this letter at your
12:53:18 2	deposition, and that was on December 7, 2012; correct?
12:53:25 3	A I believe that's correct.
12:53:26 4	Q And you said you had done no analysis; correct?
12:53:29 5	A Correct.
12:53:30 6	Q And after that deposition you didn't go back and do any
12:53:33 7	analysis; did you?
12:53:34 8	A Not that I recall.
12:53:36 9	Q And you were asked about it two days ago, and you
12:53:3810	didn't do any analysis prior to two days ago; correct?
12:53:4211	A Correct.
12:53:4312	Q And then after you testified two days ago, your counsel
12:53:4713	didn't ask you any questions, spoke with you for an hour,
12:53:5014	and all of a sudden you have done an analysis; correct?
12:53:5315	A I have done an analysis in the two days between Tuesday
12:53:5716	and today.
12:53:5817	Q And was there any work in this analysis that you
12:54:0218	conducted?
12:54:0419	A Pardon me. I didn't hear the question.
12:54:0420	Q Was there any written work that you conducted as part
12:54:0721	of this analysis?
12:54:0822	A Was there any what?
12:54:0823	Q Written work.
12:54:0824	A Written?
12:54:0925	Q Yeah. Like, did you write anything down?

12:54:15 1	A No, I did not.
12:54:15 2	Q You just looked at it and decided that you didn't think
12:54:19 3	that it was a valid criticism?
12:54:24 4	A I was able to look through what Mr. Anderson I was
12:54:30 5	able to look through the material in that exhibit and
12:54:34 6	determine that Mr. Anderson's analysis was badly flawed;
12:54:38 7	correct.
12:54:39 8	Q Okay. So when Mr. Anderson wrote that LSW's
12:54:43 9	illustrations bordered on deception and cheating, you
12:54:4810	conducted no analysis; correct?
12:54:4911	A At the time I forwarded it to Ms. MacGowan, as I
12:54:5212	testified.
12:54:5313	Q And when you were alerted that LSW's illustrations
12:54:5614	verged on deception and cheating at your deposition, you
12:55:0215	didn't think it was important to conduct any analysis then;
12:55:0316	did you?
12:55:0517	A I felt at the time that my action of forwarding it to
12:55:0718	Ms. MacGowan was sufficient.
12:55:0919	Q And two days ago you decided that your action of
12:55:1220	forwarding it to Ms. MacGowan was not sufficient; correct?
12:55:1621	A No, that is not correct.
12:55:1722	Q You decided you needed to go out and do further
12:55:2023	analysis; correct?
12:55:2124	A I did do further analysis after that. However, my
12:55:2425	decision to forward it to Ms. MacGowan was the correct

12:55:27 1	decision to do.
12:55:28 2	MR. FOSTER: Your Honor, I would move to strike
12:55:32 3	everything after I did further analysis.
12:55:36 4	THE COURT: Denied.
12:55:37 5	BY MR. FOSTER:
12:55:37 6	Q Do you wish at the time you got this letter that you
12:55:43 7	had done further analysis?
12:55:44 8	A No, I don't.
12:55:45 9	Q All right. Moving on. We have talked about the
12:55:5110	certification that you signed, which was Exhibit 226. The
12:56:1111	certification reads: Illustrated non-guaranteed elements
12:56:1712	for new and in-force policies subject to this regulation are
12:56:2213	consistent with the non-guaranteed elements amounts actually
12:56:2614	credited or charged to the same or similar forms; correct?
12:56:2915	A That is correct.
12:56:3016	Q And you have testified that non-guaranteed elements
12:56:3517	include this reduced monthly administrative charge; correct?
12:56:3918	A The amount of any administrative charge that is not
12:56:4019	guaranteed would be a non-guaranteed element; correct.
12:56:4720	Q And you have testified that there were no same or
12:56:5021	similar forms to the Provider or Paragon product at the time
12:56:5422	you were making these certifications; correct?
12:56:5623	A That is not what I testified.
12:56:5824	Q Okay. Well, you testified you didn't do any
12:57:0025	investigation to determine whether there were any same or

12:57:04 1	similar forms to Provider or Paragon; correct?
12:57:06 2	A I don't recall if that is what I said.
12:57:08 3	Q Okay. Well, sitting here today can you recall or
12:57:10 4	identify any forms that would be considered the same or
12:57:14 5	similar within the meaning of this regulation?
12:57:17 6	A I believe what I said was that I did not determine
12:57:20 7	whether there were or were not similar forms to this form.
12:57:26 8	Q Did you understand my question, Mr. Smith? Sitting
12:57:28 9	here today are there any same or similar forms that you can
12:57:3110	recall that would be considered the same or similar to
12:57:3511	Paragon or Provider for the purposes of this certification?
12:57:4012	A As I just said, I have never determined whether or not
12:57:4413	there were the same or similar forms, and that statement
12:57:4814	holds true today.
12:57:4915	Q Thank you. But what you testified, I believe, is that
12:57:5416	this language, when you certified it, your understanding is
12:57:5917	that it means illustrated non-guaranteed elements for new
12:58:0618	and in-force policies subject to this regulation are not
12:58:1119	inconsistent with the non-guaranteed elements actually
12:58:1420	credited or charged to the same or similar forms. That's
12:58:1821	your understanding; correct?
12:58:2222	A Not exactly. I would say more accurate I would say
12:58:3023	that this sentence is the same thing as saying it is not the
12:58:3424	case that there are elements that are inconsistent with
12:58:3825	those for the same or similar forms.

12:58:42 1	Q So you think this sentence means the same thing as if
12:58:46 2	it said not inconsistent?
12:58:56 3	A I don't believe that's what I just said.
12:58:58 4	Q Well, explain it for us, because it says that they are
12:59:04 5	consistent with the non-guaranteed elements amounts actually
12:59:08 6	credited or charged to the same or similar forms. You have
12:59:11 7	testified that you're not aware of any same or similar
12:59:14 8	forms. So testify what you think this sentence means.
12:59:17 9	A The sentence means that it is not the case that
12:59:2310	illustrated non-guaranteed elements are inconsistent with
12:59:2811	any of the same or similar forms.
12:59:3512	Q So you think it would be more clear if it said it is
12:59:4013	not the case, and instead of consistent said inconsistent?
12:59:5714	A Well, if you put the word that after case.
01:00:0915	Q Thank you.
01:00:1016	A It is not the case that illustrated non-guaranteed
01:00:1317	elements for new and in-force policies subject to this
01:00:1618	regulation are inconsistent with the non-guaranteed elements
01:00:2119	amounts actually credited or charged to the same or similar
01:00:2820	forms. I believe that to be an accurate sentence.
01:00:3021	Q Okay. You believe that to be an accurate sentence.
01:00:3022	And you're telling me and the jury that you don't think in
01:00:3423	the absence of this clarification that that language in this
01:00:3924	certification implied at all the existence of same or
01:00:4325	similar forms?

01:00:49 1	A I do not believe that a let me start over. I'm
01:00:53 2	confident that a regulator reviewing this certification
01:00:59 3	would take the meaning as I said.
01:01:04 4	MR. FOSTER: Objection. Ask that it be stricken.
01:01:06 5	MR. MARTENS: The answer will be stricken.
01:01:08 6	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:01:09 7	Q Do you understand the question?
01:01:10 8	A Not really. It was a very complicated question.
01:01:13 9	Q All right. I'll try and simply it just so we
01:01:1310	understand each other. I have added some language there
01:01:1511	based on what you said, that it is not the case that,
01:01:1912	inconsistent. Do you see that?
01:01:2113	A Okay.
01:01:2114	Q So leaving that language aside, the certification as it
01:01:2515	was actually written and filed with the California
01:01:2816	Department of Insurance are you with me?
01:01:3117	A Yes.
01:01:3118	Q Okay. So my question is: Are you telling the jury
01:01:3619	that you do not think that that language implies that the
01:01:4020	same or similar forms exist?
01:01:4621	A I'm telling the jury that the language I used does not
01:01:5022	imply that the same or similar forms exist, that the
01:01:5423	language I used is equivalent to what was written there.
01:01:5824	Q Thank you.
01:01:5925	Now, you also talked about how in the

01:02:03 1	certification, that there were the certification talks
01:02:11 2	about how the regulation and ASOP-24 were developed before
01:02:20 3	equity-indexed universal life products emerged in the
01:02:31 4	marketplace. Do you remember testifying about that
01:02:35 5	language?
01:02:35 6	A Yes, I do.
01:02:36 7	Q And these prior policies, they provided a constant
01:02:42 8	fixed interest rate in the future to policyholders; correct?
01:02:46 9	A Which prior policies are you referring to?
01:02:4810	Q Well, I'm just trying to get clarification on your
01:02:5111	testimony. As I understood it, you testified that there
01:02:5312	were policies predating the equity-indexed universal life
01:02:5813	products where, if seven percent was credited, you got that
01:03:0414	seven percent constantly each and every year.
01:03:0815	A Policies that existed in the marketplace prior to the
01:03:1416	illustration regulation generally were of that form, yes.
01:03:1517	Q Okay. But equity-indexed universal life policies,
01:03:1718	they're credited based on an index such as the S&P correct?
01:03:2319	A Based on how it performs, yes.
01:03:2520	Q Based on how the S&P 500 performs. And the S&P 500,
01:03:3321	it's historically volatile; correct?
01:03:3922	A The S&P 500 in a given year could go up or could go
01:03:4523	down.
01:03:4624	Q And the sequence of returns in the S&P 500, that
01:03:4825	matters; correct?

01:03:50 1	A It does matter, yes.
01:03:52 2	Q And it matters for the value that a policyholder can
01:03:56 3	expect to any sort of product that depends on the
01:04:02 4	performance of the S&P correct?
01:04:03 5	A It matters to the value that the policyholder will
01:04:08 6	eventually have is correct. I don't know what the
01:04:13 7	policyholder expects.
01:04:14 8	Q Well, let's take a look at this slide 110-06. Sequence
01:04:20 9	of returns does matter when fees are being deducted. Do you
01:04:2610	see that?
01:04:2711	MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, this is beyond the
01:04:2912	scope.
01:04:3113	THE COURT: Mr. Foster.
01:04:3214	MR. FOSTER: He testified about this language, the
01:04:3415	constant crediting, before and the change in the regulation.
01:04:4216	THE COURT: Did he testify to that today?
01:04:4317	MR. FOSTER: Today, yes.
01:04:4418	MR. MARTENS: He didn't talk about this form. I
01:04:4519	don't know why we're going into
01:04:4620	THE COURT: Overruled.
01:04:4821	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:04:4822	Q So this is accurate, right, that the sequence of
01:04:5223	returns matters when fees are being deducted?
01:05:0524	A It is correct that the sequence of return does matter,
01:05:0825	yes.

01:05:09 1	Q And the sequence of returns matters when fees are being
01:05:11 2	deducted even if you're getting the same average rate over
01:05:15 3	time; correct?
01:05:18 4	A It depends.
01:05:20 5	Q Well, in this example you get ten percent in year one
01:05:23 6	and two percent in year two in case one, and in year two you
01:05:27 7	get two percent in year one and ten percent in year two;
01:05:30 8	correct?
01:05:31 9	A In this example, that is correct.
01:05:3210	Q So you're getting the same average return but just the
01:05:3611	sequence is reversed; correct?
01:05:3912	A It depends.
01:05:4013	Q What do you mean by it depends?
01:05:4314	A In this case it depends on how you're defining the term
01:05:4815	average return.
01:05:5216	Q Well, they got ten percent interest in year one,
01:05:5517	two percent interest in year two in case one; right? In
01:05:5918	case two they got two percent interest in year one and
01:06:0419	ten percent interest in year two; correct?
01:06:0720	A That's correct.
01:06:0721	Q And these different sequences, the fact that you got
01:06:1022	the higher interest rate in year one and the lower interest
01:06:1523	rate in year two, that makes a difference on the returns
01:06:1824	that a policyholder will have; correct?

In this example that is correct.

01:06:2025

01:06:38 1	Q And this volatility in the S&P 500 that we were talking
01:06:41 2	about previously, that's a characteristic of the underlying
01:06:45 3	<pre>index; correct?</pre>
01:06:47 4	A The S&P 500 can go up in a given year or it could go
01:06:51 5	down in a given year.
01:06:54 6	Q And that's a characteristic of the S&P 500 index;
01:06:57 7	correct?
01:06:58 8	A I think it's fair to say that.
01:06:59 9	Q Okay. And the certifications that we have been talking
01:07:0210	about, those go back to the 2005-2006 period. Is it fair to
01:07:1011	say that those certifications stayed the same over the time
01:07:1212	that you were certifying them from 2005, I believe, to 2011?
01:07:1913	A I cannot recall any substantive differences.
01:07:2314	Q Do you know of any substantive differences that
01:07:2915	occurred after 2011?
01:07:3116	A Not that I am aware of.
01:07:3317	Q And they include the language about the ASOP number 24
01:07:3718	not considering equity-indexed universal life products, but
01:07:4219	isn't it true that ASOP-24 was modified in the beginning of
01:07:4820	2007 explicitly to consider equity-indexed universal life
01:07:5321	products?
01:07:5322	A Actually, now that you say that, yes, I do recall that.
01:07:5723	Q And do you recall that ASOP-24, when it was modified to
01:08:0124	include equity-indexed products, it said that for these
01:08:0625	indexed life insurance products, the characteristics of the

01:08:10 1	underlying index have to be taken into account by the
01:08:14 2	actuary?
01:08:16 3	A I don't recall the exact wording, but I do recall that
01:08:19 4	the change did reflect did discuss indexed products.
01:08:26 5	Q And do you recall that it involved indexed products in
01:08:35 6	the sense that it now required for an indexed life insurance
01:08:40 7	product with investment assumption is sensitive to business
01:08:43 8	or economic cycles, the actuary should consider the
01:08:46 9	characteristics of the underlying index? Do you recall that
01:08:4910	as part of ASOP-24?
01:08:5211	A I recall language to that affect.
01:08:5412	Q And it is true, is it not, that LSW's policy
01:09:0213	illustrations do not consider the effect of S&P 500
01:09:0614	volatility on policy value?
01:09:0915	A It depends.
01:09:1216	Q Well, the returns depicted are all constant scenarios;
01:09:1617	correct?
01:09:1918	A I don't know that that's always correct.
01:09:2219	Q Okay. You have never seen a return depicted in an
01:09:2520	illustration that's not a constant annual return; correct?
01:09:2821	A Not that I recall.
01:09:2922	Q Okay. And as you testified, LSW went on certifying to
01:09:3523	the Department of Insurance that ASOP-24 did not take into
01:09:4124	account equity-indexed products; correct?
01:09:4525	A No, that is not correct.

01:09:46 1	Q Okay. But it's fair to say that the characteristics of
01:09:52 2	the underlying index in terms of volatility and the effect
01:09:55 3	that volatility would have on policy values were not taken
01:09:59 4	into account; correct?
01:10:02 5	A I don't think that's fair to say.
01:10:05 6	Q But you have never seen them taken into account in an
01:10:10 7	illustration provided to a policyholder; correct?
01:10:15 8	A I don't understand what you mean by taken into account.
01:10:18 9	Q Well, taking into account the fact that your policy
01:10:2210	values are going to be different if instead of getting
01:10:2711	seven percent each and every year, that you're going to
01:10:3012	get that the sequence of returns are going to vary, and
01:10:3413	that's going to have an effect on your value or your lapse
01:10:3714	probability. You have never seen anything like that in the
01:10:4115	illustration; have you?
01:10:4216	A Subsequent to the actuarial standard of practice
01:10:4517	changing, even when the actuarial standard of practice
01:10:5018	changed, that did not change the fact that it is against the
01:10:5519	illustration law to illustrate something such as
01:10:5820	zero percent one year and 14 percent the next.
01:11:0221	MR. FOSTER: We'll get to that but I'm going to
01:11:0222	move to strike. That's not an answer.
01:11:0623	THE COURT: The answer will be stricken.
01:11:0924	BY MR. FOSTER:
01 11 0005	

Q Now, do you understand my question?

01:11:0925

01:11:10 1	A Would you repeat the question, please.
01:11:11 2	Q Sure. You have never seen any illustration that in any
01:11:13 3	way displayed anything other than a constant interest rate;
01:11:18 4	correct?
01:11:20 5	A Not that I recall. That's correct.
01:11:22 6	Q Okay. Let's talk about Exhibit 87. You signed this;
01:11:59 7	correct? It's in your binder under 87.
01:12:08 8	A Eighty-seven is quite thick. Could you point me to
01:12:11 9	Q 153.
01:12:1210	A (Witness reading document) That's correct.
01:12:1311	Q And I believe you previously testified that this form
01:12:1812	was filed every year; correct?
01:12:2013	A Not this form, no.
01:12:2214	Q Well, the asset adequacy testing certification is made
01:12:2815	every year; correct?
01:12:2916	A Asset adequacy testing is performed every year.
01:12:3117	Q And there is a certification signed by the appointed
01:12:3518	actuary with each annual and quarterly financial statement
01:12:4019	filed in each state in which the company writes
01:12:4420	equity-indexed universal life; correct?
01:12:4621	A That is correct.
01:12:4622	Q Okay. And it was filed by you from 2006 to 2011 in
01:12:5223	regards to the Provider and Paragon products; correct?
01:12:5724	A That is a different statement.

Did you sign the certification pursuant to actuarial

01:12:5925

01:13:06 1	guideline 36 which deals with asset adequacy with each
01:13:09 2	annual and quarterly statutory financial statement filed in
01:13:09 3	each state in which the company writes equity-indexed
01:13:09 4	universal life?
01:13:10 5	A The statement regarding the statement filed related
01:13:10 6	to actuarial guideline 36 is not about asset adequacy.
01:13:31 7	Q Well, let's focus in on this page right here about the
01:13:36 8	asset adequacy testing. You signed this page and it was
01:13:41 9	filed along with the Provider policy in 2006; correct?
01:13:4510	A No. It was filed in 2005.
01:13:4811	Q Excuse me. In 2005; correct?
01:13:5112	A Correct.
01:13:5113	Q And there was another one when Paragon was filed? You
01:13:5714	signed that one, too; correct?
01:13:5915	A I don't recall.
01:14:0016	Q Well, if you look at Exhibit 88 in your binder well,
01:14:1317	page 214 first. This is a policy form filing for Paragon;
01:14:2618	correct?
01:14:2819	A Yes, it is.
01:14:2920	Q And if you look at page LSW 327 excuse me, 325 to
01:14:4021	326.
01:14:4722	A Yes.
01:14:4723	Q Do you see there's the same language about asset
01:14:5124	adequacy testing that we see on the screen here?

A Yes, I do.

01:14:5925

01 15 01 1	
01:15:01 1	Q And if you look at Exhibit 292, 292 is a 2009 policy
01:15:18 2	form filing with the State of California for the Provider
01:15:21 3	product; correct?
01:15:28 4	A It is for a Provider product.
01:15:33 5	Q If you look at Bates number LSW 18182
01:15:42 6	MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, it does seem like we're
01:15:45 7	way beyond the scope on this one. I don't think I even
01:15:48 8	talked about this.
01:15:50 9	MR. FOSTER: He talked directly about this, but I
01:15:5210	will move it along.
01:15:5411	THE COURT: Move it along.
01:15:5412	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:15:5513	Q Do you see that page that you signed, the policy form
01:15:5714	filing in 2009 as well with the same exact language?
01:16:0515	A Yes, I do.
01:16:0616	Q Okay. And you were signing this in your role as the
01:16:0917	illustration actuary for the Paragon and Provider product?
01:16:1218	A No, I was not.
01:16:1519	Q You were signing it in your role in which role at
01:16:1820	the company?
01:16:1921	A I was signing it in my role as appointed actuary.
01:16:2322	Q As appointed actuary. Are you still the appointed
01:16:2523	actuary today?
01:16:2624	A Yes, I am.
01 16 000	

Does LSW include this same language in its policy form

01:16:2725

01:16:34 1	filings that it does for all its equity-indexed products
01:16:39 2	with the State of California?
01:16:40 3	A Do you mean subsequent to this filing?
01:16:44 4	Q Yes, subsequent filings related to Provider and Paragon
01:16:46 5	with the State of California would include this language in
01:16:51 6	the description of asset adequacy testing; correct?
01:16:57 7	MR. MARTENS: Objection. Best evidence rule, Your
01:16:57 8	Honor. If they want to put those documents in, they should.
01:16:59 9	THE COURT: Overruled.
01:17:0010	THE WITNESS: I don't recall.
01:17:0011	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:17:0112	Q You don't recall. Okay. Now, these talk about asset
01:17:0313	adequacy testing that was conducted; correct? Well, let me
01:17:1114	rephrase. Asset adequacy testing, just so everyone
01:17:1415	understands, that's part of a yearly actuarial opinion that
01:17:1916	says that the reserves and related items for a company, when
01:17:2217	considered in light of the assets held by the company with
01:17:2518	respect to such reserves, make adequate provision for
01:17:3219	anticipated cash flows; correct?
01:17:3420	A That's correct.
01:17:3421	Q And what the purpose of this certification is, is to
01:17:3622	figure out whether the cash flows from the assets backing
01:17:4023	the company's reserves are adequate to pay the benefits and
01:17:4524	expenses associated with the policies in force; correct?
01:17:4925	A Under the provisions of the reserve law, that's

01:17:52 1	correct.
01:17:52 2	Q Okay. And to make sure that the company has enough
01:17:55 3	reserves to pay the policyholders what they might be owed,
01:17:59 4	the valuation actuary or the actuary conducting these asset
01:18:04 5	adequacy tests, they need to run a number of future
01:18:09 6	scenarios regarding interest rates, and in the case of
01:18:12 7	equity-indexed universal life products, the S&P 500;
01:18:15 8	correct?
01:18:16 9	A Correct.
01:18:1610	Q And the purpose of these is to determine whether the
01:18:1911	returns of the S&P 500, the potential returns from the
01:18:2412	S&P 500, would be sufficient to establish that the company
01:18:2813	has adequate assets to pay what's owed to its policyholders;
01:18:3214	correct?
01:18:3415	A No, that is not correct.
01:18:3716	Q Isn't it true that a purpose of asset adequacy testing
01:18:4217	is to assess the adequacy of both the fixed income
01:18:4718	securities backing the guarantees as well as the options
01:18:5019	backing the equity exposure; isn't that correct?
01:18:5420	A It is to assess the adequacy of all of the assets.
01:18:5821	That's correct.
01:18:5922	Q Okay. And they're assessed under a range of potential
01:19:0223	scenarios; correct?
01:19:0324	A Yes, that's correct.

And there is documents I assume that are produced by

01:19:0425

01:19:08 1	actuaries related to the testing done for the Paragon and
01:19:11 2	Provider products; correct?
01:19:13 3	A That's correct.
01:19:13 4	Q So before making this type of filing, those documents
01:19:17 5	you would have reviewed and received some documents
01:19:23 6	pertaining to this; correct?
01:19:25 7	A Before making which filing?
01:19:27 8	Q Well, any of these filings 2005, for example.
01:19:30 9	A I don't know exactly which filing you're referring to.
01:19:3310	Q Okay. Well, the one that's up on the screen, for
01:19:3511	example, I believe is the Provider filing. Let me just ask
01:19:4212	you generally: In conducting these asset adequacy tests,
01:19:4713	you receive documents about those tests and their results;
01:19:5014	correct?
01:19:5115	A That is correct.
01:19:5216	Q And that's true in regards to the Provider and Paragon
01:19:5617	products; correct?
01:19:5718	A Provider and Paragon are two of the products included
01:20:0119	in LSW's asset adequacy testing. That's correct.
01:20:0620	Q Okay. And as far as you know, none of those documents
01:20:0721	pertaining to these asset adequacy tests for Paragon and
01:20:1522	Provider have ever been produced to the plaintiffs besides
01:20:1523	these filings; is that correct?
01:20:1924	MR. MARTENS: Objection, Your Honor. This is way
01:20:1925	out of bounds.

01:20:21 1	THE COURT: Sustained.
01:20:21 2	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:20:26 3	Q Now, you testified that the purpose of these asset
01:20:31 4	well, let's try and give an example so we can understand it.
01:20:35 5	I'll try and simplify things here.
01:20:50 6	This is a simplified asset adequacy example. Are
01:20:55 7	you able to read that there? It's probably a little small,
01:20:59 8	but do you see where I wrote simplified asset adequacy
01:21:06 9	example?
01:21:0610	A Yes, I do.
01:21:0611	Q And the other day you testified that the purpose of
01:21:0812	asset adequacy testing was to project the amount of payments
01:21:1313	that LSW will be making to the policyholders, so I wanted to
01:21:1714	give some examples.
01:21:1915	MR. MARTENS: Is that a question or a statement by
01:21:2216	Mr. Foster? Could we have the page on that.
01:21:2517	MR. FOSTER: Yeah, certainly.
01:21:2618	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:21:4019	Q Do you remember testifying that asset adequacy testing,
01:21:4320	one of the purposes is to project the amount of payments
01:21:4721	that LSW will be making to its policyholders?
01:21:5122	A I don't remember testifying that.
01:22:0523	Q Do you have a copy of the certified transcript of your
01:22:0724	testimony the other day up there?
01:22:1525	A It looks like I do.

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01:22:19 1
                       MR. FOSTER: May I approach, Your Honor?
01:22:21 2
                       THE COURT: You may.
01:22:28 3
             BY MR. FOSTER:
01:22:29 4
                  I will come up here and share with you. If we look
01:23:51 5
             together at page 191 of the transcript of your testimony the
             other day at lines 1 to 3, is it correct that you testified
01:23:54 6
01:24:00 7
             here: One part of the projections done within asset
01:24:04 8
             adequacy testing --
01:24:08 9
                       MR. MARTENS: Sorry. What day?
01:24:0910
                       MR. FOSTER: The day that he testified. That was
01:24:1011
             April 22nd, 2014.
01:24:1312
                       MR. MARTENS: Page 191?
01:24:1513
                       MR. FOSTER: Yeah, at 1 to 3, the official
01:24:1614
             certified transcript.
01:24:1915
                       MR. MARTENS: It begins how?
01:24:2016
                       MR. FOSTER: One part of the projections.
01:24:2117
                       MR. MARTENS: That's the question. Oh, the
01:24:2318
             answer. I'm sorry.
01:24:2419
                       MR. FOSTER: The question begins on the previous
01:24:2520
             page at 190.
01:24:2521
             BY MR. FOSTER:
01:24:2622
             Q.
                  What I asked you was:
01:24:2723
                            Right. So to determine whether it has
01:24:3124
                  reasonable reserves to pay Provider policyholders,
01:24:3425
                  it has to determine what it might owe the Provider
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01:24:38 1	policyholders, correct, or what it might cost to
01:24:41 2	cover the amounts that it owes the Provider
01:24:44 3	policyholders?
01:24:45 4	"A One part of the projections done within
01:24:51 5	asset adequacy testing would be to project the
01:24:55 6	amount of payments that LSW will be making to the
01:24:58 7	policyholders. Yes."
01:25:00 8	Did I correctly read the transcript?
01:25:03 9	A It looks like you did, yes.
01:25:0510	Q So that quotation that's up there, project the amount
01:25:0611	of payments that LSW will be making to the policyholders,
01:25:0812	that accurately reflects what you testified to; correct?
01:25:1413	MR. MARTENS: Objection, Your Honor. It's part of
01:25:1614	it. That's not the whole statement.
01:25:1815	THE COURT: Read the whole thing.
01:25:1916	MR. FOSTER: One part of the projections done
01:25:1917	within asset adequacy testing would be to project the amount
01:25:1918	of payments that LSW will be making to the policyholders?
01:25:2419	Yes. I think it's perfectly clear what he's testified to.
01:25:3820	MR. MARTENS: Right. What you wrote up there
01:25:3821	leaves out one part of.
01:25:3822	MR. FOSTER: All right. One part on there, if the
01:25:3823	Court thinks it's necessary.
01:25:4524	THE COURT: Next question.
01:25:4625	MR. FOSTER: Thank you.

01:25:47 1	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:27:03 2	Q Any dispute that's what you testified to?
01:27:11 3	A That is what I testified.
01:27:13 4	Q Thank you. Now, just so we understand the type of
01:27:17 5	asset adequacy testing that was done, which was the purpose
01:27:21 6	of this demonstrative, LSW does both deterministic and
01:27:25 7	stochastic testing; correct?
01:27:26 8	A That is correct.
01:27:28 9	Q So for a deterministic scenario, for example, and we'll
01:27:3410	simplify it and just use four years, for example. It will
01:27:3811	run out into the future, but you could have a movement of
01:27:4112	seven in year one, seven in year two, seven in year three,
01:27:4613	and seven in year four; correct?
01:27:5114	A Yes.
01:27:5115	Q And then LSW would determine, okay, our assets are
01:27:5616	adequate to pay the policyholders under that scenario;
01:28:0117	correct?
01:28:0418	A Part of the purpose would be to look at whether the
01:28:0719	assets are adequate under that scenario. So, yes.
01:28:1120	Q We'll just say the answer is yes, for example.
01:28:1621	A Okay.
01:28:1622	Q And you could have another deterministic scenario
01:28:2023	which, let's say, for the years were five, five, five;
01:28:2324	correct?
01:28:2625	A You could.

01:28:26 1	Q Okay. And that would be a deterministic scenario?
01:28:31 2	A That's correct.
01:28:32 3	Q Okay. Determining are the assets adequate; correct?
01:28:35 4	A Correct.
01:28:35 5	Q And you could have another deterministic scenario which
01:28:39 6	went something like two, two, two; correct?
01:28:43 7	A Correct.
01:28:44 8	Q Same thing. Determine are the assets adequate under
01:28:47 9	this situation. But stochastic scenarios are different;
01:28:5210	correct?
01:28:5311	A Correct.
01:28:5312	Q So your testimony is that in conducting the stochastic
01:28:5613	scenarios, LSW takes randomized sequences of the S&P 500;
01:29:0214	correct?
01:29:0315	A The stochastic scenarios would include randomized
01:29:0716	sequences of the S&P, yes.
01:29:0917	Q Okay. So you could have one stochastic sequence which
01:29:1118	said two, five, seven, two; correct?
01:29:1919	A That is a possible one.
01:29:2320	Q Possible one. Could be randomly generated S&P 500
01:29:2721	returns. You could have another stochastic scenario which
01:29:2822	said five, seven, two, seven; correct?
01:29:3723	A That could be, yes.
01:29:3924	Q And LSW does random stochastic scenarios going all the
01:29:4425	way up to the year 100; correct?

01:29:46 1	A No, that's not correct.
01:29:46 2	Q Not to year 100. Excuse me. To a hundred scenarios;
01:29:48 3	correct?
01:29:49 4	A That is correct. We do a hundred scenarios.
01:29:51 5	Q Okay. And you testified that you felt that these were
01:29:55 6	different from Monte Carlos because they weren't projecting
01:29:59 7	what the market would return; correct?
01:30:03 8	A I don't recall saying that.
01:30:05 9	Q Okay. But your testimony was that LSW is just taking
01:30:1010	random scenarios of the S&P 500 and it's not projecting what
01:30:1411	the S&P 500 may look like in the future; correct?
01:30:2012	A We use random scenarios within our cash flow testing.
01:30:2513	Q And those random scenarios, those return different
01:30:2914	results than the stochastic scenarios; correct?
01:30:3215	A Random scenarios are the same thing as stochastic
01:30:3616	scenarios.
01:30:3717	Q Excuse me. They return different results than the
01:30:4018	deterministic scenarios; correct?
01:30:4319	A That is correct.
01:30:4320	Q And you testified, I believe, that they were different
01:30:4621	than Monte Carlos because there isn't a probability result;
01:30:4922	correct?
01:30:5123	A What I testified is I don't personally view what we do
01:30:5524	within the stochastic modeling as being a Monte Carlo
01:31:0125	projection.

01:31:02 1	Q Okay. So, for example, if all of these you know,
01:31:05 2	say the assets are adequate, you're not coming up with a
01:31:13 3	probability that the assets will be adequate; correct?
01:31:17 4	A Correct.
01:31:17 5	Q Okay. But you understand that instead of just taking
01:31:22 6	randomized movements in the S&P 500, you could project based
01:31:28 7	on historical sequences of the S&P 500; correct?
01:31:33 8	A Within the projection I can use any sequence of the S&P
01:31:38 9	500 as I like.
01:31:3910	Q And one of the sequences that you could use if you so
01:31:4311	chose was the historical sequence of the S&P 500; correct?
01:31:4712	A I could have, yes.
01:31:4813	Q And that wouldn't have caused you any problems or any
01:31:5214	difficulty; correct?
01:31:5315	A Using that sequence within my asset adequacy analysis
01:32:0216	would be fine.
01:32:0317	Q Okay. And it would have been fine back in 2005 when
01:32:0718	these products were introduced?
01:32:0819	A That's correct.
01:32:0920	Q It would have been fine even going back prior to before
01:32:1021	2005 when the products were introduced?
01:32:1522	A I would have had no need to before the products were
01:32:1823	introduced.
01:32:2024	Q But you don't have any doubt that it could have been

01:32:2225

done?

01:32:23 1	A Correct.
01:32:23 2	Q Okay. So, for example, putting up 116-01, you see at
01:32:54 3	the top there is a sequence of S&P 500 returns going by
01:32:58 4	year? The top bar, year return, and then there's each year
01:33:05 5	after application of the cap and floor there is a
01:33:09 6	percentage?
01:33:10 7	A Which row?
01:33:11 8	Q The top row.
01:33:12 9	A You mean the row that says after cap and floor?
01:33:1610	Q Yeah, exactly.
01:33:1611	A Okay. I see that.
01:33:2012	Q And that has the returns by year after application of
01:33:2313	the cap and floor. At least that's what the document
01:33:2714	purports to say. And those sequences of S&P 500 returns,
01:33:3115	those could be randomly rearranged, correct, to have a
01:33:3516	different order?
01:33:3717	A I guess so, yes.
01:33:3918	Q If they were randomly rearranged in a different order
01:33:4219	and each variation, if there were fees coming out, the
01:33:4720	result would be different for a policyholder who put money
01:33:5121	<pre>into a policy; correct?</pre>
01:33:5222	A Yes, that would be correct.
01:33:5423	Q And you knew that back in 2005; correct?
01:33:5824	A Yes.
01:34:0025	Q And others at the company know that, too; correct?

01:34:03 1	A I think that's fair to say, yes.
01:34:16 2	Q Now, you gave an opinion about violating the
01:34:19 3	illustration regulation. I want to try and understand that
01:34:29 4	opinion.
01:34:29 5	A Okay.
01:34:30 6	Q So are you expressing the opinion that interest rates
01:34:36 7	higher than the disciplined current scale cannot be shown in
01:34:41 8	an illustration?
01:34:42 9	A Correct.
01:34:4910	Q So, for example, if you had something like this which
01:34:5811	was previously marked as 2001 for identification purposes,
01:35:0212	and there was a sequence which you see there's a weighted
01:35:0713	average interest rate there?
01:35:0814	A Yes.
01:35:0915	Q And it says, you know, it's in the range of 9.6 percent
01:35:1316	or so?
01:35:1417	A Okay.
01:35:1418	Q And there is some numbers that were written next to it
01:35:1819	that say 11, 13. Do you see those?
01:35:2220	A Yes.
01:35:2321	Q There is absolutely no dispute that those numbers could
01:35:2522	not be shown in the current basis B column of the
01:35:2823	illustration; correct?
01:35:2924	A If the disciplined current scale is 9.5 or 9.6 or
01:35:3625	whatever, one cannot show 11 or 13. That's correct.

01:35:41 1	Q Right. And the weighted average interest rate, that's
01:35:43 2	based on the disciplined current scale in the illustration;
01:35:46 3	correct?
01:35:47 4	A The disciplined current scale would be part of where
01:35:52 5	that number comes from; correct.
01:35:53 6	Q So your opinion is that you can't show these numbers
01:35:58 7	that are higher than the weighted average interest rate
01:36:02 8	because they would be higher than the disciplined current
01:36:06 9	scale; correct?
01:36:0710	A Correct.
01:36:0811	Q What regulation do you rely on for that?
01:36:1112	A Both the NAIC model insurance regulation and the
01:36:1913	California illustration law.
01:36:2014	Q Okay. So let's talk about the California illustration
01:36:2215	law. If you look at Exhibit 606 in your binder.
01:36:4116	A Okay.
01:36:4417	Q If you look at section $10509.956(a)(7)$, which is at
01:36:5418	page 5 of 11.
01:37:0619	A Okay.
01:37:0720	Q Now, is that the language that you were referring to as
01:37:1121	the basis for your opinion that you can't show interest
01:37:1522	rates higher than a disciplined current scale?
01:37:1823	A In part.
01:37:1924	Q Okay. That's the part of the California law that
01:37:2125	pertains to your opinion?

01:37:23 1	A This is part of the California law.
01:37:24 2	Q Okay. And this is the section of the California law
01:37:26 3	that pertains to your opinion that you can't show interest
01:37:30 4	rates higher than the disciplined current scale; correct?
01:37:38 5	A In addition to this section, there is another section.
01:37:42 6	Q On page 4?
01:37:43 7	A Correct.
01:37:44 8	Q And it says pretty much the same thing at sub-five.
01:37:49 9	You can't use an illustration at a policy duration that is
01:37:5210	depicting policy performance more favorable to the policy
01:37:5711	owner than that produced by the illustrated scale of the
01:37:5812	insurer whose policy is being illustrated; right?
01:38:0213	A Correct.
01:38:0214	Q So those are the two sections of the California
01:38:0615	regulation that you're referring to; correct?
01:38:0716	A With regard to by year, yes.
01:38:1217	Q Now, setting that aside and the reason you couldn't
01:38:1818	show 13 percent when the disciplined current scale returned
01:38:2319	nine percent is that that would be showing a policyholder
01:38:2520	getting a numeric value that was higher than the disciplined
01:38:3021	current scale would support; correct?
01:38:3422	A It would be a return higher than the scale, yes.
01:38:3623	Q Okay. It would be a return higher than the scale.
01:38:3624	Now, the regulation, though, it doesn't speak to telling
01:38:4025	consumers about a risk of lapse, does it, in these two

01:38:49 1	sections about the disciplined current scale?
01:38:53 2	A Not in those two sections.
01:38:55 3	Q Okay. Well, telling a consumer about a risk of lapse
01:39:01 4	based on volatility in the S&P 500, that doesn't require you
01:39:05 5	to show any illustrated scale to the policyholder; does it?
01:39:15 6	A Do you mean just making a verbal statement?
01:39:18 7	Q Or making a written statement in the illustration.
01:39:22 8	A I suppose one can make a written statement without
01:39:25 9	showing numbers.
01:39:2610	Q Okay. And if there was a written statement, that would
01:39:2911	not in your opinion violate these provisions of the
01:39:3312	California regulation?
01:39:3613	A The entire regulation is much longer than that, and I
01:39:4014	would want to review the entire regulation.
01:39:4215	Q Well, let me ask you specifically: If there was a
01:39:4616	disclosure, a written disclosure in the illustration that
01:39:4817	the values shown in current basis B assume a constant rate
01:39:5318	of return for the indexed strategy but actual returns to the
01:39:5719	S&P 500 will be volatile but not constant, the current basis
01:40:0120	B values may understate the risks of lapse due to volatility
01:40:0621	even if the S&P 500 performs in the future at the same rate
01:40:1022	on average as is used in calculating the current basis B
01:40:1423	values. Can you think of any reason why that disclosure, if
01:40:1824	true, could not be given?
01:40:2325	A Not that I can think of.

01:40:26 1	Q So that one dealt with lapse. Let me ask you about a
01:40:32 2	disclosure about reduced value. If there was a written
01:40:35 3	disclosure, the values shown in current basis B assume a
01:40:38 4	constant rate of return for the indexed strategies but
01:40:41 5	actual returns to the S&P 500 will be volatile and not
01:40:44 6	constant, the current basis B values may be overstated even
01:40:47 7	if the S&P 500 performs in the future at the same rate on
01:40:52 8	average as is used in calculating the current basis B
01:40:57 9	values. Is there anything that you can think of that would
01:41:0010	stop LSW from giving that disclosure, if true?
01:41:0311	A If true, not that I can think of.
01:41:0512	Q Nothing would stop them from giving either of those
01:41:0713	disclosures in their illustrations; would it?
01:41:1014	A Not that I can think of.
01:41:1115	Q Okay. Let's talk about a statistic. So if a
01:41:2316	policyholder was informed that even if the S&P 500 performs
01:41:2817	on average in the future as is depicted in your current
01:41:3318	basis B illustration, you have a 64 percent chance of lapse
01:41:3719	based on that illustration before your life expectancy.
01:41:4020	There is nothing in the regulations that would prohibit
01:41:4421	giving them that statistic; is there?
01:41:4722	A I don't know.
01:41:4823	Q You are not aware of anything that would prohibit LSW
01:41:5124	from disclosing to policyholders a lapse risk statistic

about the likelihood that their policy could lapse before

01:41:5525

01:41:58 1	their life expectancy?
01:42:01 2	A I would be concerned about such a disclosure without
01:42:06 3	doing further research.
01:42:07 4	Q Sure. But if true, there is nothing in any of the
01:42:10 5	regulations that you're aware of that would prohibit LSW
01:42:14 6	from giving that disclosure?
01:42:16 7	A My concern is the statement there is a 64 percent
01:42:20 8	probability or whatever it was. There is no way of
01:42:24 9	assigning a truth to a probability like that.
01:42:2710	Q Right. So you're saying that there would need to be
01:42:3011	additional disclosures about the method for calculating that
01:42:3512	statistic and disclaimers that actual results may be more or
01:42:4013	less favorable, things like that?
01:42:4214	A I'm saying I'm not aware of any way to accurately
01:42:4815	calculate that statistic.
01:42:5116	Q Well, respectfully, that wasn't my question. I'm
01:42:5317	assuming, saying that it could be calculated and saying that
01:42:5818	it was true for an individual policyholder they had a
01:43:0119	64 percent chance of lapsing before their life expectancy
01:43:0520	based on the returns depicted in the illustration, is there
01:43:0921	anything in the two sections of the California regulation
01:43:1322	that we discussed that would prohibit LSW from giving that
01:43:1723	information?
01:43:2124	A So the preface to the question is saying something I
01:43:2725	think is impossible to calculate can be calculated, so

01:43:31 1	assuming the impossible?
01:43:34 2	MR. FOSTER: Move to strike, Your Honor.
01:43:36 3	THE COURT: It will be stricken.
01:43:37 4	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:43:37 5	Q I'm asking you to assume it can be calculated, and
01:43:39 6	assuming the number is true. We have talked about two
01:43:41 7	sections of the illustration, the California regulation, and
01:43:45 8	there is nothing in either of those two sections that would
01:43:48 9	prohibit giving a consumer a statistic that they had a
01:43:5310	64 percent of chance of lapse before their life expectancy;
01:43:5611	correct?
01:43:5912	A Given all of the assumptions that you just stated,
01:44:0413	within those two narrow sections of the law, I believe
01:44:0714	that's correct.
01:44:0915	Q Moving on. Beyond those two narrow sections, you're
01:44:1316	not aware of anything else in California law that would
01:44:1617	prohibit giving that statistic, like a 64 percent statistic;
01:44:2018	are you?
01:44:2519	A I would want to review an awful lot of law before
01:44:2920	reaching a conclusion like that. But off the top of my
01:44:3321	head, no, I'm not aware of any.
01:44:3522	Q And that's true not only in regards to the California
01:44:3823	regulation but to all that's fine.
01:44:4324	Is it also true that we talked about an
01:44:4625	individual statistic for an individualized policyholder. In

01:44:50 1	regards to statistics for groups of policyholders as a
01:44:55 2	whole, if it was true that there was a 90 or 95 percent
01:45:01 3	chance of reduced value for these policies even if the S&P
01:45:05 4	500 performed on average in the future as the rate depicted
01:45:10 5	in the current basis B illustration over time, is there
01:45:13 6	anything in the California illustration regulation that
01:45:18 7	would prohibit LSW from giving that information to
01:45:21 8	consumers?
01:45:25 9	A I don't believe there is anything in the regulation
01:45:2610	that talks about groups of policies at all.
01:45:2911	Q And there is nothing in giving that statistic to
01:45:3212	consumers that would violate the regulation that you can
01:45:3513	think of?
01:45:4214	A With the same caveats I provided in the last answer,
01:45:4615	that's correct. I can think of nothing off the top of my
01:45:5016	head.
01:45:5017	Q Right. And going beyond California and assuming these
01:45:5318	statistics can be calculated and are true and correct, there
01:45:5719	is nothing you can think of that would prohibit LSW from
01:46:0020	giving these disclosures; correct?
01:46:0221	A Again with all the caveats and assumptions in my prior
01:46:0522	answer, I would have the same answer.
01:46:0723	Q Okay. There is nothing that would prohibit them from
01:46:0924	giving those in the illustration itself; correct?

Not that I am aware of.

01:46:1525

01:46:16 1	Q And there's nothing that would prohibit it in giving it
01:46:19 2	in a supplemental optional report that it required to come
01:46:19 3	along with the illustration; correct?
01:46:26 4	MR. MARTENS: What is the reference to "it?"
01:46:27 5	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:46:27 6	Q There's nothing that would prohibit giving the types of
01:46:30 7	statistics that we're discussing, whether for an individual,
01:46:32 8	their individualized chance of lapsing before life
01:46:32 9	expectancy or for a group the reduced expected value for all
01:46:3210	policyholders as a whole, there would be nothing to prohibit
01:46:3211	LSW from giving that information in a supplemental optional
01:46:4712	report that it required to be provided with the
01:46:5013	illustration; is there?
01:46:5114	A Again within the hypothetical assumption of something I
01:46:5415	don't believe is possible, I'm not aware of anything that
01:46:5716	would prohibit it.
01:47:0117	MR. FOSTER: I'd move to strike the possible part,
01:47:0318	Your Honor.
01:47:0419	THE COURT: It will be stricken.
01:47:0520	MR. FOSTER: Thank you.
01:47:0521	BY MR. FOSTER:
01:47:0522	Q There is nothing you are aware of that would prohibit
01:47:1223	it; correct?
01:47:1224	A Correct.
01:47:1425	Q Nothing at all?

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01:47:15 1	A Correct.
01:47:26 2	MR. FOSTER: I have nothing further, Your Honor.
01:47:27 3	THE COURT: Mr. Martens.
01:47:28 4	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
01:47:29 5	BY MR. MARTENS:
01:48:01 6	Q Just going back briefly to Mr. Foster's hypotheticals
01:48:05 7	to you, would your answer be different if those statistics
01:48:09 8	were calculated based on an assumption that in certain years
01:48:13 9	the interest rate was above the disciplined current scale?
01:48:2410	A I guess I don't understand the question.
01:48:2811	Q Are you familiar on illustrations, going back let's
01:48:3312	take Exhibit 2001. Do you see there is an interest rate
01:48:3913	column in current basis B on page 11 of 21?
01:48:4314	A Yes.
01:48:4315	Q And then there is a cash surrender value. Do you see
01:48:4716	that?
01:48:4717	A Yes, I do.
01:48:4818	Q Do you believe that you could as an illustration
01:48:5219	actuary certify an illustration that contained interest
01:48:5520	rates above the disciplined current scale?
01:48:5821	A No, I do not.
01:48:5922	Q Even if it was only one year above the disciplined
01:49:0223	current scale?
01:49:0324	A Correct.
01:49:0325	Q You couldn't do that?

01:49:05 1	A The law does not allow it for any year.
01:49:08 2	Q As you understand it?
01:49:10 3	A As I understand it.
01:49:10 4	Q And the cash surrender value, could you report a cash
01:49:14 5	surrender value that was calculated based on an interest
01:49:18 6	rate for any given year that was above the disciplined
01:49:22 7	current scale?
01:49:23 8	A No, I could not.
01:49:24 9	Q That's what you believe as you understand the law?
01:49:2610	A That's correct.
01:49:2611	Q Could you report any other statistic or figure that was
01:49:3012	based on an interest rate that in any given year was above
01:49:3513	the disciplined current scale?
01:49:3614	A No, I could not.
01:49:3715	Q So if the percentages of lapse probability in
01:49:4016	Mr. Foster's hypothetical were calculated based on Monte
01:49:4517	Carlos that included interest rates in a given year above
01:49:4818	the disciplined current scale, would that impact your answer
01:49:5319	on whether or not you could report those lapse
01:49:5520	probabilities?
01:49:5621	A Yes, it would.
01:49:5722	Q If those Monte Carlo statistics of lapse probability
01:50:0023	were based on interest rates that in any given year were
01:50:0524	above and below the disciplined current scale, do you
01:50:1025	believe consistent with law you could report those lapse

01:50:13 1	figures?
01:50:14 2	A No, I do not.
01:50:15 3	THE COURT: Wait a minute. I think the last
01:50:15 4	answer is ambiguous.
01:50:15 5	BY MR. MARTENS:
01:50:18 6	Q When you say no, you do not, meaning no, you do not
01:50:21 7	believe that you could report that?
01:50:23 8	A I do not believe I could report a number that was based
01:50:29 9	in any way on any year being higher than the disciplined
01:50:3610	current scale.
01:50:3811	Q Just to be clear, looking at those two subsections of
01:50:4212	the law that Mr. Foster showed you and applying your
01:50:4613	understanding of that law and your professional judgment,
01:50:4814	could you report the results of a Monte Carlo that included
01:50:5315	years with interest rates above the disciplined current
01:50:5916	scale?
01:51:0017	A No, I could not.
01:51:0018	Q So if the Monte Carlos results were calculated
01:51:0519	excuse me. If the Monte Carlos were run with years above
01:51:0720	the disciplined current scale to generate lapse percentages,
01:51:1221	do you believe consistent with the law you could report
01:51:1522	those lapse percentages?
01:51:1723	A Consistent with the law I do not believe I could report
01:51:2124	those lapse percentages.
01:51:2325	Q And as an illustration actuary, consistent with your

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01:51:24 1	professional obligations, would you certify an illustration
01:51:26 2	that contained lapse statistics that were calculated in that
01:51:29 3	manner?
01:51:29 4	A No, I would not.
01:51:32 5	Q Are you aware of any illustration actuary who has ever
01:51:36 6	done that?
01:51:36 7	A No, I am not.
01:51:43 8	Q Now, you were also asked some questions about your
01:51:46 9	illustration actuary certifications in subsequent years. Do
01:51:4910	you recall that?
01:51:5011	A Yes, I do.
01:51:5212	Q When I was examining you, I showed you, I believe it
01:51:5413	was, Exhibit 87, which was your 2005 certification for one
01:51:5914	of the policies?
01:52:1015	A Now I'm losing you. Exhibit 87?
01:52:1716	Q I'm sorry. It's 226.
01:52:1917	A Okay. Yes, 226 I have.
01:52:2318	Q I apologize for that. You were asked about the
01:52:2919	certification about compliance with ASOP-24 by Mr. Foster.
01:52:3420	Do you recall that?
01:52:3521	A Yes, I do.
01:52:3622	Q And he asked you whether or not after Exhibit 226 in
01:52:4023	2005 you continued certifying the same thing in subsequent
01:52:4724	years. Do you recall that?
01:52:4825	A Yes, I do.

01:52:48 1	Q But he didn't actually show you the subsequent years;
01:52:51 2	correct?
01:52:52 3	A That's correct.
01:52:52 4	Q And then he brought up, oh, but the regulation changed.
01:52:57 5	Do you remember that?
01:52:57 6	A Yes, I do.
01:52:58 7	Q And he still didn't show you the form. Do you remember
01:53:01 8	that?
01:53:01 9	A Yes, I do.
01:53:0210	Q So I'm going to show it to you.
01:53:0411	MR. MARTENS: Exhibit 251, pages 7 to 9, which I
01:53:1112	would like to mark as Exhibit 251-A, Your Honor.
01:53:1413	THE COURT: You may.
01:53:1814	MR. MARTENS: And before I publish it, because I'm
01:53:1815	not sure it's in evidence, can I show it to the witness to
01:53:2316	make sure he can identify it?
01:53:2617	THE COURT: Please.
01:53:2618	MR. MARTENS: Thank you.
01:53:2619	BY MR. MARTENS:
01:53:3620	Q Do you recognize Exhibit 251-A as a certification that
01:53:4021	you made in subsequent years for, among other policies, the
01:53:4722	Provider policy?
01:53:4823	A Could I look at it again quickly?
01:53:5024	Yes, I do.
01:53:5125	Q In fact, just so the jury can see what we're looking at

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01:53:55 1	here
01:54:03 2	THE COURT: Do you want to offer it?
01:54:04 3	MR. MARTENS: I would like to offer Exhibit 251-A
01:54:09 4	in evidence, Your Honor.
01:54:11 5	MR. FOSTER: I don't have a copy, Your Honor, but
01:54:11 6	no objection.
01:54:15 7	THE COURT: 251-A will be received.
01:54:16 8	(Exhibit No. 251-A received in evidence)
01:54:16 9	BY MR. MARTENS:
01:54:1710	Q Do you recognize this as the illustration actuary
01:54:2111	certification made on October 6, 2009?
01:54:2512	A Yes, I do.
01:54:2513	Q And it lists a number of policies that it's made for;
01:54:2814	is that correct?
01:54:2815	A That's correct.
01:54:2816	Q And one of them is illustration policy form 8212. Do
01:54:3217	you see that?
01:54:3318	A Yes, I do.
01:54:3319	Q And going back to Exhibit 226, that's the same policy
01:54:4020	form number as Provider; correct?
01:54:4221	A Yes.
01:54:4222	Q And there is language about ASOP-24. Do you see that
01:54:5023	on Exhibit 251-A?
01:54:5324	A Yes, I do.
01:54:5325	Q So just to make sure we're clear here, there was

01:54:56 1	language before the regulation that was changed in
01:54:59 2	Exhibit 226; correct?
01:55:01 3	A Correct.
01:55:02 4	Q And it talks about whether it's possible to do it
01:55:07 5	consistent with the prior regulation. Do you see that?
01:55:10 6	A Yes, I do.
01:55:10 7	Q And then going to Exhibit 251-A, did you change your
01:55:16 8	certification with regard to ASOP-24 to comply with the
01:55:21 9	change in the ASOP-24?
01:55:2310	A Yes, I did.
01:55:2411	Q Can you read for the jury what you did to change your
01:55:2612	certification to comply with the law after the regulation
01:55:3013	changed.
01:55:3014	A I wrote: Consistent with the guidance provided under
01:55:3315	ASOP-24, the interest crediting rate used in the
01:55:3716	illustration is based on a geometric average that would have
01:55:4017	resulted from application of a given participation rate and
01:55:4418	cap rate to historical S&P 500 returns.
01:55:4819	Q Why is that different language in there?
01:55:5120	A Because as I have had my memory refreshed, in 2007
01:55:5621	ASOP-24 was revised to explicitly provide for using this
01:56:0622	methodology.
01:56:1023	Q And did you then revise the language of the
01:56:1224	certification you made in order to comply with the new
01:56:1425	regulation?

01:56:15 1	A I revised the language subsequent to the change in ASOP
01:56:20 2	24 going forward, yes.
01:56:22 3	Q Thank you.
01:56:24 4	Now, Mr. Foster showed you a copy of Exhibit 226
01:56:29 5	that he wrote on. I'm going to mark it 226-A so that we can
01:56:35 6	identify it. Do you remember this exhibit?
01:56:36 7	A Yes, I do.
01:56:37 8	MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, I am going to offer
01:56:42 9	Exhibit 226-A into evidence if I could.
01:56:4810	MR. FOSTER: No objection, Your Honor.
01:56:4911	THE COURT: It will be received.
01:56:5012	(Exhibit No. 226-A received in evidence)
01:56:5013	BY MR. MARTENS:
01:56:5114	Q Do you see how Mr. Foster do you recall how
01:56:5215	Mr. Foster preferred to rewrite the last sentence with a
01:56:5516	double negative to say: It is not the case that illustrated
01:56:5517	non-guaranteed elements for new and in-force policies
01:56:5518	subject to this regulation are inconsistent with the
01:57:0219	non-guaranteed elements actually credited or charged to the
01:57:0620	same or similar forms. Do you see that?
01:57:0821	MR. FOSTER: Objection. Misstates the record.
01:57:1122	THE WITNESS: I do see it.
01:57:1223	BY MR. MARTENS:
01:57:1224	Q And that has a double negative in it; correct?
01:57:1625	A Yes.

01:57:17 1	Q It's not inconsistent; correct?
01:57:19 2	A Yes.
01:57:20 3	Q And you wrote "are consistent"; correct?
01:57:22 4	A The original file, in 226, yes, I did.
01:57:23 5	Q And where did you get your language? Did you get it
01:57:25 6	from Mr. Foster?
01:57:27 7	A No, I did not.
01:57:28 8	Q Where did you get the language that you used?
01:57:30 9	A I got it from a life practice note that I obtained from
01:57:3410	the American Academy of Actuaries.
01:57:3811	Q And did you use it word for word out of that practice
01:57:4112	note?
01:57:4113	A Yes, I did.
01:57:4114	Q Now, I think that Mr. Foster moved to strike your
01:57:4515	explanation as to how a reasonable regulator would
01:57:4816	understand this language. Do you recall that?
01:57:5017	A Yes, I do.
01:57:5218	Q Could you tell us how, based on your experience, how a
01:57:5419	reasonable regulator familiar with the regulations would
01:57:5820	understand your language.
01:58:0021	MR. FOSTER: Objection. Foundation.
01:58:0222	THE COURT: Overruled.
01:58:0323	THE WITNESS: Yes. A reasonable regulator would
01:58:0524	know that a part of the regulation says it must be disclosed
01:58:1425	if the non-guaranteed values are not consistent and

01:58:22 1	therefore would take the way I wrote the the sentence I
01:58:27 2	wrote in the certification as indicating that there is
01:58:33 3	nothing to disclose in that regard.
01:58:35 4	BY MR. MARTENS:
01:58:37 5	Q In your experience would a reasonable regulator
01:58:40 6	understand, for example, the ASOP practice notes?
01:58:44 7	A It depends.
01:58:46 8	Q And in your experience well, let me ask you this:
01:58:47 9	Did DOI ever follow up and ask for any clarification?
01:58:5410	A No, they did not.
01:58:5511	Q And Mr. Foster asked: Well, couldn't your sentence be
01:59:0012	read as suggesting that there are similar forms?
01:59:0313	Do you remember him asking you that?
01:59:0414	A I do.
01:59:0515	Q Does California have copies of all your forms?
01:59:0816	A Yes, they do.
01:59:0817	Q When you filed this certification in 2005, California
01:59:1418	had all your forms?
01:59:1519	A That's correct.
01:59:1620	Q For every other product you had ever offered in
01:59:1821	California?
01:59:1922	A That's correct.
01:59:2023	Q So they would know whether any form was similar;
01:59:2224	correct?
01:59:2425	A They would have the ability to ascertain that, yes.

01:59:27 1	Q Did you think you were sneaking anything by them here?
01:59:30 2	A No, I did not.
01:59:31 3	Q Looking at this even with Mr. Foster's rewrite, do you
01:59:34 4	have any concern that your statement was in any way
01:59:37 5	misleading?
01:59:38 6	A I have no concern whatsoever.
01:59:40 7	Q Did you have any intent to be misleading?
01:59:42 8	A No, I did not.
01:59:43 9	Q Has the California Department of Insurance ever
01:59:4510	followed up and suggested you were misleading?
01:59:4911	A No, they have not.
01:59:4912	Q Have they followed up and asked you any questions about
01:59:5313	this?
01:59:5314	A No, they have not.
01:59:5415	MR. MARTENS: One last thing, Your Honor. I'm
01:59:5816	going to mark the simplified asset adequacy example. If
02:00:0517	it's okay with Mr. Foster, I'm going to mark it Exhibit 1010
02:00:1318	for identification.
02:00:1419	MR. FOSTER: No objection.
02:00:1420	BY MR. MARTENS:
02:00:1521	Q Do you remember this exhibit that Mr. Foster showed
02:00:1822	you?
02:00:1823	A Yes, I do.
02:00:1824	Q And do you see there is a section where he does the
02:00:2125	stochastic analysis?

A Yes, I do.
Q Do you consider that a Monte Carlo?
A No, I do not.
Q Is it designed as performed at the company to predict
probabilities that assets would be adequate?
A No, it is not.
Q And you heard questions about projections of lapse
probabilities or lapse propensity from Mr. Foster; correct?
A Correct.
Q And do you understand projections of propensity of
probability to be different than what you were doing here?
A Yes, I do.
THE COURT: How much more do you have?
MR. MARTENS: I think that's all I have got, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Foster, how much do you have?
MR. FOSTER: I have a few minutes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: How much do you have? Give me an
estimate.
MR. FOSTER: Five to ten minutes.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we would like to
conclude the evidence today. Is it convenient to spend
another five to ten minutes?
Okay.
MR. FOSTER: Thank you, Your Honor.

02:01:13 1	RECROSS-EXAMINATION
02:01:13 2	BY MR. FOSTER:
02:01:35 3	Q Mr. Martens examined you about a later certification
02:01:39 4	that you provided; correct?
02:01:40 5	A Correct.
02:01:41 6	Q And he marked that certification, I believe, as 251-A;
02:01:47 7	correct?
02:01:50 8	A I don't recall.
02:01:52 9	Q Well, earlier when I was examining you, I asked you
02:01:5610	I showed you a certification and I asked you if the
02:01:5911	certification had stayed the same. Do you remember that?
02:02:0312	A I do remember.
02:02:0513	Q And you said you didn't recall any changes to the
02:02:0814	certification; correct?
02:02:0815	A I did say that.
02:02:0916	Q Okay. And then we went on to talk about the change in
02:02:1217	the ASOP, and the change that I asked you about was whether
02:02:1618	the revised ASOP said that you had to consider a
02:02:2119	characteristic of the underlying index. Do you remember
02:02:2420	that line of questioning?
02:02:2521	A I remember the line of questioning.
02:02:2722	Q Okay. And do you remember the line of questioning that
02:02:3023	a characteristic of the underlying index, the S&P 500 index,
02:02:3424	is volatility? Do you remember that?
02:02:3625	A I do.

02:02:36 1	Q And you testified that that was a characteristic of the
02:02:38 2	underlying index, volatility?
02:02:40 3	A Yes.
02:02:40 4	Q Okay. So looking at this exhibit that Mr. Martens has
02:02:45 5	marked, it is true that the language in this later one did
02:02:50 6	change; correct?
02:02:52 7	A That is correct.
02:02:53 8	Q So when you testified you didn't recall any changes,
02:02:56 9	you weren't recalling this change?
02:02:5910	A I was not recalling this change. That's correct.
02:03:0111	Q That's fair. That's understandable.
02:03:0312	Now, the question I have here is you say
02:03:0813	consistent with the guidance provided under ASOP-24, the
02:03:1214	interest crediting rate used in the illustration is based on
02:03:1415	a geometric average that would have resulted from
02:03:1716	application of a given participation rate and cap rate to
02:03:2017	historical S&P 500 returns. Do you see that?
02:03:2218	A Yes, I do.
02:03:2319	Q And that geometric average that is created, that's a
02:03:2920	number, a percentage based on the historical return of the
02:03:3321	S&P 500 filtered through the policy's caps and floors;
02:03:3722	correct?
02:03:3723	A That is correct.
02:03:3824	Q And that percentage is then used in LSW's illustrations
02:03:4225	on a constant basis each and every year; correct?

02:03:46 1	A That's correct.
02:03:46 2	Q So this certification, just like the ones before it, it
02:03:51 3	doesn't take into account that a characteristic of the S&P
02:03:54 4	500 index is volatility and that the returns will be
02:03:58 5	different even if on average the S&P 500 returns the same in
02:04:02 6	the future as it has in the past based on the sequence of
02:04:09 7	returns; isn't that correct? It doesn't say anything about
02:04:11 8	that?
02:04:11 9	A It does not say anything about that.
02:04:1110	Q Okay. So the later change in the language that
02:04:1311	Mr. Martens was examining you about, that didn't have
02:04:1712	anything to do with my line of examination about whether
02:04:1913	volatility in the sequence of returns was taken into account
02:04:2514	in these certifications; correct?
02:04:2615	A The later change in the language did not change the
02:04:2916	analysis of what we were doing.
02:04:3217	Q Okay. Thank you.
02:04:3318	Now, let's talk about Mr. Martens asked you a
02:04:3819	number of questions about whether you could prevent
02:04:4320	present in an illustration a lapse risk statistic, like a 64
02:04:4521	percent chance of lapse. Do you remember that?
02:04:5122	A Yes, I do.
02:04:5123	Q And you testified that it was your opinion that you
02:04:5424	could not present that statistic based on the California
00 04 5005	

02:04:5825 | regulation if a part of generating that statistic was the

02:05:03 1	use of a series of returns that in a single given year was
02:05:10 2	higher than what was depicted in the disciplined current
02:05:16 3	scale; correct?
02:05:16 4	A Yes.
02:05:17 5	Q But doesn't the regulation in California law, it
02:05:22 6	prohibits showing a scale that is more favorable to the
02:05:28 7	policyholder than the insured's illustrated scale at any
02:05:33 8	duration; isn't that correct?
02:05:33 9	A That's correct.
02:05:3410	Q Now, if there was a 64 percent chance of lapse, that
02:05:3811	would not be more favorable for a policyholder than what is
02:05:4212	shown in LSW's illustration; correct?
02:05:4413	A It depends.
02:05:4514	Q Well, if there is a 64 percent chance that if the
02:05:4915	S&P 500 returns on average the interest rate returned in the
02:05:5316	current basis B values of the illustration, the current
02:05:5617	basis B values of the illustration show no lapse risk,
02:06:0118	saying there is a 64 percent chance of lapse, that would not
02:06:0419	be more favorable to the policyholder; would it? The
02:06:1020	illustration depicts no lapse and information is given that
02:06:1321	there is actually a 64 percent chance of lapse even if the
02:06:1722	S&P 500 returns that average, that would not be more
02:06:2023	favorable to a policyholder; would it?
02:06:2424	A A 64 percent chance of lapse in total isolation would
02:06:3225	not be more favorable than a zero percent chance of lapse,

02:06:38 1	assuming that all other things were within the regulation
02:06:43 2	and were equal.
02:06:45 3	Q And based on your experience and professional
02:06:48 4	expertise, what these provisions of the regulation prohibit
02:06:51 5	is showing something to the policyholder that is more
02:06:53 6	favorable than what is shown in the illustrations of
02:06:57 7	disciplined current scale; correct?
02:06:59 8	A More favorable in any given year.
02:07:02 9	Q The regulation doesn't talk about lapse risk statistics
02:07:0910	at all; does it?
02:07:1111	A Not that I am aware of.
02:07:1212	Q Okay. And you understand that lapse risk statistics
02:07:1613	can be based on average the exact same percentage shown in
02:07:2014	the current basis B illustrations rate of return; correct?
02:07:2815	A I don't understand the question.
02:07:2916	Q Sure. Well, your testimony is that it would let me
02:07:3617	ask you one other question. You talked about lapse risks
02:07:3918	not being more favorable to a policyholder. Let's talk
02:07:4319	about disclosures of reduced value.
02:07:4620	If there was a disclosure that 90 or 95 percent
02:07:4921	likelihood that a policyholder could suffer reduced value as
02:07:5422	compared to what's depicted in the illustration, that type
02:07:5723	of disclosure would not be a disclosure of more favorable to
02:08:0124	the policyholder; would it?

With all of the caveats and assumptions that we have

02:08:0225

00 00 05 1	
02:08:05 1	talked about before and purely in isolation, I do not think
02:08:12 2	it would be more favorable.
02:08:13 3	Q And assuming the assumptions are correct and it's
02:08:17 4	correctly calculated and accurate, there is nothing in the
02:08:20 5	regulations that would prohibit giving that to
02:08:22 6	policyholders; is there?
02:08:23 7	A Under the assumptions that somehow one could calculate
02:08:30 8	this probability and under the assumptions that it was
02:08:36 9	viewed not to violate the part of the law that prohibited
02:08:4010	any year being more favorable, I believe that would be
02:08:4411	correct.
02:08:4412	Q Okay. Even though these aren't more favorable to
02:08:5013	policyholders, just to be clear, your opinion only pertains
02:08:5414	to the illustration itself, correct, and what can be
02:08:5715	displayed in that illustration?
02:09:0016	A I'm not sure what you're asking.
02:09:1417	(Plaintiffs' counsel conferring)
02:09:1418	BY MR. FOSTER:
02:09:1519	Q Just to be clear for the record, if there was a
02:09:1820	disclosure that 90 or 95 percent of policyholders would
02:09:2421	suffer a reduced value and that was true and correctly
02:09:2722	calculated, that disclosure would not be more favorable to a
02:09:3223	policyholder that what's depicted in the illustration;
02:09:3424	correct?
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Within the caveat that I view that as an artificial

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02:09:38 1	construct, that's correct.
02:09:40 2	Q I'm asking you to assume it's correct. Do you
02:09:45 3	understand that?
02:09:46 4	A Again with your assumption, correct.
02:09:47 5	Q There is nothing in the illustration regulation that
02:09:49 6	would prohibit giving those statistics to policyholders;
02:09:52 7	correct?
02:09:53 8	A Assuming that the derivation of the statistic, if it
02:09:53 9	involved a year more favorable, that that was viewed as not
02:10:0210	violating the law; correct.
02:10:0511	Q Okay. And there is nothing in the illustration
02:10:0912	regulation itself that talks about these reduced value
02:10:1313	statistics; is there?
02:10:1514	A Not that I am aware of.
02:10:1715	Q Okay. And setting aside illustrations, there is
02:10:2616	nothing that would prohibit LSW from disclosing these types
02:10:3217	of statistics in a different type of document that it
02:10:3418	required to be provided along with the illustrations;
02:10:3719	correct?
02:10:3820	A I believe a document required to be provided along with
02:10:4121	the illustrations carries the same requirements as an
02:10:4522	illustration.
02:10:4623	Q You think the buyer's guide, for example, carries the
02:10:4924	same requirements as an illustration?
02:10:5425	A I'm not an expert in this area, but I believe to the

02:10:57 1	extent numbers are related that are comparable to an
02:11:01 2	illustration, it would have the same concerns.
02:11:08 3	Q Okay. Well, setting aside statistics, we talked about
02:11:11 4	written disclaimers before about a risk of lapse, and such a
02:11:16 5	statement about the risk of lapse that a policyholder could
02:11:18 6	expect as a result of volatility either generally or
02:11:22 7	individually, that would not be prohibited in any way by the
02:11:27 8	regulations; correct?
02:11:28 9	A With all the assumptions and caveats, I believe that's
02:11:3310	correct.
02:11:3311	Q Nothing would prohibit that; correct?
02:11:3612	A Correct.
02:11:3713	MR. FOSTER: No further questions, Your Honor.
02:11:4014	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to
02:11:4115	conclude here today. Thanks for spending a little bit of
02:11:4116	additional time.
02:11:4217	We will resume tomorrow at 8:00. Please remember
02:11:4518	the admonition not to discuss the case with anyone and not
02:11:4919	to form any opinions on the issues in the case until it is
02:11:5320	submitted to you. So we will see you tomorrow.
02:12:0221	(Jury not present)
02:12:1622	THE COURT: Sir, you may step down.
02:12:1823	Mr. Martens.
02:12:1924	MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, subject to we have some

documents that we would like to move into evidence, that's

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02:12:24 1	all we have.
02:12:25 2	THE COURT: Okay. I will ask you to rest again
02:12:28 3	tomorrow. I should have asked you to rest in front of the
02:12:31 4	jury.
02:12:32 5	Go ahead.
02:12:32 6	MR. MARTENS: I don't know what the Court's
02:12:32 7	pleasure is, whether it was a 50(a) motion or
02:12:37 8	THE COURT: Well, if you're just talking about
02:12:45 9	housekeeping to make sure what you think is in is in, I will
02:12:4910	ask the parties to get together with Ms. Tunis.
02:12:5111	If there is something new
02:12:5312	MR. MARTENS: I think there is something new, and
02:12:5313	it might be more efficient if I talk with opposing counsel
02:12:5714	about it and then came back to the Court rather than make
02:12:5815	the Court sort it all out now.
02:13:0216	THE COURT: Okay. Then why don't we be in recess
02:13:0217	for about 15 minutes, and then we will take up the motions.
02:13:0818	MR. MARTENS: Thank you.
02:13:0819	(Recess taken at 2:13 p.m.;
02:20:4320	proceeding resumed at 2:25 p.m.)
02:25:2221	THE COURT: At this time we will take up LSW's
02:25:2522	motion to decertify and its Rule 50(a) motion.
02:25:3023	And to the extent the plaintiffs want to make a
02:25:3324	Rule 50(a) motion, I will take that up as well.
02:25:4025	MR. BROSNAHAN: Your Honor, for the record I would

02:25:41 1 like to note our same objection that we made when 02:25:45 2 Ms. MacGowan was providing similar testimony. We believe 02:25:48 3 it's undisclosed expert testimony that should have been 02:25:54 4 designated that they were going to provide expert testimony. 02:25:56 5 We make a motion for a mistrial. We think it's improper and 02:26:00 6 we move to strike the testimony of the witness on the same 02:26:03 7 grounds we asserted with regard to Ms. MacGowan, that it violates Rule 26(a). 02:26:06 8 02:26:08 9 THE COURT: Denied. 02:26:0910 MR. BROSNAHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 02:26:1111 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Martens, let's begin with 02:26:1412 you. 02:26:1613 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. MARTENS: 02:26:1614 We have submitted a written motion in support of 02:26:1915 both our Rule 26(a) and our Rule 50, so I incorporate by 02:26:2516 reference in this oral argument all the things that I state 02:26:2717 there. 02:26:4218 I will try to focus here on the things that I 02:26:4519 think are most pertinent. 02:26:4820 With regard to the class certification motion, I 02:26:5021 think the starting point for evaluating whether class should 02:26:5322 be decertified is to begin with what was certified, what was 02:26:5323 the case that the Court certified for presentation, because 02:27:0224 I think by identifying that, it becomes clear that the case

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that was tried was not the case that was certified.

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At docket number 353, the order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, the Court certified a pure omissions claims case, quote, which do not depend on any type of illustrations provided to plaintiffs and instead consist of pure omissions not disclosed anywhere to any applicant or policyholder.

That was the class that was certified, a pure omissions claim which did not depend on any type of illustration.

What we have heard throughout this trial are various attacks on the current basis B values in illustrations and their probability of lapsing, their probability of being reduced, or whether additional language should be included disclosing the likelihood that they would suffer reduced value or be reduced. That is fundamentally not the case that was ever certified.

The Court certified a case which did not depend on any type of illustrations, yet the entire course of evidence here has been -- for example, with the lapse propensity -- whether or not we should have reported the propensity that a policy would lapse if loans were taken in the amount illustrated.

The Court will recall this became a central issue over what the lapse statistic was and what it applied to.

And the heading on that lapse statistic exhibit was the

1 lapse propensity of the policies with loan amounts as
102:28:44 2 illustrated.
102:28:46 3 So what we have now is a case that certainly
102:28:49 4 depends on any type of illustration, directly contrary to

tried, that's not the case that was certified.

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Similarly, the reduced value is reduced value if you take loans in the amount illustrated -- again, a case that depends squarely on any type of illustration, directly contrary to the case that was certified.

the class certification order. If that's the case they

I think it's particularly important when you sort of look at this from the flip side. There is no classwide evidence of lapse propensity. I think frankly it was quite egregious when in their opposition brief to our motion for a Rule 23 decertification at page 12, when the plaintiffs stated, quote: The risk of the policies do not depend on whether any particular policyholder received an illustration showing loans. They say Dr. Brockett's conclusions based on the sample that 59.8 percent of Provider policies and 55 percent of Paragon policies will lapse before the policyholder's life expectancy constitutes classwide proof of lapse propensity bearing on the fitness of the policies to be used for retirement income.

That quote in that brief is exactly why I objected to that evidence at trial, because that is a misleading

02:30:15 1 quote at best. Dr. Brockett himself said that lapse 02:30:19 2 statistic that he calculated on the 105 policies in his 02:30:24 3 sample could not be extrapolated. I asked him: Does that 02:30:29 4 even apply to the 280 policies from which the 105 was 02:30:32 5 derived? He told me, no, it could not be. In fact, his 02:30:34 6 words as I recall were it wasn't intended to tell you the 02:30:39 7 lapse probability of anything beyond that 105. 02:30:43 8 So even if you set aside the fact that the case 02:30:46 9 they have tried was not the case certified, even the case 02:30:5010 02:30:5411 lapse probability as to the class. They don't even have

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they have tried was not the case certified, even the case they tried can't be a classwide case because they don't have lapse probability as to the class. They don't even have lapse probability as to the sample of 280, because the 280 includes many policies that don't have loans, and there's many policies even outside the sample that don't even have sales illustrations, only have batch illustrations, which Dr. Brockett admitted he didn't even think could lapse.

So they have a problem with lapse probability, even if you say, well, have they proven classwide evidence on the case they tried, different than the one that was certified. Even as to the case they tried, they have not shown classwide evidence of lapse propensity.

Now, I know what happens in response to this, which is they keep coming back to that was a sample designed to get a ratio. The ratio is used to get damages. That's been their tactic throughout this case, which is to meld the

02:31:46 1 questions of was there deception and was there damage. 02:31:51 2 think it's critical that those two elements be taken 02:31:56 3 separately. 02:31:58 4 Question one: Was there some deception? 02:32:01 5 people not told something that they needed to be told? 02:32:05 6 particular, were people not told about a lapse propensity? 02:32:09 7 The answer to that is we have no evidence of lapse 02:32:14 8 propensity across the class. We have nothing that can be 02:32:16 9 extrapolated across the class as to lapse propensity. 02:32:2210 Similarly with regard to reduced value, we know

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Similarly with regard to reduced value, we know that there is no evidence of reduced value that can be extrapolated across the class. We know that for several reasons, because the reduced value was only calculated as to policies that showed loans being taken. That's problem number one.

Problem number two is the reduced value even then, using Dr. Brockett's Monte Carlo analysis, did not show reduced value across the class. It showed it 95 percent of the time on Provider and 90 percent of the time on Paragon. Even using their analyses, you do not have classwide proof of reduced value for all policyholders even with sales illustrations, much less without sales illustrations.

Again, I think that's important.

Dr. Brockett said the PA/PR would be different for batch illustrations as opposed to sales illustrations. He

02:33:23 1 ran his PA/PR only on sales illustrations. And even then he 02:33:27 2 came up short of classwide proof of PR being over PA by his 02:33:34 3 own analysis, using even those policies that receive sales 02:33:34 4 illustrations. Five to ten percent of the time, PA is 02:33:35 5 higher than PR on average, meaning for those policyholders 02:33:49 6 who received only sales illustrations, five to ten percent 02:33:53 7 of the time there was nothing that LSW failed to tell those 02:33:56 8 people even by Dr. Brockett's own analysis. Five to 02:34:00 9 ten percent of the time for those policyholders, there was 02:34:0310 no omission. Their policies even under his analysis would 02:34:0911 not suffer reduced value. Those policies under his analysis 02:34:1512 were not worth less than was represented to them. 02:34:1813 So you can't just jump to, well, we included that 02:34:1914 five to ten percent in calculating our average PA/PR for 02:34:2215

five to ten percent in calculating our average PA/PR for purposes of damages. And that's been the constant tactic is to say, well, we still have a classwide calculation as to damages, because question number one is: Were those five to ten percent of policyholders deceived and could they be identified?

Dr. Brockett said he didn't identify them, couldn't tell me who they are, and acknowledged that the actual value, his PA of those policies, was higher than the value of the policies as represented to those policyholders.

Those people did not have any material information omitted from them under Dr. Brockett's own analysis. And

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02:34:59 1 that's only for folks who have received only sales
02:35:04 2 illustrations. We know that there's additional people who
02:35:07 3 received only batch illustrations, or stated more precisely,
02:35:10 4 there's a group of policyholders that we have no evidence
02:35:14 5 received anything other than batch illustrations.
02:35:17 6 Dr. Brockett intentionally did not run his PA/PR

Dr. Brockett intentionally did not run his PA/PR analysis on those, though he was able to tell me that for those policyholders that had both a sales and a batch illustration, the PA/PR ratio would differ. I used the example of Ms. Walker. So we can't draw conclusions about what the PA/PR ratio would be for those folks who received only batch illustrations, a number that is at least 25 percent of the class.

So even if they're allowed to shift their theory from what was certified to this new theory of lapse propensity and reduced value as compared to the value in illustrations, which would be a new theory that was not certified, they still don't have classwide proof on question number one, which was: Was there an omission? They fail for that reason.

Stated another way, maybe another way to think about this is in the case of a policyholder who received an illustration, who showed no loans, what case has ever been tried as to that policyholder? We know that that's true of everyone who has only a batch illustration. And in

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02:36:34 1 Dr. Brockett's sample of 280 policies, I believe it was true 02:36:38 2 of 60 percent, 175 out of 280, the difference between the 02:36:42 3 105 and the 280. 175 of the 280 in his sample had even 02:36:50 4 sales illustrations that showed no loans. 02:36:52 5 THE COURT: Is that dispositive? I mean, one of 02:36:54 6 the features offered in this policy is the ability to take 02:36:59 7 loans, whether or not they are shown in the sales 02:37:01 8 illustration. 02:37:05 9 MR. MARTENS: That's true, Your Honor. 02:37:0510 understand that that is one of the features. And I'll 02:37:0611 accept that for the sake of argument. 02:37:0712 THE COURT: But isn't it just flat out true that 02:37:1313 regardless of what your sales illustration showed, a policy 02:37:1814 purchaser had the ability to take loans during the life of 02:37:2115 the policy? 02:37:2316 MR. MARTENS: Absolutely. I don't have trouble 02:37:2517 conceding that, that that was one of the marketing features 02:37:2718 of the policies and that was one of the actual features that 02:37:3019 the policies could be used for. 02:37:3420 The problem is what did that particular 02:37:3621 policyholder think of the importance of that? In other 02:37:4022 words, as Mr. DeSantos testified, every policyholder isn't 02:37:4423 the same in how much they weight the relative features, and 02:37:4824 it's not the case that -- this, I think, is critical, and I 02:37:5325 think this goes to the heart of the Court's question.

232 02:37:56 1 plaintiffs' evidence is not that if you take loans -- let's 02:38:00 2 take even that sample of 105 policyholders where 02:38:04 3 Dr. Brockett calculated this 59.8 percent and 55.7 percent 02:38:06 4 likelihood of lapse. It was very important, the heading he 02:38:15 5 put in that document. That was the likelihood of lapse if 02:38:16 6 they took loans in the illustrated amounts. 02:38:19 7 It's not the likelihood that it will lapse if they 02:38:22 8 take loans, and that's why, if the Court remembers, I asked 02:38:25 9 a number of witness over a over: If a policy has \$500,000 02:38:2610 in cash accumulation and you take \$500,000 in loans, will it 02:38:3511 lapse? Yes. What if you take a dollar in loans? Will it 02:38:3812 lapse? Probably not. 02:38:3913 So what they've calculated is for those 02:38:4214 individuals who elected, because it's not a default, who 02:38:4515 elected to put loan amounts in their illustrations based on 02:38:5016 their unique conversations with their agent, that there is a

probability calculated that those illustrations, those policies as illustrated, would lapse.

What we don't know is what would be the probability of lapse if they reduced the amount of their loans by \$100 or \$500 or \$1,000 or \$10,000.

For example, even with regard to Ms. Walker, the, I think, 61 percent risk of lapse for her policy as illustrated doesn't answer the question can she use that policy for retirement income without lapse. Dr. Brockett's

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analysis simply says what's the probability of lapse if she takes \$93,167? He doesn't answer the question what if she takes \$75,000 or what if she takes \$70,000.

I think that's why it's important for all these individuals who don't have sales illustrations showing loans, we have no idea — loans, what did they want to take in terms of loans? In what amount? In other words, there is no evidence that they can't take loans, those other folks. Even their analysis would only be if you take loans in too large of an amount, it would lapse. But we don't even know what those folks wanted to do, how much in the way of loans did they want to take.

I think that's a critical point. The evidence is not that you can't use these for loans without creating a probability of lapse. It's that even accepting Dr. Brockett's analysis, you can't use these for loans in particular amounts. And that becomes a problem for the 60 percent of the 280 sample who show no loans, so we have no idea in what amounts those individuals thought, expected, or hoped to take loans, if any.

Much less, for all the folks who received only batch illustrations which show no loans, we have no idea what they expected, believed, or anticipated they could take in loans and whether their belief, it all differed from whether or not they could take loans.

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02:40:54 1 Let's take an example where you have someone who 02:40:59 2 got one of these sales illustrations in the 280 sample, a 02:41:04 3 sales illustration that shows no loans. It is certainly not 02:41:07 4 the case that that person can't take any loans. 02:41:11 5 certainly the case probably for almost all of them that they 02:41:13 6 could take a hundred dollars in loans for life. 02:41:18 7 What if that's all they wanted to do? What if all 02:41:21 8 02:41:26 9 for life out of this policy. What if that's all someone 02:41:3310

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they wanted to do is take a hundred dollars a month in loans for life out of this policy. What if that's all someone with an illustration with a policy the size of Ms. Walker's but without a loan specified, what if that's all that that person wanted to take? How do we know that reality has at all deviated from what their anticipation was?

That becomes the problem. When there's no loans in the illustration, we have no idea what that person thought they could do or couldn't do and whether reality deviates from that at all. That's the problem when they were pushed back into this situation where all they have is lapse rates and reduced values, lapse rates in particular, when calculated on a sample that has loans as illustrated, because now they can't answer the question of what is the lapse rate of all those policies that don't have illustrations; and what's the reduced value, if any, of all those policies that don't have illustrations with loans in them.

02:42:24 1 So I think that is the central problem, that at 02:42:26 2 the end of the day Dr. Brockett answers a question for a 02:42:30 3 narrow slice of people, even if you accept his analysis --02:42:33 4 and all my discussion here is accepting for sake of argument 02:42:37 5 his analysis. Even if you accept his analysis, it doesn't 02:42:44 6 tell us anything, anything about whether reality deviated 02:42:47 7 from expectations for all the people, and it is a lot. 02:42:51 8 is a significant chunk of this class, probably over 02:42:55 9 50 percent. 02:42:5610 THE COURT: But you're assuming that we have to 02:42:5711 have particularized expectations. If a fact would be 02:43:0112 material if disclosed, I think it gets around the necessity 02:43:0913 of what the individual expectations were. It's clear that

have particularized expectations. If a fact would be material if disclosed, I think it gets around the necessity of what the individual expectations were. It's clear that people could take loans. Regardless of what's in the illustrations, if the fact was that they took loans, just say for sake of example, over four years the amount of ten percent of whatever the balance was, they would lapse.

Now, they didn't have it presented to them in the policy illustration. I assume there are a number where there was no loans shown in the illustration, but nevertheless the theoretical defect would be there if they acted in a way that would trigger a lapse. And that wasn't disclosed without regard to what's in the policy illustrations.

Let me give you this example: Suppose I go to the

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02:44:03 1 auto dealer and I tell him I want to buy this car and most 02:44:07 2 of the time I really just drive around the neighborhood. I 02:44:12 3 live in a small town, probably don't drive 15 miles a week, 02:44:20 4 never go over 30 miles an hour. And the fact of the matter 02:44:21 5 is there is some key defect in the engine that comes into 02:44:26 6 play when you go 50 miles an hour. 02:44:28 7 Now, the person bought the car with the 02:44:30 8 02:44:35 9 than 25 miles an hour, but that defect was there. And it 02:44:3810

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expectation of driving only a few miles and not going more than 25 miles an hour, but that defect was there. And it seems to me what the plaintiffs are saying. The defect in my hypothetical of a car having a catastrophic problem when you put it over 50 is there and would be material to somebody even if they said, you know, usually I just drive around here, but some day I might want to go out on the freeway. I think the argument is — and I think there's at least proof enough here to sustain it — that the undisclosed facts would be material even if you didn't have an immediate intention to invoke the facts that would bring the defect into play.

MR. MARTENS: Here is why I don't think that analogy holds, Your Honor. It's undisputed -- I can't imagine we have to disclose the fact that if you take loans in an amount that runs your account dry, your policy will lapse.

THE COURT: But aren't you free to argue that off

02:45:34 1 the face of the policy illustrations and the testimony here? 02:45:36 2 MR. MARTENS: Right. But the problem is what's 02:45:38 3 the evidence that anyone didn't know that obvious fact on a 02:45:41 4 classwide basis? In other words, what's the defect that we 02:45:45 5 didn't disclose? That if you take loans that run your 02:45:48 6 account value dry, you will lapse? 02:45:51 7 THE COURT: No. It's the interplay between the 02:45:53 8 loans and the volatility. That's the issue. I mean, the 02:45:58 9 claim is not that if you take loans, your policy will lapse. 02:46:0110 The claim goes deeper. The argument is that there is a 02:46:0411 relationship between taking loans and volatility which 02:46:0712 accelerates or exacerbates the probability of lapse. MR. MARTENS: Well, I think their theory is 02:46:1213 02:46:1714 something quite different, which is that the interplay 02:46:1915 between the features and he S&P reduces the value of the 02:46:2316 policy, reduces the cash value, and thus that reduces the 02:46:2617 amount of loans you can take. 02:46:2718 THE COURT: Well, but in turn if it reduces the 02:46:3119 value, it increases the insurance expense because you have 02:46:3420 got the amount between the value in the policy at the moment 02:46:3721 and the face value of the insurance. If the value goes 02:46:4122 down, what you're paying in insurance premiums goes up. 02:46:4423 MR. MARTENS: Well, I don't think there's any 02:46:4524 evidence about how much that cost of insurance is affected 02:46:4725 at all. There is no testimony about the amount, that that

02:46:51 1 would at all be material. In fact, the only evidence on how 02:46:55 2 much cost of insurance was the one dollar change that we 02:47:02 3 They offered no evidence on the cost of insurance. offered. 02:47:02 4 THE COURT: There is plenty of evidence that there 02:47:04 5 is a relationship between expenses affecting the value of 02:47:11 6 the fund in the policy and there being a relationship 02:47:16 7 between that and what it costs you for insurance. Yeah, the max rates are all laid out, but the question is if I go into 02:47:19 8 02:47:24 9 this, assuming a \$2.5 million policy, that I'm going to have to insure \$2 million is different from if I am going to have 02:47:3110 02:47:3511 to insure \$2,250,000. 02:47:4012 MR. MARTENS: My question there is what haven't we 02:47:4313 disclosed on that? Do we really need to tell people when 02:47:4714 you're charged a charge, your value will go down? 02:47:5415 THE COURT: Under the theory it's not as simple as 02:47:5716 There is a factor not disclosed -- namely, that. 02:47:5917 volatility -- under the plaintiffs' theory that drives the 02:48:0418 acceleration of costs, therefore drive value down, therefore 02:48:0719 increases the likelihood of lapse. That's the key piece. 02:48:1220 agree you don't have to tell people if you take all the 02:48:1321 money out of the policy, your policy will lapse. I think that's almost self-evident. But I think it's more subtle 02:48:1722 02:48:2123 that that. 02:48:2224 MR. MARTENS: As I understand what the Court is 02:48:2425 articulating, their new theory, again not the theory that

02:48:28 1 was certified, because the value is reduced, reduced 02:48:32 2 relative to what, is the question. To say that the value is 02:48:37 3 reduced from what people expected, you have to answer the 02:48:40 4 question: Reduced relative to what? In what way does this 02:48:47 5 policy have reduced value? Reduced requires a benchmark, 02:48:52 6 and that's why the illustrations have always been critical. 02:48:57 7 Their pure omissions case, as I understood 02:48:58 8 initially, was they thought they were going to show these 02:48:58 9 things have high lapse rates classwide, and they would then 02:49:0210 be able to say no consumer expected these things would have 02:49:0611 a 90 percent lapse rate. The problem was they didn't 02:49:0912

actually have that evidence, and they didn't have

Dr. Brockett calculate a classwide lapse rate. But they

could say no consumer would have expected these things would

lapse 90, 80, whatever percent they expected when they

started this case.

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So they fell back to this reduced value theory, but that begs the question of reduced relative to what.

What is the benchmark that any particular policyholder expected and now the reality for them is different?

What we have heard is that for some sample that can't being extrapolated classwide, their value might not match up to what was illustrated. That's the key point —to what was illustrated. And there is no evidence here.

So to use your car example, not everyone buying a

02:49:53 1 Toyota Corolla would understand --02:49:55 2 THE COURT: Don't use that. 02:49:56 3 MR. MARTENS: I'm sorry. I don't remember what 02:49:57 4 car you used. I'll pick another one -- Volkswagen --02:50:02 5 THE COURT: A generic car. 02:50:04 6 MR. MARTENS: A generic car. No one would expect 02:50:06 7 that you could drive a generic starter car 150 miles an 02:50:11 8 hour. So to say that the car only accelerates up to 100 02:50:15 9 wouldn't be a defect. 02:50:1810 THE COURT: No, but in my hypothetical there was a 02:50:2011 defect if you went 50 miles an hour. 02:50:2312 MR. MARTENS: And that's the key point, is because 02:50:2313 a consumer going into that would certainly expect I can 02:50:2614 drive my car 50, because that's what cars do. I think 02:50:2915 that's why that example is fundamentally different, because 02:50:3216 it would be easy to establish that consumers expect that I 02:50:3517 could drive the car 50 miles an hour. 02:50:3818 THE COURT: But the analogy is between the person 02:50:4119 who doesn't have loans in the policy illustration and the 02:50:4420 person who says I'm just going to drive 25 miles an hour 02:50:4821 around my little town ten miles a week. Neither person 02:50:5322 expected to encounter the defect but questions whether the defect is there under certain conditions. That's the 02:50:5723 02:51:0024 defect. 02:51:0125 MR. MARTENS: So using your analogy, if someone

02:51:05 1 only intended to drive 25 miles an hour and the car wouldn't 02:51:09 2 go above 50, and the normal consumer would think you could 02:51:13 3 drive your car above 50, I think in that instance it's easy to understand the defect. And the reason is because the 02:51:18 4 02:51:20 5 consumer would expect I can drive my car above 50. 02:51:26 6 02:51:26 7 02:51:26 8 02:51:26 9 02:51:2610 02:51:3611 you can only drive it 25. So using that analogy here, what's the 50? What's 02:51:3912 02:51:4213 02:51:4614 02:51:5115

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But I think that's the critical piece, that the Court is assuming rather than expecting you'd have to prove, and it would probably be easy to prove, but would nonetheless have to prove, which is, a reasonable consumer would expect you could drive this car above 50 when in fact

the amount that a reasonable consumer would expect you could take out of this policy? I don't know of any evidence of that. That's the critical missing piece. What they say is at some point way up here you can't hit 150 miles an hour with a starter car. Maybe you can't hit 125 miles an hour. But where's the evidence that any consumer thought you could get to that amount for all of those consumers who have no illustrations showing loans. I think that's the critical difference.

It's not like the car where everybody thinks you can drive a car 50 miles an hour. Everybody doesn't think you can take a loan in some indeterminate amount. That expectation has to come from somewhere, and that's what they

02:52:28 1 don't have on a classwide basis. They don't have that 02:52:28 2 benchmark, that 50 miles an hour where you say it can't live 02:52:33 3 up to that. It has got some reduced value that you didn't 02:52:36 4 tell me about.

> it, even whether they would take advantage of the full loan amount. My question is what is that amount. For all those people who have illustrations with no loans, what is that 50 miles an hour here? What is that comparable benchmark that we can say it doesn't live up to? I think that's the problem they have. They don't have that benchmark that can be extrapolated out so that we can evaluate it for those who have no illustrated loans.

> For those who have an illustrated loan, I think their benchmark is wrong, but I understand the Court's point, which is that's the 50 miles an hour. But what about all those policies that don't have that? What is that benchmark that someone must have thought this thing would perform at? I think that is a fundamental failing in the proof.

As I said, for all those folks who we don't know how much loan they wanted to take or how much loan they thought they could take, what's the omission? What didn't we tell them? What benchmark did we tell them this policy won't live up to? What did we need to say? It will not

02:52:38 5 I am not here fighting about how people would use

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allow you to do what? And how is that what any different than what they expected? We just don't know for any of those individuals.

More importantly, we know -- not more importantly but equally important, we know that for five to ten percent of those individuals, even in the sample, it would go above 50 miles an hour. So to use the Court's example, those folks thought they could drive that car 50 miles an hour. It turns out they can drive it 75 miles an hour. Their car didn't have a defect even under the plaintiffs' theory. Five to ten percent of the time their car would go 75. So what did we fail to tell them? What is it that we have omitted to that part of the class?

Again, I think all of this is a new theory that was never certified. But even under this new theory, they can't show what the lapse rate is classwide. Dr. Brockett said it cannot be extrapolated. And the reduced value, even if it can be extrapolated, shows that five to ten percent of the time — in fact, I asked him this. I said: Would you expect your 280 sample and your reduced value 90 to 95 percent of the time, would you assume that that can be extrapolated? I believe he said, yes, he would expect that to repeat itself because it's a statistical sample, and that's what damns his model, because that shows that five to ten percent of the time in the 46,000, even under his

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analysis, the car drives faster.

We do not have classwide proof on that. Five to ten percent of the time the car drives faster than 50, under Dr. Brockett's own analysis. And we have no idea who those people are, yet they're going to stand up and demand damages for the class. And we have no idea who the five to ten percent are whose car goes faster.

We literally have folks in here who were not deceived. We know that even under Dr. Brockett's analysis. They were not deceived. I don't care whether those five to ten percent were used to calculate the average PA/PR to get damages. Those five to ten percent were not deceived.

THE COURT: But you fix on the nature of the illustration rather than the existence of a defect without regard to what's in the illustration.

MR. MARTENS: Well, those five to ten percent, what's the defect? I don't even know what the defect is for those people. I don't know what we failed to tell them. We failed to tell them that your policy as it works will do better than we tell you. Yours is not defective even under Dr. Brockett's analysis.

I understand what the Court is saying, that

Dr. Brockett's analysis, if you accept it, shows defect as
to 90 to 95 percent. It does not show that as to the five
to ten percent. Their car drives faster. It does not have

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a defect. It does not blow up when you cross 50 miles an hour. So for that part of the class, we didn't omit anything to them. Nothing. We would have lied to them had we told them their policy was defective. We would have told them something that was false, because it's not.

won't go above 50 when it will. So I think even under this new theory that has developed at trial, the reduced value theory, it doesn't even apply classwide. The lapse certainly doesn't, the lapse probability, because Dr. Brockett testified you cannot extrapolate that 59.8 percent and that 55.7 percent. You cannot extrapolate it. He admitted that. He said it wasn't even meant to be extrapolated to the 280. That theory is gone by his own analysis because he acknowledged they're pushed back now to this reduced value theory. And the reduced value theory does not apply classwide either.

At the end of the day, we would have lied to people had we told them that it may be lower when in fact it can drive faster than 55. I think that's the first -- this is just issue one on was there even deception.

The additional issue for matters of class certification are that they have a damages problem, and that is that Dr. Brockett's approach, which I don't believe is a legitimate approach, but he looks at how much market value

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would have moved. And thus how much people were overcharged I think fails on two respects. Number one, it's not the law. This may be somewhat Rule 50 but also Rule 23. You have to calculate what's the highest amount a willing buyer would pay and compare that to what they actually paid.

Maybe this is a Comcast problem; maybe this is a Rule 50. I think in some way it all merges together here. I read him the definition from the instructions and said: Did you do this calculation? And he told me no. I asked him again after plaintiffs' counsel tried to muddle it up on redirect, and I went back on recross and said I just want to be clear. And he said: I didn't do that calculation. He did not do the willingness to pay calculation as defined in the law.

What he did instead was he tried to look at how much market price shifted. This is where the POM beverages case comes into play. In POM beverages the Court said: We think it highly doubtful that you can use this increased market price as a valid measure of fraudulent concealment damages. But if you can, you can only do it if there is an efficient market. You can only say the misinformation would have inflated the market price if the market was efficient.

Again, Dr. Brockett said in no uncertain terms that the market is not efficient. The market for IULs is not efficient. He used the exact same definition of

03:00:21 1 efficiency right out of POM. So even if you accept that 03:00:25 2 what he did was a willingness to pay, even though he 03:00:29 3 disclaimed that he used willingness to pay as defined, even 03:00:29 4 if you accept that his market analysis of how much market 03:00:33 5 price would move was a willingness to pay analysis, it only 03:00:38 6 works according to the POM beverage case in an efficient 03:00:42 7 market. 03:00:43 8 You can only assume that a \$1 change in value of 03:00:46 9 03:00:5010 03:00:5411

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the policy will have a \$1 change in the price of the policy if the market is efficient, if the market incorporates that information on an efficient basis. And Dr. Brockett denied that the market is efficient.

So even if you can use that theory -- and that's a big if according to POM -- I don't think even think it's a big if when Dr. Brockett denies that he used the definition in the statute. But you can't do it if the market's not efficient. So again they have no classwide evidence of damages.

Finally I'd say this. Dr. Brockett tries to save the day to some degree by recasting the damages as intrinsic value. I think the short answer on intrinsic value is he used the same calculation. That's not intrinsic value. Intrinsic value doesn't look at market price. By definition intrinsic value doesn't look at market price. We can give the Court a case from the Ninth Circuit that explains that

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when you're looking at intrinsic value, you look at such things as how much did it cost to build it, or what type of emotional worth does it have. Some of the examples are like how do you figure out what the value of a cat is if you lost your cat.

You can look to the intrinsic value -- or how much is a ship worth that's sunken in the ocean, because there is no market for that? The Court said, well, you could look at how much it cost to build minus any deterioration in the product. But they don't have anything that looks like that. Dr. Brockett took literally the same calculation, slapped a new label on it, and calls it intrinsic value.

So at the end of the day I think their case fails to show classwide that there was a lapse statistic that applied classwide. They have no evidence of that at all. With regard to reduced value, they have 90 to 95 percent of policies, if you accept the analysis, but ten percent of the time the car could drive faster than 50 miles an hour. And their damage model does not line up because Dr. Brockett said he did not analyze willingness to pay, the definition out of the jury instructions. And his fall-back approach, which is to look at market price, doesn't work in the absence of an efficient market.

That's my Rule 23 argument. I can make the Rule 50 argument now if you want to hear from Mr. Brosnahan.

03:03:11 1 We have many additional arguments on Rule 50. 03:03:20 2 THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Brosnahan, 03:03:23 3 please. 03:03:24 4 MR. BROSNAHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I think 03:03:26 5 the Court grasped quite well that our case is a defect case. 03:03:31 6 It's an omissions case. Mr. Martens jumped right over that 03:03:35 7 fact and immediately started attacking what you do with the 03:03:37 8 illustrations. 03:03:41 9 The theory of the case is that these policies are 03:03:4410 not fit for the purposes for which they are designed and 03:03:4811 marketed, and the consumer expectations center around the 03:03:5312 purposes for which the products were designed and marketed. 03:03:5613 The evidence is that they were designed and marketed for a 03:03:5814 cash accumulation and in particular for retirement income. Yes, there is a death benefit, because that's a requirement 03:04:0315 03:04:0616 in order to get the tax benefits. 03:04:0917 Mr. Tivilini testified that you would never buy 03:04:1318 this policy if all you wanted was a death benefit. 03:04:1719 no evidence in the record about riders. Whatever different 03:04:1920 case that could have been is not before us. This is a case 03:04:2021 about consumers buying a policy for cash accumulation and in 03:04:2422 particular retirement income and thinking that that product 03:04:2823 is a safe and secure way to accomplish that end. 03:04:3424 The problem is that the defect is volatility.

SHARON SEFFENS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT REPORTER

way it interacts with this policy produces lapse rates, and

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03:04:43 1 it produces reduced value. Those are two different aspects, 03:04:48 2 but we think that the consumer expectation is that 03:04:53 3 volatility is not going to be interacting with this policy 03:04:59 4 design, is not going to produce a high risk of lapse, and is 03:05:01 5 not going to reduce the value of the policy versus a 03:05:05 6 situation of no volatility. 03:05:07 7 He was asking, okay, what's the 50? The 50 is no 03:05:11 8 volatility. The 50 is volatility that doesn't affect your 03:05:14 9 policy. THE COURT: What do you do with the fact that 03:05:1510 03:05:1711 Dr. Brockett could not extrapolate his lapse rates from 105 03:05:2112 who had loans to the whole class of 46,000? 03:05:3013 MR. BROSNAHAN: That's a completely false 03:05:3414 assertion for exactly the reason Your Honor raised. 03:05:3415 THE COURT: Did he not say that you couldn't 03:05:3716 extrapolate that finding to the class? 03:05:3917 MR. BROSNAHAN: I think he said you can't 03:05:4018 extrapolate it to the other illustrations. But you can 03:05:4419 extrapolate it to the class because what it is is a measure 03:05:4720 of a failure rate. It is a measure of a failure rate. 03:05:5121 it is a failure rate that is based on 105 realistic 03:05:5722 retirement income plans that were prepared for real people. 03:06:0423 I don't have in mind the exact questioning and 03:06:0824 answering. I think Mr. Martens did a very good job of 03:06:1225 manipulating the testimony of Dr. Brockett. I suppose

03:06:16 1 that's to his credit as a cross-examiner. I didn't have an 03:06:20 2 opportunity, as the Court will recall, to have the final 03:06:21 3 opportunity with Dr. Brockett. But there is no question in 03:06:24 4 this case that the 105 policy sample reflects a failure rate 03:06:31 5 for 105 real retirement plans. It's being used to prove 03:06:38 6 that the defect exists. If you tried to use this policy for 03:06:44 7 a realistic retirement plan, you have a high rate of 03:06:48 8 failure. 03:06:49 9 That's what that statistic proves. And it's true 03:06:4910 of the product. He keeps acting as if these statistics are 03:06:5411 about particular people. No. They are true of the product 03:06:5912 and how the product can be used across the range of 03:07:0213 situations that people would expect to use it. 03:07:0514 03:07:0815 03:07:1116 03:07:1417

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The Court pointed to the fellow who didn't expect to drive, didn't plan to drive 50, but he knows that sometime he might want to go on the freeway. So it's an important fact to him that the car can be driven above 50 miles an hour.

Similarly, whether I have an illustration that illustrates loans or not, the ability to use the policy for loans for retirement income is important to me regardless. So the 105 policy sample is data about the policy. It's not data about somebody else's illustration.

So when Dr. Brockett said I can't extrapolate it to these other illustrations, of course he can't. He was

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measuring those illustrations. But what those illustrations had in common was exactly what we need to prove here. The relevant thing is these are the realistic retirement plans, and what is the failure rate of those plans.

That's why he didn't use batch illustrations. The testimony is unequivocal that batch illustrations do not reflect retirement plans at all, so that's why you don't use those. Plans that don't have loans, those are not retirement income plans. So you don't use those.

You use only the plans that reflect loans because those are the retirement income plans. Therefore, his statistic shows that there is a high failure rate when you try to use the policy for a realistic retirement income plan. And that's what that data shows.

With respect to the reduced value aspect of it,
Mr. Martens is wrong because that is not limited to policies
with loans. That's the entire 280 policy sample. What it
demonstrates is that when you buy that policy, volatility is
biasing your value downward. Volatility can be expected to
reduce the expected value of that policy below what it would
be if volatility did not interact with that policy.

And it doesn't matter who got what illustration.

If, for example, Mr. Foster happened to get an illustration that put him in the five to ten percent and I got an illustration that put me in the 90 to 95 percent, on day one

03:09:23 1 we are both buying the same policy. Again, this is a 03:09:27 2 03:09:31 3 03:09:34 4 03:09:38 5 characteristics of the product. 03:09:41 6 03:09:45 7 03:09:48 8 03:09:52 9 03:09:5410 03:09:5711 03:10:0112 03:10:0513 03:10:0914 03:10:1215 03:10:1416 policy. 03:10:1917

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statistical sample that demonstrates the characteristics of the product, not the characteristics of the illustration. The illustration is just the data from which we deduced the

The day after we buy our policies, I could go off and pay premiums and take loans the way it was shown in his illustration, or he could do the reverse with me. But that's not how you assess damages. It's not how you assess the truth of a representation. You have to look at the time of sale. At the time of sale these policies were biased in a negative direction as compared to a situation where volatility did not interact with the policy design.

So you don't consider what may happen 30 years down the line how somebody might actually end up using the Those are all ex post considerations. So the data that Dr. Brockett has adduced shows the defects in those two important aspects of the policy which we believe any reasonable consumer would expect, and we think the jury is entitled to find that people would expect these products to function without this vulnerability to volatility.

I think that addresses the arguments he made on the first point.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there. You're saying notwithstanding the fact that his analysis showed that five

03:10:53 1 to ten percent of his sample didn't have reduced value and 03:10:58 2 that that could be extrapolated to the class, there is 03:11:03 3 nevertheless a showing on a classwide basis? 03:11:06 4 MR. BROSNAHAN: Absolutely, because he is showing 03:11:08 5 the propensities of the policy. You have to remember the 03:11:10 6 product is the policy; it's not the illustration. It's not 03:11:13 7 like I bought an illustration that had more value in it. You bought a policy, and the statistics show the 03:11:16 8 03:11:20 9 characteristics of the policy. How people will end up using 03:11:2310 the policy in the future, nobody knows. But on day one I 03:11:2811 bought a policy, and the statistics show that the chances of 03:11:3212 that policy having the same value it would have if 03:11:3613 volatility did not interact with it are very, very poor. 03:11:4214 THE COURT: Are very, very --03:11:4415 MR. BROSNAHAN: The chances are high that it will 03:11:4516 not have the same value that it would have if it did not 03:11:5017 interact with volatility. 03:11:5218 THE COURT: Is the chances that the probability of 03:11:5419 reduced value will be high the same as proof on a class 03:11:5820 basis? 03:12:0021 MR. BROSNAHAN: Absolutely, because it's proof 03:12:0222 about the characteristic of the product. There is nothing 03:12:0823 individualized about that other than the fact that a 03:12:1224 different person's illustration was used to calculate the 03:12:1625 data, because how the person chooses to have it illustrated

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does not reflect how the product is going to be used in the future. We don't know how the product is going to be used in the future. It's an ex post consideration. But they're all buying the same policy on day one.

THE COURT: So you're saying with respect to the five or ten percent that showed an increased value, that they may be subject to the defect effect based on the way they use the policy, and that's not disclosed to them? MR. BROSNAHAN: Absolutely. That's the first

issue.

With respect to the damages issue, first of all, I think this issue that the defense keeps raising about the highest amount a willing buyer would pay is a gross misrepresentation of the law. In fact, I think that the Court should -- well, we had asked that the instruction be clarified because we think that the BAJI instruction is more clear.

The premise of it is that you don't look at market value at all. You look at each individual person's subjective willingness to pay. It's the same argument they made at the discovery phase. I believe they raised it again in class certification. The Court rejected it both times. They're making it again just because of a vague formulation in the instruction that speaks of the highest price that a willing buyer would pay.

03:13:45 1 He asked Dr. Brockett: Is that what you looked 03:13:48 2 at? Dr. Brockett said: No, that wasn't what I looked at, 03:13:52 3 because Dr. Brockett in fact looked at market value, which 03:13:54 4 is what he was supposed to look at. 03:13:55 5 On reexamination I clarified that, yes, a willing 03:14:00 6 buyer might be -- a person might be willing to pay more if 03:14:03 7 he had to; but if the market price were lower, he wouldn't. 03:14:08 8 No willing buyer would pay more than the market price 03:14:11 9 because he doesn't have to pay more than the market price, 03:14:1610 and that's the ambiguity in the instruction that Mr. Martens 03:14:1911 is seeking to exploit and to totally gut the market-value 03:14:2212 test and convert it into an individualized subjective test. 03:14:2713 I went through this with Dr. Brockett. So if the 03:14:3114 price of POM is \$3 in the marketplace and Mr. Martens 03:14:3515 happens to like it a lot and would be willing to pay \$5, 03:14:3916 what does he have to pay? Well, of course, he only has to 03:14:4417 \$3. And that's the market price. So that's what determines 03:14:4618 fraud damages, not an individual subjective valuation. 03:14:5019 As I said, that was previously litigated, and 03:14:5020 there is just no question under the cases that you look at 03:14:5621 market value, not individual subjective value. 03:15:0122 THE COURT: But the CACI instruction talks about 03:15:0323 the price which a willing buyer and a willing seller would 03:15:0724 strike. 03:15:0925 Right. But by definition that is MR. BROSNAHAN:

03:15:10 1 bounded by the market price. It's supposed to be a market 03:15:15 2 price. It's just a vague formulation because, as I say, no 03:15:18 3 willing buyer would willingly pay more than the market 03:15:21 4 price. So the market price sets a bound on the price you 03:15:27 5 pay. Even if he would be willing to pay \$5 if the market 03:15:31 6 price were \$5 -- if the price went from to \$3 or \$5, some 03:15:34 7 people would say: Forget it. I value it at \$3.50. I am not going to buy it anymore. 03:15:40 8 03:15:41 9 There may be other people who say: Okay. 03:15:4110 \$5, I like it a lot and I will still buy it. But if the 03:15:4111 price were \$3 in the market, that person would say, no, I 03:15:4712 won't pay \$5 because I can get it for \$3. 03:15:5113 THE COURT: Unless you go to the wrong grocery 03:15:5514 store.

> MR. BROSNAHAN: Well, then you're talking about what exactly is the relevant market, which I think is a separate issue. But there's no question under the law that you're supposed to look at market value, that individual preferences that might cause someone to be willing to pay more than the market price, they're completely irrelevant because otherwise that destroys the market value test.

In fact, Mr. Martens drew supply and demand first. He drew them backwards, of course. But everyone, when you have that market price line going across at the intersection of supply and demand, everyone on that demand curve that's

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03:16:30 1 above that horizontal line by definition values the product 03:16:34 2 more than the market price. But none of them have to pay 03:16:37 3 more than the market price because that's the nature of a 03:16:37 4 market price. 03:16:43 5 So in the market value test, you throw out all of 03:16:46 6 those individualized preferences and you look at the market 03:16:50 7 price, because that's what a willing buyer would actually --03:16:52 8 the highest he would actually be willing to pay because he's 03:16:55 9 not going to be willing to pay more than he has to, and he 03:16:5910 doesn't have to pay more than the market price. 03:17:0011 So I would again urge the Court to take another 03:17:0312 look at the BAJI instruction, which I think is a little bit 03:17:0613 more clear on this, so that we don't have this argument 03:17:0914 there tomorrow to confuse the jury. 03:17:1415 With respect to POM, POM is a fraud in the market 03:17:1816 That was their theory. They needed that -case. 03:17:2017 THE COURT: I think you have adequately 03:17:2318 distinguished POM. 03:17:2419 MR. BROSNAHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 03:17:2520 With respect to intrinsic value, I think 03:17:2721 Mr. Martens has it backwards. His perspective is, well, 03:17:3222 okay, Dr. Brockett did the market value test and then he did 03:17:3623 the intrinsic value test, and it's the same thing. It's the 03:17:3924 other way around. The intrinsic value test is the building 03:17:4425 block where Dr. Brockett -- in terms of the mathematics,

O3:17:45 1 Dr. Brockett took the market price as a starting point, as a 03:17:51 2 reference point, market price based on the way the product 03:17:55 3 is represented to the market.

He then calculated the discount off that price in

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He then calculated the discount off that price in terms of how the product as it actually performs falls short of the performance as represented to the market.

So it's a totally internal type of analysis without referring to, you know, what would change in a but-for world if disclosure were made. And it's based on cash flows as you would value any investment. But you're taking the market price as given and you are calculating the cash flows and calculating how much it's really intrinsically worth.

The market value test then takes a further step and says if there were full disclosure, the market price would fall to the level of the intrinsic value. So it's the market value test that kind of has this sort of extra step in it. The intrinsic value test is the simpler test. The law is clear that in situations where market value is difficult to determine, then you can rely on intrinsic value, and intrinsic value may differ in different cases. But in cases where the market value is difficult to determine, that doesn't mean that people should be free to commit fraud with impunity and not be subjected to a damages award. So there is this alternative measure.

03:19:18 1 Now, Mr. Martens mentioned that there are some 03:19:21 2 cases that calculate intrinsic value from the ground up 03:19:25 3 through costs. Well, we tried to do that. We requested 03:19:29 4 cost information in discovery, and in fact we specifically 03:19:31 5 said -- for example, we said: Okay. We want to know the 03:19:35 6 cost of term insurance and we want to know the cost of 03:19:39 7 riders, and we want to build this product from the ground up 03:19:41 8 to see how much all these costs are to approach 03:19:45 9 alternatively the damages valuation that way, too. They 03:19:4810 objected. Their objection was sustained. 03:19:5111 In the Court's order, the Court laid out two ways 03:19:5312 for us to try to establish damages. One was a 03:19:5313 willingness-to-pay measure, which we have adopted because 03:19:5914 it's an entire -- Dr. Brockett's analysis is entirely from 03:20:0215 the demand side, as the Court instructed. The Court also 03:20:0616 laid out an intrinsic value approach. We have done that, 03:20:1017 too. I think they can't be coming in at this time and 03:20:1318 saying, well, you should have done it based on costs, 03:20:1719 building the product from the ground up, when they refused 03:20:1920 to give us that discovery. And their position was 03:20:2321 sustained. 03:20:2322 So I would be happy to address any other issues. 03:20:2823 THE COURT: No. Thank you. 03:20:2924 Briefly, Mr. Martens.

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MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, with regard to the lapse

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03:20:36 1 rates and the sample of the 105, I defy Mr. Brosnahan to 03:20:41 2 point the Court to the evidence he must present to carry his 03:20:46 3 burden of proof that that 105 can show the lapse rates for 03:20:50 4 the class as a whole. 03:20:52 5 They have to put forward testimony. Dr. Brockett 03:20:57 6 had to affirmatively testify that that could be extrapolated 03:21:00 7 to a reasonable degree of statistical certainty. 03:21:05 8 testimony does not exist. He did not testify that the 105 03:21:09 9 is a random sample. He did not testify that that 105 could 03:21:1210 be extrapolated to the universe to a reasonable degree of 03:21:1611 statistical certainty. 03:21:1712 03:21:2113 03:21:2314

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That's why I objected to that 59.8 percent coming in, because it's going to be abused. The argument is going to be made that applies classwide, and there is no evidence of that. It's their burden.

This isn't just a matter of my crafty questioning of Dr. Brockett. He never affirmatively testified to it. They never asked him during his direct examination: Can that lapse rate be extrapolated? It doesn't exist. That evidence does not exist.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Brosnahan seemed to suggest that Dr. Brockett did not testify that he could not extrapolate. The way I remember the testimony is he was asked that question square on, and he said he couldn't extrapolate it. Mr. Brosnahan took issue with that.

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MR. MARTENS: Right. So I'm saying let's say that -- I remember my questioning the way the Court does. Sorry, I don't mean to point to the Court with my pen. I remember the question the way the Court does, which is I asked him can you extrapolate it, and he said no.

But let's assume I'm wrong. Let's assume I never asked that and that that question never came in. I still should prevail because it's not my burden to get him to nail it down. It's their burden to get him to put up that evidence. I think that this 59.8 percent in particular would be egregious for this theory to go forward, because it's going to be distorted.

The jury are not mathematicians, and the jury was never told in their case with their burden of proof under their questioning: Dr. Brockett, can you to a reasonable degree of statistical certainty extrapolate the lapse rates for the 105 to the class as a whole? Answer: We don't have the answer

That question was never put to him. None of the underlying questions that make it up such as whether the 105 was a sufficient sample size, whether it was random, any of those things. They did not carry the burden of proof on that, so there is no classwide proof on lapse rates. So I think that that is critical on that issue. That's the one point I wanted to make in rebuttal with regard to the

03:23:21 1 Rule 23. I have additional arguments on the Rule 50 if the 03:23:23 2 03:23:25 3 Court would like to hear them. 03:23:26 4 THE COURT: We will get to those in a minute. 03:23:27 5 MR. MARTENS: Okay. 03:23:30 6 MR. BROSNAHAN: Would you like me to respond? 03:23:32 7 THE COURT: No. I'm not going to decertify the class at this 03:23:35 8 03:23:40 9 I think there are some sharp methodological 03:23:4310 disputes, but it seems to me that if we go to a macro level, 03:23:4911 there are defects that have been asserted. There's some 03:23:5212 evidence that's been offered for those defects, and there is 03:23:5613 evidence that those defects weren't disclosed. 03:23:5914 If the jury finds they're material, then there was 03:24:0315 a fraudulent disclosure. If you come down from a macro 03:24:0816 level, there are all kinds of methodological disputes and 03:24:1117 what not, but I believe that a macro level analysis is 03:24:1318 sufficient at least for the time being to allow this to 03:24:2219 proceed to the jury as a class action. With regard to the 50(a) motion, much of it 03:24:2520 03:24:2521 overlaps, as Mr. Martens pointed out, with the class 03:24:2722 certification issue. I have read your brief, and I think I 03:24:3023 would only like to have argument on the punitive damages 03:24:3524 issue. 03:24:3525 So why don't we take about ten minutes and come

03:24:38 1 back and do that. 03:24:40 2 (Recess taken at 3:24 p.m.; 03:24:40 3 proceeding resumed at 3:32 p.m.) 03:32:16 4 THE COURT: Mr. Martens. 03:32:34 5 MR. MARTENS: As I indicated previously, I will 03:32:50 6 incorporate my arguments in the motion and then I will focus 03:32:52 7 on what the Court asked, which is on the punitive damages 03:32:56 8 award. 03:32:56 9 I think on the punitive damages award, California 03:32:5710 case law is clear and particularly California cases have 03:33:0211 looked to the instruction to explain that the jury must be 03:33:0412 able to consider the financial condition -- and that's the language, the financial condition -- of the company because 03:33:0813 03:33:1114 what the jury is not allowed to do is simply impose 03:33:1515 something that would be ruinous. And that's what the Court 03:33:1916 distinguishes. The case law distinguishes between something 03:33:2117 that would hurt and something that would be ruinous. 03:33:2418 So they have to have in order to capably conduct 03:33:2919 that analysis, they must have a statement of the financial 03:33:3320 condition of the defendant. The case law is clear not only 03:33:3621 in the case I cited this morning, the Murakami case, but 03:33:4422 also in Lockyer vs. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco --03:33:4923 THE COURT: I don't think it could be seriously 03:33:4924 argued that the plaintiff has the burden without regard to 03:33:5225 what the defendant does to prove the financial condition.

03:33:56 1 They need to prove the financial condition is fatal to an 03:33:59 2 award of punitive damages. I think that is a given in the 03:34:02 3 case law. 03:34:05 4 MR. MARTENS: I think that's right, Your Honor. 03:34:05 5 The Court had made clear, for example, in Tomaselli versus 03:34:08 6 Transamerica that you can't look to the parent, that you 03:34:10 7 have to look to the particular company that is the defendant. The jury has to be able to answer the question: 03:34:13 8 03:34:16 9 Will that corporation be ruined by this award? 03:34:2010 The problem that we have here is frankly the exact 03:34:2311 same program as in Tomaselli versus Transamerica. There is 03:34:2612 no evidence of LSW's financial condition. There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record on this. The plaintiffs 03:34:3313 03:34:3714 never filed a motion to compel. 03:34:3915 Regardless of that, we are where we are, and at 03:34:4216 the end of the case there is not one scintilla of evidence. 03:34:4617 We don't know what LSW's assets are; we don't know what 03:34:4918 their liabilities are; we don't know what their reserves 03:34:5119 are; we don't know what their net income is. We don't have a statement of cash flows. We don't have annual revenue. 03:34:5420 03:34:5721 We don't have annual income. 03:35:0022 We have nothing in this record about LSW's 03:35:0523 financial condition. There is simply no basis for the jury 03:35:0924 to make the necessary analysis to conduct it. The Court 03:35:1325 will be instructing them to consider LSW's financial

03:35:15 1 condition, and they will have no evidence of that. 03:35:19 2 I think as a matter of law, we cannot send the 03:35:21 3 case to the jury asking them to do an analysis that there is 03:35:26 4 no evidence on. I don't have anything to argue. Frankly 03:35:31 5 Mr. Brosnahan has nothing to argue. He can't argue as he 03:35:35 6 would need to, and this is the critical point. He would 03:35:37 7 need to argue they can absorb this amount, that LSW can absorb what he asked for \$129 million punitive damages 03:35:42 8 03:35:45 9 The jury would have no way to evaluate whether that's true or not. There is just no evidence on that. 03:35:4910 03:35:5311 So on that failure of proof, I think California 03:35:5512 law is crystal clear. It's the plaintiff's burden to put in 03:36:0113 evidence of our financial condition. There is not a single 03:36:0414 financial statement specific to LSW. 03:36:0615 So for that reason, I think the jury cannot be 03:36:0716 provided with an opportunity to simply, what the California 03:36:1017 Courts have said, speculate. That's all they would be 03:36:1318 They would literally be guessing as to whether or 03:36:1619 not LSW could afford \$129 million or something less or 03:36:2220 something more. 03:36:2321 For that reason, I believe that claim cannot go to 03:36:2622 the jury. Thank you. 03:36:2723 THE COURT: Mr. Brosnahan. 03:36:2824 MR. BROSNAHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 03:36:2825 THE COURT: You would agree if the record only

03:36:31 1 contained the National balance sheet, financial statement, 03:36:36 2 that you wouldn't have a basis for punitive damages? 03:36:39 3 MR. BROSNAHAN: The only quibble I have with that, 03:36:41 4 Your Honor, is that in this case we sought the discovery. 03:36:45 5 They refused to give it. They said they don't keep their 03:36:50 6 numbers that way. THE COURT: But doesn't Tomaselli foreclose that 03:36:53 7 03:36:55 8 argument, focusing on the public policy nature of an award 03:36:59 9 of punitive damages? The award is made for the protection of the public. It's simply happenstance that the dollars go 03:37:0410 03:37:0611 to the plaintiffs. 03:37:0812 MR. BROSNAHAN: That's true, Your Honor. 03:37:0913 confess I have not had a chance to read the Tomaselli case. 03:37:1314 I got this brief this morning. It doesn't even cite the 03:37:1815 Tomaselli case. 03:37:2016 THE COURT: It just cites Adams. 03:37:2317 MR. BROSNAHAN: Yes. And I did have a chance to 03:37:2318 read Adams during a break. It was in Adams they said it 03:37:2519 will not happen due to inaction. The defendant in that case 03:37:3120 apparently failed to object to the fact that no evidence of 03:37:3421 financial condition was put in. And I think it says in 03:37:4022 footnote 5, which I believe was the footnote cited, that 03:37:4323 punitive damages will not be allowed due to inaction, I 03:37:4724 think is the phrase. 03:37:4825 THE COURT: Right.

03:37:49 1	MR. BROSNAHAN: Which I think is different from
03:37:51 2	what we have here. Here we have consolidated financials,
03:37:55 3	and from what they've told us, they just don't keep track of
03:37:59 4	it separately, and so they were unwilling to give it to us
03:38:04 5	separately. They told us, well
03:38:05 6	THE COURT: Isn't that contrary to testimony that
03:38:07 7	you elicited from
03:38:12 8	MR. BROSNAHAN: I got a rough estimate of at least
03:38:16 9	20 percent of the business was LSW. Mr. DeSantos testified
03:38:2110	that California was one of their largest markets. There was
03:38:2711	some very general testimony. In Ms. MacGowan's deposition I
03:38:2812	asked her how much of the business was California, and she
03:38:3113	said she couldn't tell me at all.
03:38:3314	THE COURT: But in your examination of
03:38:3715	Mr. DeSantos at page 151 and 152:
03:38:4216	"Q Do you know what LSW's revenues were for
03:38:4617	last year?
03:38:4618	"A I do not.
03:38:5219	"Q Is that reported, LSW's revenues?
03:38:5320	"A I don't know.
03:38:5321	"Q But there would be documents that
03:38:5522	recount LSW's revenues?
03:38:5823	"A Yes, there would be documents."
03:38:5924	MR. BROSNAHAN: They refused to produce them. So
03:39:0225	unless the standard is that we have to make a motion to

03:39:06 1	compel and lose on every single thing and I don't think
03:39:10 2	that is the standard
03:39:12 3	THE COURT: You made the judgment not to make a
03:39:15 4	motion to compel based on being pointed toward the web page
03:39:19 5	where the financials for National appear and the assumption
03:39:24 6	that you would get some kind of breakout from them as to
03:39:28 7	what portion was attributable to LSW, but you never got that
03:39:32 8	follow-on data; did you?
03:39:35 9	MR. BROSNAHAN: We did not get the follow-on data
03:39:3710	other than the data that we have elicited in the trial,
03:39:4111	admittedly not very specific data.
03:39:4412	THE COURT: Is there any data on the assets of
03:39:4713	LSW?
03:39:4814	MR. BROSNAHAN: Specific assets, no.
03:39:4915	THE COURT: Assets in general?
03:39:5116	MR. BROSNAHAN: Well, other than as may be
03:39:5217	inferred from their contribution to the size of the
03:39:5518	business. We do have data on the profitability
03:39:5919	THE COURT: But we have no direct evidence of
03:40:0120	their assets; correct?
03:40:0221	MR. BROSNAHAN: No direct evidence.
03:40:0322	THE COURT: We have no direct evidence of their
03:40:0623	liabilities; correct?
03:40:0724	MR. BROSNAHAN: That's correct.
03:40:1025	THE COURT: Okay. Wouldn't those two factors be

03:40:12 1 significant in making an assessment of a business entity's 03:40:17 2 financial condition? 03:40:19 3 MR. BROSNAHAN: Those factors would be 03:40:21 4 significant. On the other hand, if we limit our prayer as 03:40:27 5 we have, I think a reasonable inference can be drawn that 03:40:32 6 it's not significant in the scheme of the overall size of 03:40:37 7 the business. We do have data on the size of the Paragon 03:40:40 8 and Provider businesses. 03:40:43 9 THE COURT: But would you not agree it would make 03:40:4910 a difference as to whether there is 100 million in assets or 03:40:5311 1 million in assets for LSW in assessing its financial 03:40:5812 condition? 03:40:5813 MR. BROSNAHAN: Yes, I would agree, Your Honor. 03:40:5914 THE COURT: Wouldn't you agree that it would be 03:41:0115 significant to look at the liability side and to see what 03:41:0516 the shareholder equity number is? 03:41:1117 MR. BROSNAHAN: Yes, Your Honor. I would agree. 03:41:1318 THE COURT: And wouldn't the analysis be different 03:41:1619 of the financial condition if the shareholder equity number 03:41:2120 were 1 million plus or 1 million minus? 03:41:2521 MR. BROSNAHAN: Yes, Your Honor, although I do 03:41:2622 think again we have to look to LSW's conduct not just in 03:41:3223 failing to produce discovery but in objecting to questions 03:41:3624 having anything to do with separation of corporate form. 03:41:4025 When they were putting on their witnesses, it was all one

03:41:43 1 happy family --03:41:46 2 THE COURT: But Tomaselli makes the point, I 03:41:48 3 think, quite nicely. On appeal the plaintiff argued that it 03:41:54 4 should be analyzed under an alter ego theory. The Court 03:41:58 5 rejected that out of hand because it wasn't litigated. It 03:42:01 6 wasn't litigated here either. 03:42:05 7 MR. BROSNAHAN: Normally it's the plaintiff who is 03:42:07 8 trying to litigate an alter ego theory. They essentially 03:42:13 9 litigated an alter ego defense, telling the jury that LSW 03:42:1310 was a mutual company. They litigated an alter ego defense 03:42:1911 here. So I think that makes it very different. 03:42:2112 THE COURT: Okay. 03:42:2113 MR. BROSNAHAN: I have nothing further, Your 03:42:2214 Honor. 03:42:2415 THE COURT: Well --03:42:2816 MR. BROSNAHAN: We would appreciate an opportunity 03:42:3017 to look at the cases since we have not had an opportunity to 03:42:3318 do that. 03:42:3619 THE COURT: I'm going to grant the 50(a) motion as 03:42:3820 to the punitive damage claim. 03:42:4121 When I shared my preliminary thoughts this 03:42:4322 morning, I gave some weight to the fact that discovery 03:42:5123 relative to punitive damages was sought and resisted by 03:42:5524 pointing the plaintiffs to the National Life website. I 03:43:0325 think in the final analysis, it's error to give any weight

03:43:08 1 to those set of facts because they do not diminish the
03:43:12 2 burden of the plaintiff under Adams to make an affirmative
03:43:16 3 showing of the financial condition of the defendant.
03:43:19 4 Tomaselli is found at 25 Cal.App. 4th at 1269, and
03:43:26 5 at 1282 the Court observes: Our review of that recent

at 1282 the Court observes: Our review of that recent authority, meaning Adams, convinces that this is a requirement imposed as a matter of public policy and hence not subject to waiver by failure of an intended defendant to object or otherwise call attention to the inadequacy of the proof.

The Court goes on to discuss Adams further at 1283: The rationale of the Adams Court concerning the purpose of punitive damages leads us to conclude that a private litigant's error or omission such as a failure to object to irrelevant evidence cannot obviate the public's interest in meaningful judicial oversight of punitive damage awards. Adams explained that the function of punitive damages is a purely public one — and public is in italics — to punish wrongdoing and thereby protect itself from future misconduct.

I reaffirm my view that I cannot give any weight to the fact that plaintiffs may have been thrown off the track in the fact that LSW pointed to the National web page and the National financials. Nevertheless, in terms of the public policy aspect and the purpose of punitive damages,

03:43:19 4 03:43:26 5 03:43:37 6 03:43:40 7 03:43:43 8 03:43:49 9 03:43:5310 03:43:5911 03:44:0912 03:44:1513 03:44:1714 03:44:2315 03:44:2516 03:44:3017 03:44:3518 03:44:3819 03:44:4520 03:44:4921 03:44:5322 03:44:5623

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03:45:08 1	that does not vitiate the obligation of the plaintiff in the
03:45:14 2	first instance to establish the financial condition of the
03:45:17 3	defendant.
03:45:18 4	We have two snippets in the record which I find
03:45:22 5	insufficient even when joined with the National financial
03:45:26 6	statements in Exhibit 557 to give the jury a sufficient set
03:45:32 7	of facts to make a reasonable determination of LSW's
03:45:36 8	financial condition.
03:45:43 9	In Mr. DeSantos's testimony, he is asked at page
03:45:4710	151 :
03:45:4911	"Q Okay. So why don't you speak of the
03:45:5412	life insurance product line.
03:45:5513	"A I believe that we sold north of 150 of
03:45:5814	what we call rated premium across all product
03:46:0115	lines, referring to National.
03:46:0416	"Q What share of those revenues stems from
03:46:0817	California?
03:46:0918	"A I don't know the exact share.
03:46:1219	"Q Isn't it fair that California is about
03:46:1620	20 percent of the LSW business?
03:46:1921	"A I know it's one of our larger markets,
03:46:2222	yes."
03:46:2323	THE COURT: It goes on a little bit further:
03:46:2624	"Q Do you know what LSW's revenues were
03:46:3025	last year?

03:46:31 1	"A I do not.
03:46:32 2	"Q Is that reported, LSW's revenue for the
03:46:38 3	life business?
03:46:39 4	"A I don't know.
03:46:39 5	"Q But there would be documents that
03:46:45 6	recount LSW's revenues?
03:46:47 7	"A Yes."
03:46:47 8	I believe I read that passage previously and
03:46:50 9	attributed it to Ms. MacGowan incorrectly. It should be to
03:46:5310	Mr. DeSantos.
03:46:5711	If we turn to Ms. MacGowan's testimony, there is
03:46:5912	also a snippet in the April 22 volume at page 124:
03:47:0513	"Q But National Life Insurance Company owns
03:47:1414	LSW; right?
03:47:1615	"A It does.
03:47:1816	"Q Okay. And approximately what are the
03:47:1917	profits of LSW on an annual basis?
03:47:2218	"A I don't know.
03:47:2519	"Q No idea?
03:47:2620	"A No. We look at what is reported to us
03:47:3421	at the employee level. What is reported to us at
03:47:3522	the employee level is the overall company profits,
03:47:3823	which include the life and annuity and both
03:47:4124	companies combined."
03:47:4225	"Q And is LSW's contribution of that profit

03:47:46 1 ten percent, 20 percent? 03:47:47 2 I think it's more than either of those 03:47:49 3 two numbers, but I don't know how much. 03:47:52 4 Somewhere north of 20 percent? 03:47:54 5 " A Yes. "Q 03:47:55 6 Of the National Life Group companies? 03:48:00 7 I think so." "A 03:48:04 8 Assuming that there is a basis to infer that 03:48:06 9 20 percent of the profits of the insurance business, of 03:48:1010 National's insurance business, come from LSW, I believe that 03:48:1611 that is insufficient to provide the jury a reasonable basis 03:48:2012 to assess the financial condition of LSW. 03:48:2813 It would make a difference without regard to what 03:48:3014 the revenues or profits are as to what the assets and 03:48:3715 liabilities are, particularly I would focus on the 03:48:4316 shareholders' equity, which is really a balancing of the 03:48:5017 assets that are in excess of liabilities drops down to your 03:48:5418 shareholder equity. 03:48:5719 As I suggested in my hypothetical in understanding 03:49:0020 what is an appropriate number to punish but not to eliminate 03:49:0421 from the marketplace, it would be critical to know what the 03:49:0722 assets and liabilities are, what the relative relationship 03:49:1023 between the two is. And I think the best barometer of that 03:49:1324 for a jury determination of financial condition is the 03:49:1725 shareholder equity number. We have none of that in the

03:49:21 1 03:49:22 2 03:49:31 3 03:49:34 4 03:49:36 5 03:49:36 6 03:49:53 7 03:49:56 8 03:49:59 9 03:50:0210 03:50:0711 03:50:1212 03:50:1913 03:50:2314 03:50:3115 03:50:3616 03:50:4117 03:50:4418 03:50:4819 03:50:5420 03:50:5821 03:51:0322 03:51:0723

03:51:1024

03:51:1325

record.

I find that profits alone, even if Ms. MacGowan's testimony is credited fully, and I think there are enough caveats to question the worth of her testimony, to question the basis for her testimony — worth is not a good word — but to question the ten to 20 percent figure, that still doesn't tell you what the overall financial condition is and it doesn't serve as a surrogate for knowing what the assets and liabilities are.

Similarly, revenues don't tell you enough to assess the financial condition. The company may have large revenues but little or no profit. A company may have large revenues but a very small profit margin.

Compare the typical profit margin at a grocery store to a business that has high markups. A grocery store typically has about a one-percent-of-revenue profit. Other businesses are much more. Therefore, the revenues don't tell you much unless you know what the profitability is.

All we have before us is the National financial statement prepared by Price Waterhouse. I think what the Court in Tomaselli said about the inadequacy of a similar piece of data for the parent corporation in that case is true here.

The Court analyzed the facts. This annual report -- at 1283: This annual report is a consolidated

03:51:19 1 financial statement for the parent company and all of its 03:51:22 2 many subsidiaries. However, the annual report contains no 03:51:24 3 separate information on appellant's financial status. 03:51:26 4 Instead, the annual report was for the parent company and 03:51:30 5 encompassed the assets, revenues, and profits from a host of 03:51:33 6 businesses such as consumer lending, commercial lending, 03:51:43 7 leasing, real estate services, investment management, life 03:51:47 8 insurance, et cetera, which are wholly unrelated to 03:51:50 9 appellant's business. The only part of the annual report 03:51:5410 even remotely germane was a section summarizing the 03:51:5811 financial status of something described as the Transamerica 03:52:0012 Insurance Group. I think the same could be said of Exhibit 557 03:52:0313 03:52:0714 where the revenues are broken out in a similar number of 03:52:1415 disparate categories. 557 at page 3, insurance premiums, 03:52:2016 policy and contract charges, net investment income, net 03:52:2317 realized investment gain, losses, change in value of trading 03:52:2718 equities, mutual fund commissions and fees, other income. 03:52:3219 The same melange of revenue sources that was illustrated in 03:52:3720 Tomaselli has its parallel at page 3 of Exhibit 557. 03:52:4321 For all the foregoing reasons, I find that no reasonable jury could come to a conclusion as to what the 03:52:4822 financial condition of LSW is. Absent an affirmative 03:52:5023 03:52:5524 showing of what the financial condition is, Adams vs.

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Murakami makes clear that there is a failure of proof on

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03:53:00 1	punitive damages. Accordingly, the Rule 50(a) motion is
03:53:06 2	granted as to the punitive damage claim.
03:53:14 3	Okay. Anything else before we turn to the
03:53:16 4	instructions?
03:53:17 5	MR. BROSNAHAN: I think nothing else before we
03:53:19 6	turn to the instructions.
03:53:24 7	THE COURT: Okay. Then why don't we all gather up
03:53:24 8	and head to the jury room.
03:53:24 9	(Proceeding adjourned at 3:53 p.m.)
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03:53:24 5	CERTIFICATE
03:53:24 6	
03:53:24 7	I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753,
03:53:24 8	Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and
03:53:24 9	correct transcript of the stenographically reported
03:53:2410	proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the
03:53:2411	transcript page format is in conformance with the
03:53:2412	regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
03:53:2413	
03:53:2414	Date: April 25, 2014
03:53:2415	
03:53:2416 03:53:24 03:53:2417	/s/ Sharon A. Seffens 4/25/14
03:53:24 03:53:2418	SHARON A. SEFFENS, U.S. COURT REPORTER
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